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I declare that this thesis is my ovn twrork, 




When I have applied my mind to politics so that I might 
examine what belongs to politics with the same freedom of 
mind as we use for mathematics, I have taken my best pains 
not to laugh at the actions of mankind, not to groan over 
them, not to be angry with them, but to understand them. ' 
Spinoza, Tractaus Politicus (1675-77; chap. 1: 4) 
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One Zot'cogitates on the way of religion, 
Another ponders on the path of mystical certainty; 
But I fear one day the cry will go up, 
ýOh you fools, neither this nor that'is the way: 
' 
( The Ruba'iyat Of Omar Khayyam, Translated By Peter Avery 
and John Heath-Stubbs). 
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ABSTRACT. 
The primary objective of this thesis is to study empirically 
Iran's foreign policy from the inception of the Second World 
War in September 1939 to the collapse of the Azarbayijan 
Government in December 1946, with particular emphasis on 
domestic politics whose international dimensions frequently 
determined the core of Irants foreign policy. This study reveals 
a striking consistency in the original pattern of Iran's foreign 
policy, although after the debacle of Rizä Shah various 
antagonistic forces appeared on the Iranian political scene as 
well as the presence of foreign troops in the country. 
The study begins with an analysis of Rizä Shäh'-s policy of 
neutrality, which was adopted soon after the outbreak of the 
war, and Iran's relations with Germany, the Soviet Union, and 
Great Britain during the last two years of his reign. It is 
suggested that the policy of neutrality was the best policy to 
be adopted at the time, and at the same time it was the only 
policy left to the Iranian Government, because none of the 
belligerent powers approached the Government with a view of 
entering into an alliance with Iran. 
After the Anglo-Russian occupation of Iran, a tripartite 
treaty of alliance was concluded between Iran, Britain, and 
Russia, according to which Iran officially became allied with 
those two powers. Under this treaty, Iran declared support for 
the Allies' cause. But at the same time she pursued her 
undeclared policy which was to keep her relations with the Axis, 
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in particular with Germany, through a number of secret pro- 
Axis organisations set up inside the country with Berlin 
connections. I have called this undeclared policy "the last 
policy of reinsurance with the Axis". When the fortunes of the 
war began to turn against Germany, Iran also began to abandon 
the last policy of reinsurance by declaring war against Germany, 
but at the same time she started a search for another power 
in order. to compensate for the loss of Germany. In other 
words, Iran was anxious to keep the original pattern of her 
foreign policy unchanged - only Germany would be replaced by 
another thrid power. This time the natural choice for Iran 
was the United States to take over the position of Germany in 
Iran's politics. 
Sensing this "new" development - Iran's search for a third 
power- the Soviet Union found the moment opportune to set up a 
regime in the north on the Soviet model. To achieve this aim, 
the Soviet Government first began with a revival of an old 
claim concerning petroleum rights in the Dasht-i Kavir-i 
IChüriyan area, and later, with a demand for an oil concession 
in avast area in the north, stretching from Äzarbäyijän to 
Khuräsän. Once having failed to obtain the concession, the 
Soviet Government encouraged and supported the establishment 
of the Azarbayijan Government which collapsed after one year. 
Once more Iran's calculated and diligent foreign policy succeeded 
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INTRODUCTION TO THE SOURCES 
`To carry out this research I had to build up a conceptual 
framework as a guide line., Like any research of this naturei 
a number of hypotheses and questions had to be put before and 
during the research in order to find out their proof and 
answers by empirical gains. Without this conceptual framework 
it would have been like wandering about in a Kavir (desert) 
of documents, whilst lacking a chart or compass to attain the 
journey's end. 
The core of this framework was to find answers to the 
question of how foreign policy originates and evolves, 
particularly in a developing nation-state. 
Foreign policy does not originate in a vacuum. Is it the 
internal politics that dictate it or is it a number of policies 
formulated as a response to external behaviour in an international 
system? The answer would be "a combthation of both". But we have 
to differentiate between the foreign policy making of big powers 
and that of small, underdeveloped nation states. In the case of 
the latter groups, foreign policy often originates entirely 
from domestic politics. The chief objective öf'the foreign 
policies of these nations is twofold: (a) to preserve their 
territorial integrity, independence and security, and (b) to 
achieve, if possible, a greater degree of economic development. 
Most of these nation states do not even have regional interests, 
let alone continental or global ones. In those nation states 
which have highly personalised authoritarian regimes, foreign 
policy is often formulated as to protect the ruler or the 
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govering elites, and also to give them a free hand to deal 
with internal security. The threats to internal security 
are domestic in origin or emanate from the attitude of 
neighbouring powers. Therefore, it is mainly the domestic 
situation which dictates foreign policy in these countries 
where, like anywhere, it is also influenced by the characteristics 
of the ruler or the country's elite. But in these countries 
this influence is almost deterministic in shaping their foreign 
policies, because, unlike the developed nation states, the 
voice of the media, public opinion, and the opposition is 
virtually non-existent. The foreign policies of Rizä Shäh, 
Nehru, Nasser and the late Shah are perhaps the best examples, 
without mentioning Idi Amin, Jean-Bedel Bokassa and Pol Pot. 
Therefore, there is always the danger that a foreign policy 
analyst who is obsessed with analysing the interaction rather 
than the action of a nation state in the international system 
(i. e the domestic sources of its foreign policy are ignored), 
will lose his way. To minimise this danger, an attempt has 
been made in this research to put emphasis on domestic affairs 
or politics (e. g, the characteristics of elites,. political 
parties, the Najlis, elections, the cabinets, the Court, etc'. 
) 
wherever it has seemed necessary. For instance, I have 
discussed at length the pro-Axis organistations in Iran. 
Without knowing about the strength, influence, and structure 
of these organisations, it would be difficult to comprehend 
exactly why the Iranian Government pursued a pro-Axis policy. 
However, in the case of Iran, this research shows that 
her foreign policy did not evolve exclusively out of the domestic 
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politics, but external factors also influenced its development. 
Typical examples of these external factors were the traditional 
Soviet menace to security and territorial integrity of Iran, 
and the Anglo-Russian rivalry in that country. 
In short, I have approached Iran's domestic politics, 
in this researoh, not as a subject in itself, but as one of 
the factorsfor the shaping of her foreign policy. 
This thesis draws almost entirely on primary sources. 
These sources are divided into unpublished and published 
materials., The unpublished sources have been collected from 
the Public Record Office (PRO) and the India Office Library 
and Records in London. I also succeeded in obtaining a limited 
number of photo-copies of Iranian documents, for the years 
1939-1941, from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. But when in 
the summer of 1979 I referred to that Ministry for further 
research into their documents, permission was not granted, 
The Foreign Offices unpublished materials used here are 
listed under P0371 and P0248 (Persia, 34) and kept at the PRO. 
Most of the files for the period 1939- 1946, inclusive, under 
F0248 (Embassy and Consular Archives) are closed for fifty 
years, and those which are open, contain similar or identical 
documents to those under F0371. There are also many single 
documents and a number of files under-F0371 that are closed 
for fifty or seventy-five years. But, on the whole, they hardly 
exceed two percent of the'total volume of documents, kept 
at the PRO for this period, Apart from these, there are files 
kept at the India Office and Records under L/P&S/12. Here again, 
most of the documents are identical to those of the PRO. They 
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are reproduced copies of documents which were repeated to 
India by the FO, DO or the British embassies through the 
10 and vice versa. However, where I have had indentical 
documents from the PRO and IOL, the PRO (F0371) file has 
been given as the reference. The file numbers in the 
bibliography are strictly those I have read and used for 
this research. 
The published primary materials used here can generally 
be divided into two groups. The first group contains documents 
from the German 2oreign Ministry, the Australian Department 
of Foreign Affairs, and the US State Department. The second 
group includes publications from the UN, the Iranian Foreign 
Ministry, the Azarbayijan Government, Royal Institute of 
ti 
International Affairs, the British Government, Hansard, and 
a number of books containing documents - all listed in the 
bibliography. 
The German and Australian documents cover the 1939-41 
period. The US State Department's materials on Iran are 
the most. voluminous in comparison with the other two sources. 
But the US documents cover the period 1940-47 with over two 
thousand pages in seven volumes. The volumes on the Potsdam 
Conference, Malta and Yalta, and Cairo and Tehran Conferences 
must be added to this list', 
The most interesting but perhaps difficult part of this 
research was the comparative study of these materials from 
different origins, particularly the comparison between the 
documents of the British Foreign Office and the US State 
Department. Many cases could be found in which the legations 
of these two countries had reported on identical events or 
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topics from Tihran, each giving its own interpretations, 
comments and verdicts which often contradicted those of 
the other. In these case, s I have tried in this thesis to 
draw balanced conclusions. This double checking is almost 
totally absent in the existing literature in this field, 
particularly in Ramazani's book (Iran's Foreign Policy 
1941-1978) which is supposed to be the only systematic 
study of Iran's foreign policy. 
It must be mentioned that there was less cohesion 
in views expressed by the US Legation reporting from Tihran 
than the British Legation during this period. This was 
probably because the US State Department appointed two 
Ministers and two Ambassadors between 1939 and 1947 Dreyfus, 
Morris, Murray, and Allen), whereas Sir Reader Bullard, the 
British Minister and Ambassador in Tihran was only replaced 
by Sir John Le Rougetel in early 1946, neither of whom have, 
however, left any diaries or memoires. 
The Iranian newspapers and periodicals have furnished 
this research with valuable information on events, policies 
of the Government, political parties, and personalities. 
Between 1941 and 1947, some 464 dailies, weeklies and monthlies 
appeared in Iran, mostly in Persian but some in Turkish, 
Armenian, English, French, Kurdish, Russian and Polish as 
well. To plough through all these papers was impracticable, 
if not impossible. But to=find. them all under one roof was 
indeed impossible. Some were kept at the Press Library of the 
Central Library of Tihran University, some at the library of 
the Faculty of Law and Political Science of the same university, 
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and some in the Milli and Najlis libraries. However, a 
number of these papers could not be found on the shelves 
of these libraries. Access was granted to me to read them 
in the private collections and libraries of friends who 
gave me the opportunity and who will, however, remain 
anonymous as well as those I informally interviewed. 
The article ("The Iranian Press, 1941-1947") by 
Professor Elwell-Sutton was very helpful in this research. 
It provides the reader with a short history of each paper 
and its ideological leaning. Considering the number of 
newspapers, it was, therefore, decided to select, in the 
first stage, a number of newspapers listed in the article 
The Iranian Press) from each political range: the rightist, 
neutrals, and the leftists. This selection contained the 
names of almost sixty newspapers, but only forty-five could 
be found in practice. Yet, to find all the issues of each 
paper(listed in: the bibliography) was impossible. Either most 
of these papers had been suppressed at least once between 
1941 and 1947; hence there was a gap between issues, or in 
almost all of the collections at those libraries, a number 
of issues of each newspaper were missing. Reading these 
newspapers one should, however, be sceptical. 
Secondary sources include a vast range of books and 
articles relevant to the period under study as well as a number 
of books which provide a general study of foreign policy. 
Khatirahä (Memoires) edited by Ismä'il Välizäda is a 
collection of memoires of twenty-eight Iranian statesmen 
who served under the Pahlavis. Each memoire sheds light on 
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obscure or untold moments of the modern history of Iran, 
and each has naturally its own bias. As a whole, the book 
is a unique collection of memoires and documents in Persian. 
Asirän is the name of a book by Nürulläh Lärudi, an 
employee of the Iranian Finance Ministry in Shiraz in 1942 
who was arrested and interned by Iranian and British 
authorities for his pro-Axis activities. The book contains 
interesting information about the other internees and the 
internment camps. It is a stream of coarse invectives. 
Aussenhandel und Aussenwirtschaftspolitik des Iran by 
Abc azl Adli is a very good analysis of Iran's foreign trade 
and policy between 1930 and 1960. The author discusses from 
an economic point of view without making politically biased 
comments. The book is abundant in statistical tables and 
materials for the period 1930-1960. 
Unlike the above book, Die Wirtschafts-und Handelsbezie- 
hungen Zwischen Iran und dem nationalsozialistischen Deutschen 
Reich by Ahmad Mahrad discusses Iran's trade relations with 
the National Socialist regime of Germany during'Rizä Shah's 
regime from a political point of view. On the whole, the 
argument presented in this book is neither scientific nor 
cohesive. It is more or less a combination of the author's 
personal views, and a number of German documents which could 
be useful for other purposes. 
A recently published book by Ervand Abrahamian, Iran 
Between Two Revolution, deals with Iranian history and politics 
from the beginning of this century up to 1978-9. Perhaps the 
main and best part of the book is the part which covers the 
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period 1941-47, for which the author has had access to 
primary sources, e. g. the FO's documents. The book 
represents a Marxist interpretation of Iranian history, 
though the author seems to have adopted F. P. Thompson's 
neo-Marxist approach for his interpretation. As mentioned, 
the book generally discusses Iran's internal politics, but 
it, inevitably, covers parts of Iran's foreign relations 
as well. The main problem with this book is the author's 
confusion in putting facts and events in their proper place. 
For instance, Abrahamian attributes the bread riots of 
December 8 and 9,1942 partly to the opposition of the 
bazaar guilds to the tax bill drafted by Millspaugh (p. 183)" 
In fact, Millspaugh came to Iran at the end of January 1943 
and the tax reform bill was initiated months after his 
arrival. Therefore, there was no connection whatsoever 
between the bread riots of December 1942 and Millspaugh's 
tax bill. Again, Abrahamiarn states that Qavam"was willing 
both to print the necessary bank notes and arrest the pro- 
German officials" (p. 182). On the contrary, Qaväm was very 
reluctant to do so. 
The merit of the book is, however, its use of unpublished 
documents of the FO and documents from the US State Department. 
Had Abrahamian consulted more British and US documents and 
made a proper balance between them, his statements and 
conclusions would have been, perhaps, more accurate. 
An objective and analytical study of Iran's political 
history for the period 1939-1947 is represented in Modern Iran 
(Chapters 20-25) by Peter Avery. Although the book does not 
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directly discuss Iran's foreign policy, it provides an analysis 
of the domestic politics, which is vital for better understanding 
of the country's foreign relations. 
R. K. Ramazani's Iran's Foreign Policy 1941-1973 is the 
boolc which specifically discusses Iran's foreign policy. 
As its title suggests, the book deals with four decades of 
Iran's foreign policy. Consequently the period of 1939-47 
could not perhaps be discussed in a more elaborated form 
than the present one. The problem with this work, like 
many others, is the total reliance on one governmental 
primary source - US State Department's documents. The book 
gives the impression that it has been written mainly for 
American readers, and the emphasis has been put on Iran-US 
relations. Due to the lack of access to British documents, 
the author has frequently drawn biased or inaccurate 
conclusions. In spite of this short-coming, this work is the 
only systematic, study of Iran's foreign policy. 
Similarly, the Ph. D theses by K. Tabari, Iran's policies 
toward the United States During the Anglo-Russian occupation 
1941-1946, and M. Z. Partin, US-Iranian Relations 1945-1947, 
have relied totally on US documents and secondary sources. 
Both have exaggerated Anglo-Russian rivalry in Iran and put 
naturally too much emphasis on the role of the US in Iran's 
foreign policy. 
Russia and the West in Iran, 1918-1948 by G. Lenczowski 
is an old but useful book, part of which gives a descriptive 
as well as objective account of this period (1939-1947)" 
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General Arfa's memoire, Under Five Shahs, reveals 
less known facts, although some of them must genuinely 
be verified. 
A Russian view of this period has been given by M. S. 
V Ivanov, Neoveish-aya _istoriya Irana. 
Persian Oil, by L. P. Llwell-Sutton is an analytical 
study of Iranian oil history. But it also partly covers 
Iran's foreign relations during this period. The author 
is sympathetic to the Iranian cause. 
B. Rubin's book, Paved with good intentions, concentrates 
on US-Iran relations. The primary sources used in this 
book are American documents. The whole purpose of the 
book is to portray US relations with Iran in a very 
favourable way as a reaction, perhaps, to the prevailing 
anti-American feeling in Iran after the "revolution" of 
1978-9. 
An article (1942-1976: The Reign of Muhammad Riza Shah) 
by R. Greaves in Amirsadeghi's (ed. ) Twentieth Century Iran, 
covers part of the period 1939-47. It utilises unpublished 
primary sources from the FO and US State Department documents. 
The problem with this article is the selection of only those 
FO's documents which suited the purpose of the book which 
was sponsored by Amirsadeghi, a son, of the late Shah's 
chauffeur. 
There are many articles about Iran's politics and history 
published in well-known journals. Three articles on Iran's 
political parties of this period by L. P. Elwell-Sutton, 
F. Machalsky (booth in English), and G. D'Erme (in Italian) 
XX 
discuss the interaction between the parties themselves and 
the Government. The article by Machalski is very sympathetic 
to the Tuda Party, like the one by R. Shahshahani, The 
Background of the Iranian Affair. 
Abrahamian's article, Factionalism in Iran: Political 
groups in the 14th Parliament (1944-46), is an interesting 
study of the interaction between political fractions in the 
14th Majlis, which in fact constituted a new era-in the 
political life of Iran's Parliament. The uniqueness of this 
article is its use of unpublished primary sources of the FO. 
Another article by Abrahamian, Communism and Communalism 
in Iran: The Tudah and the Firgah-i Dimukrat, is a comparative 
sociological as well as political study of these two parties. 
The author concludes that these parties are different in origin 
and objective. This conclusion is of course debatable. It is 
known that those who were at first members of the Tüda party 
in Xzarbäyijan joined the Firga'i Dimukrat when it was founded 
in 1945. 
In connection with the role of the US in Iran's foreign 
policy, the article by Hess, The Iranian crisis of 1945-46 
and the Cold ZJar, exaggerates this role and the US involvement 
in Iran's affairs, while both articles by S. L. McFarland, 
A peripheral view of the origins of the Cold War: The Crises 
in Iran 1941-41, and J. Ph. Rosenberg, The Cheshire Ultimatum: 
Truman's Message to Stalin in the 1946 Azerbaijan Crisis, 
discount any US ultimatum to the Soviet Union over this crisis. 
An attempt had been made to list in the bibliography 
only those articles and books which were chiefly totally or 
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partly relevant to the period of this research. 
This thesis contains nine chapters, a conclusion, and 
five appendices. The first chapter discusses an analysis 
of Iran's policy of neutrality announced after the outbreak 
of the Second World War, and the country's relations with 
Germany, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain during the 
last two years of Rizä Shah's reign, and it also demonstrates 
how a foreign propaganda campaign was carried out in Iran 
during these years, and its effect on Iran's foreign policy. 
Chapter two discusses British-Soviet policies vis-a-vis 
Iran's policy of neutrality, and the secret negotiations carried 
on behind the scenes between Britain and Russia which resulted 
in the occupation of Iran in August 1941. 
Chapter three contains revealing facts on British policy 
with regard to the restoration of the Qajar dynasty after 
the collapse of Rizä Shäh, and it shows how this policy was 
not implemented after all. 
In Chapter four, an analysis has been given of Iran's 
foreign policy after Rizä Shah, the Anglo-Russian zones of 
occupation in Iran, the internal situation, and the conclusion 
of the Tripartite Treaty of Alliance between Iran, Britain and 
Russia in January 19112. 
Chapter five deals with the new developments in Iran's 
relations with the Allies, the Allies' demands which resulted 
in food and currency crises in 1942 and their adverse effects 
on Iran's policy towards Britain. 
Chapter six gives an account of Iran's relations with the 
Axis, the German plot and pro-Axis organisations in Iran. This 
XXII 
chapter discusses how and why Iran kept her close relations 
with Germany despite being officially allied with Britain 
and Russia by the treaty. 
Chapter seven, although discussing domestic politics, 
the elections of the Fourteenth MMajlis, which was not, 
however, totally free from British and Russian interference, 
and the return of Sayyid Zij , is an introduction for the next 
two chapters. The-Fourteenth Majlis influenced the shaping 
of Iran's foreign policy but it could not change its pattern, 
although it was an assembly filled with pro-Soviet, pro- 
British, pro-American, pro-monarchy, and neutral Deputies. 
Chapters eight and nine discuss the "new" trends in 
Iran's foreign policy: the rejection of the Soviet demand 
for an oil concession, and the Äzarbayijän crisis respectively. 
The general conclusion of these two chapters is to show how and 
why Iran's foreign policy evolved without its original pattern 
being changed.. 
Appendix one presents a short "who's who" of the Iranian 
statesmen and personalities who were instrumental in shaping 
or executing Iran's foreign policy from the early years of 
the present century until 19L+7. 
Appendices two, three, and five contain photo-copies 
of published and unpublished documents which have been given 
as further references. 
Appendix four is a supplement to Chapter seven. It can 
be itself expanded into a thesis. It is an alphabetical (Persian) 
list of the political parties and trade unions which appeared 
between 1941 and 1947 with a short description of each party 
XXIII 
or organisation. This appendix also contains an analytical 
list of the Fourteenth Majlis Deputies. 
With the exception of the name of the country "Iran"9 
all Persian names of people and places as well as words 
and sentences have been transliterated according to the 
system used by The Cambridge History of Iran. The Christian 
equivalents of the Iranian dates have been shown in brackets. 
Finally, in spite of being greatly enlightened and 
amused by the revealing facts kept inside the secret files, 
I have not been tempted to agree with Sardou, the 19th 
century French playwright, in whose play "Diplomacy" we are 
led to understand that the fates of nations are settled by 




I. Policy of Neutrality. 
I 
Soon after the outbreak of the Second World War in 
September 1939, the Iranian Government declared a policy 
of neutrality towards the belligerent powers, which was 
published and all foreign missions were so informed. 
The policy could fairly be described as a frantic 
neutrality. 
Some argued that the Iranian Government by adopting 
this policy, had, in fact, neglected moral issues involved 
in the war. This argument could, somehow, be justified. 
The British Minister, Bullard, in conversation with the 
Crown, Prince, showed that these issues made little appeal, 
if none, to the Iranian public and the Government. In his 
interview the Prince's attitude, Bullard described, was, 
roughly, that the war had been a nuisance and ought not to 
have been allowed to happen. 'Only Danzig' stood between 
the world and peace, the Prince remarked upon. He continued 
by saying that it was a great pity Germany had been , 
'driven 
into the arms of Russia'. Bullard believed that this 
represented in condensed form his father's - Rb Shah - 
view of, the war. Bullard wrote; 
r 
N4 
'... It was easy to show that something 
more than Danzig stood between the world 
and peace; and easy to quote the analogy 
of the last war when Germany would have 
welcomed peace proposals while she 
remained in possession of part of France 
and nearly the whole of Belgium. But his 
Highness was evidently nol convinced and 
became no more cheerful. ' 
The men, who had witnessed the fate of Iran in the 
last war, and were beginning to see the determination 
of the western democracies to fight fascism to an end, 
doubted the wisdom of adopting such a policy. 
The American Charge d'affairs, Engert, in Tihrän concluded 
the reason for taking that policy by the Shah was this; 
'... Self interest being the determining 
factor in the Shah's policy he dreads the 
thought of being obliged to sign any defensive 
pacts with either Great Britain or Russia. i2 
To describe the Shäh's policy merely based on 'self 
interest' is perhaps to do him an injustice. He had seen 
the last war during which Iran was quite unable, even had 
her Government so intentioned, to preserve her neutrality; 
each side violated Iranian territory, accusing the other 
of having begun it. Therefore, this alone had sufficed to 
make the Jiiah and his Government resolve to maintain 
strictly the declared neutrality. Thus the Government- 
controlled press was allowed to publish no independent 
comments on the progress of the war, but was forced to 
content itself with printing extracts from news agency reports. 
1. Bullard to Lord Halifax (Foreign Office, hereafter 
referred to as (FO). ), January 26,1940, E827, F0371/24570., 
2. Engert to Secretary of State (SOS), October 23,1939, 
Foreign Relations of the United States; Diplomatic paper, 
1940, p. 624. vol. I11. (Hereafter cited as US. F. R. ) 
3 
i 
Listening to foreign radios was officially forbidden 
in public places though little notice appeared to be 
taken of this edict except in Tihrän. For instance, 
to show its adherence to the policy, the Government 
went, even so far as to accomodate the representatives 
of the rival powers in two different halls at the 
inauguration of the new session of the twelfth Majlis 
on October 26,1939. The representatives of neutral 
countries were divided amongst the belligerent. 
3 
On the same occasion RiiR Shah announced his government 
policy towards the war, and added; 
'.... a subject for regret is the state of 
war in Europe. Although the policy of our 
government is one of absolute neutrality. '4 
II 
; During the period 1939 - 1940, the impression given 
by Iranian officials was that Iran would defend the policy 
if she had to resort to force or Iran would fight anyone 
who breached her neutrality. 
In early February 1940 there appeared in the Tihrän 
newspaper tItti1a at' an article in reply to articles 
which were alleged to have been published about the foreign 
policy of Iran in the Daily Telegraph and World Federation 
published in Tokyo. The former wrote, 'Iran is afraid of 
being attacked', while a certain Indian named Mahendra Pratap 
Rajah stated in the journal, that Iran and-Afghanistan should 
3. Bullard to Lord Halifax (FO), Feb. 10,1940, E 584/584/34, 
, 
FO 371/25581. 
4. Muzakirti Majlis shuray-i Milli, daura-yi Daväzdähum, 
'cited in Donald Wilber, Riza Shah, p. 193" 
i 
Lt 
go to war. Ittilä`ät's article, undoubtedly inspired 
by the government authorities, declared; 'if the 
Iranians have adopted a policy of neutrality it is not 
from fear -a word unknown to the descendants of their 
brave ancestors who made the plains of Central Asia 
resound with their cries- but from the desire to devote 
all their energies to the prosperity of the beloved 
fatherland. ' ... This spirit, however, will last only 
so long as the rights of Iran are respected by others. ' 
A day earlier than the article published, the 
Iranian Minister of war said to the British Military 
Attache, in Tihr.. n, that the time had come for both 
countries to discuss a common plan in order to save mutual 
interests, though he could not himself put the suggestion 
to the Shäh. He thought that it would come best through 
the diplomatic channel. 
Whether or not any connection existed between the 
Minister of war's conversation and the appearance of the 
article, was a matter of speculation. Bullard wrote: 'It 
is perhaps hardly a coincidence that this article appeared 
the day after the Minister of war's speaking "personally 
and confidentially" to the military attache to this legation. ' 
Then Bullard concluded, "This invitation, which could hardly 
have-been made without the Shah's approval, is remaining 
'private and confidential'. 
5 
5. Bullard to-Lord Halifax, secret, Feb. 6,1940, E 829/621/ 
34, FO 371/24582. 
5 
"Iran" newspaper of February 3,1940, published a letter 
to the editor, in which the writer implied that the 
concentration of troops in Khüzistän showed that Iran 
would be able to protect her neutrality and defend her 
frontiers against the evil intentions of foreigners. 
Obviously the object of the letter was to warn 
foreign powers to expect resistance if they attacked 
Iran. But the surprising point in the letter was that 
it had spoken of the military preparation in the south 
rather than in the north, whereas the immediate menace 
was from the north. According to Bullard's interpretation 
the object was after all to warn Russia, but to leave a way 
of retreat, so that if the Soviet Government asked about 
these boasted preparations, the Iranian Government might reply; 
"No, sir, I do not bite my thumb at you, sir; but I bite my 
thumb, sir. "6 
Nevertheless, the policy of neutrality was discreetly 
implemented. It was not until August of 1941, when Iran was 
occupied, that the need to initiate new diplomacy became far 
more discernible. 
An account, of Iran's relationships with Germany, the 
Soviet Union, and Britain, during the period of 1939-1940, 
may throw lights on events which led to the Anglo-Russian 
occupation of August 1941. 
6. Ibid. 
6 
II. Relations with Germany. 
I 
During the last years of'his reign, Riz. Shäh adopted 
a policy of intimacy with Germany. This policy could serve 
his two main purposes. Firstly, it would help the Shäh to 
proceed with his programme of industrialization, and, 
secondly, Germany could politically be played off against 
the Soviet Union. 
To serve the first purpose, Germany was welcomed to 
participate in various industrial projects, commercial 
activities, and trade in Iran, With regard to the second 
objective, Germany seemed to be the only possible choice 
of the Shah to offset the Soviet Union's pressure, because 
the United States' idealistic policies of non-entanglement 
and non-intervention, which were still as much applicable 
in Iran as in the 19th century, had made the Shah fully 
conscious of the political implications of such policies. 
As to Great Britain, her declining influences and prestige 
in Iran, becoming evident from the end of World War I, had, 
further decreased during ßiia Shäh's reign. Therefore, the 
remaining power was Germany who could act as a counter- 
balance to Iran's neighbouring powers, without showing any 
sign of apparent political interest in her affairs. 
7 
, 
The booming trade with Germany became apparent from 
the mid 1930's. 
7 Germany not only supplied Iran with 
industrial material and finished goods of all types, but 
also took by far the greater proportion of her exports. 
In the Iranian fiscal year of 1319'- March 21,1940 - 
March 20,1941 - Germany became the biggest exporter to 
Iran with a total of 370,630,604 Rls. ( £1,647,270 ), or 
41 percent of the total of commercial imports. In the same 
year Germany was the biggest buyer of Iranian produce, the 
total amounting to 67,405 tons, valued at 442,883,260 Rls. 
(26,748,180 ), a record figure, representing 47 percent of 
the total commercial exports. 
8 
7. (a) Abolfazl Adli demonstrates the increasing role of 
Germany in Iran's foreign trade until Hitler became 
the country's main trading partner by 1938-1939, see, 
Aussenhandel und Aussenwirtschafts politik des Iran, 
pp" 49-50,61,65-66 . (b) Yair Hirschfed, on the contrary, shows an analysis 
of a reduction rather than increase of Germany's 
role in Iran during the National Socialist as contrasted 
with the Weimar period, see, "German policy towards Iran: 
Continuit and Change from Weimar to Hitler, 1919-1939", 
pp. 117-141. 
(c) For Iran-Germany economic and trade relations during 
1933-1941, see also Ahmad Mahrad, Die Wirtschafts-und 
dem nationalsozialistichen Deutschen Reich. This book 
contains many documents about economic relations between 
the two countries. 
8. (ä) Tableau General, Iranian Customs Administration, 1319; 
, extracts 
in E 1178/35/34, January 22,1942. FO 371/31399- 
(b) G. Lenczowski notices that the share of German trade 
, was 
higher than the official figures published by the 
Iranian Government in, e. g., Statistique annulaire du 
Commerce exterieur de'l'Iran. Because the Iranian 
authorities did not count those German goods imported 
via Tribozond and Istanbul, or via England and India as 
German, but as Turkish, British or Indian, See, Russia and 
the West in Iran, P-157- 
(cl Russian analysis of the Irano-German trade has shown in 
M. S. Ivanov, Love isha a -istoew Irans (M. S. Ivanov, The Modern 
History of Iran), Persian Translation, p. 91. 
8 
As the result of Germany's economic performance and 
technical assistance, closer political relations were 
established between the two countries, but Rizä Shah never 
inclined Iran's foreign policy unduly to favour Germany. 
".... Hitler's occupation policies in Europe showed my 
father the dangers of ever allowing Iran to become a 
German satellite", wrote the late Shah, ".... a leader 
who: himself had authoritarian tendencies, my father- 
resented another dictator such as Hitler". 
9 
By the end of 1939 there was, however, a lag in the 
delivery of German goods in exchange for Iranian exports. 
The Iranian Government claimed that when the war broke 
out Germany was indebted to Iran under the clearing system 
of some 40 million Reichmarks. 
In September 1939, the Iranian Minister of Finance, 
Mahmud Badir10 expressed to the German Minister, Dr. Smend, 
the desire of his government to keep trade with Germany on 
at least the same level of 1938, even if possible to expand 
it. 
11 
But this could not be fulfilled while there was a 
transportation problem. 
The British Government's decision to seize German goods 
destined to Iran, had left the transit route by only way of 
Russia. Although Iran had a claim on Russia for the transit 
of Iranian goods according to the treaty of 1921, Russian 
9. Pahlavi, H. I. M. Mohammed Reza, Mission for my country, p. 67- 
10. See Personalities, Appendix I, p. 509. 
11. Smend to the Foreign Ministry (Germany), Sept. 6,1939, 
Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945 Series D, 
No. 14, vol. VIII, (Hereafter cited as German Foreign Policy), 
p. 13" 
9 
obstruction had, for many years, made the use of a 
such transit impracticable. 
To solve this problem Badir suggested that the 
transit problem should be solved through a Russo-German 
agreement. Subsequently, the German Minister assured 
Badir that, " everything would be done to maintain the 
level of German deliveries", and, efforts would be made to 
reach, an understanding with Russia in respect to the transit 
problem. 
12 
Such understanding reached between Germany and the 
Soviet Union on the basis of the Moscow Agreement of 
September 28,1939. And the Iranian Government was so 
informed. Although some members of the Iranian Government 
"felt grave doubts as to the dependability of the Soviet 
assurances regarding transit". 
13 
The problem of transit and trade with Germany were 
put to a lengthy cabinet meeting, with the Shah presiding. 
The Deputy Minister of Trade, Väsigl, 
l 
expressed his view 
on the Iranian Government that could no longer justify 
allowing the economy to gravitate towards Germany by 
preference to the extent provided by the Iranian-German 
15 
economic agreement concluded in l938. He believed that 
12. Ibid. f. n. (6). 
13. Memorandum by an Official of the Economic Policy 
Department, Berlin, Oct. 28,1939. German Foreign 
Policy, No. 312, vol. VIII, p. 353. 
14. See Personalities, Appendix I, p. 535 
15. German Foreign Policy, No. 312, op. cit. 
10 
Iran had to look for other markets and sources of supply, 
namely Japan and Italy. 
16 The Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
Muzaffar Alam; 
17 
while agreeing with Vasiql, voiced his 
fear of aggresive intentions of the Soviet Union towards 
Iran and Afghanistan. Badir, on the contrary, opposed 
the ministers, and emphasized that 11 it was absolutely 
necessary to adhere to the present policy". Finally, the 
Shäh rounded off the meeting by saying that "the political 
and economic policies with reference to Germany should be 
maintained as heretofore, unless it should be proved that 
this would be to Iran's disadvantage", 
18 
In October 1939, the British Government eased its 
policy in connection with the seizure of German goods 
destined to Iran. The British Minister gave assurances 
to the Government of Iran that his government would not 
confiscate German goods, even war material, being transported 
to Iran in neutral ships, if they had already become the 
property of the Iranian Government. This decision relaxed 
the tension among the members of the cabinet, though Badir 
suspected the reliability of such assurances. 
19 
On October 25, the Shah changed the cabinet, probably 
because of Badir's strong pro-German stance. Mahmüd Jam 
20 
16. Ibid. Italy and Japan had shown their willingness to 
take over important German deliveries and imports with 
all of the German stipulations. Particularly Japan was 
interested to take over the agreement of July 11,1939 
between Christian Dierid A. G. Langen-bielau, and the 
Iranian cotton Goods Company, according to which Germany 
had to import 10,000 tons of cotton in return for German 
cotton goods in an amount equal to the value of the raw 
cotton. 
17, See Personalities, Appendix I, p. 502.. 
18, German Foreign Policy, No. 312, op. cit. 
19. Ibid. 
20. See Personalities, Appendix It p. 515. 
11 
who had been the Prime Minister since 1935, was appointed 
as Minister of Court, the post vacant since the fall of 
Taimürtäsh. This appointment seemed likely to be one of 
honour rather than great influence. Badir was replaced 
21 
by General Amir Khusrauvi, the Governor of the Bank 
Milli, with whom he had carried on a long contest for 
control of the Government's financial operations. 
The new cabinet was formed by Dr. Ahmad Matin. Daftarl, 
22 
the youthful Minister of Justice in the former cabinet. 
II 
During 1940 the German policy concerning the delivery 
of arms did not change. Hitlers Government was aware of 
the short-term benefit of the Shah's neutrality since the 
Germans believed that the British wished the war to be 
spread to the Middle East. The Germans also believed that 
Rizä Shah would only maintain this policy if his army was 
strong enough. 
The Army had been equipped almost entirely by Skoda 
and Brno, the Swedish firm of Bofors. The Shah had 
endeavoured to buy armaments from small states which were 
not in a position to exert undue influences on Iran. But 
the disappearance of Czechoslovakia and the subsequent 
take over of Skoda works by the German-firm, Krupp, was a 
severe blow to the Shah, and he became even more dependent 
21. See Personalities, Appendix I. p. 504. - 
22. See Personalities, Appendix I, p. 532. 
12 
on Germany than before. Therefore, he needed Germany's 
aid with respect to material for the expansion of the Army. 
The conclusion of the trade agreement with the Soviet 
Union in March 1940 assured Germany of the Shah's good 
intentions in reducing tensions in this part of the world. 
The German Minister wrote to Berlin: 
"I ani convinced that, especially since 
the conclusion of the treaty with the 
Soviet Union, Iran is in fact a valuable 
guarantor for preventing the spread of 
war in the Middle East. There is no doubt 
as to the sincerity of the Shah's policy, 
and I urgently recommend every possible 
accomodation in the delivery of armaments". 
23 
The relevant documents show the shipments of arms 
to Iran were carried out throughout 1940.24 
III 
By the end of 1940, tensions arose among the members 
of the Iranian Government by the Berlin visit of Molotov 
in November. British propaganda in Iran operated with the 
slogan "Iran sold by Germany to the Soviet Union". 
This succeeded in disturbing official Iranian circles and 
merchants. The British slogan was not unfounded. Apparently, 
Iran was not discussed on that occasion. But the basic 
agreement between the two countries, concerning spheres of 
influence of the Axis powers and Russia, implicitly included 
that country. 
23, German Foreign Policy. Secret, March 19,1940, * 
No-3, vol. ]X, 1940, p. 17. 
24. German Foreign Policy. Microfilm, serials; 4809 
and 9662. 
13 
On November 13, the Reich Foreign Minister, von 
Ribbentrop put to Molotov the contents of the agreement 
outlined by him, and added that beside this agreement 
a secret agreement could also be concluded bstablishing 
the focal points in the territorial aspirations of the four 
countries. "The focal points in the territorial aspirations 
of the Soviet Union would presumably be centered south of 
the territory of the Soviet Union in the direction of the 
Indian Ocean". 
25 
The outline of this 'secret agreement' was vague. 
It did not specify Iran or Afghanistan and did not make 
it clear whether both were included in Soviet territorial 
aspiration. This vagueness was, of course, deliberate, 
because, the German Foreign Ministry felt that if 
unavoidable, Russia could have a foothold on the Indian 
Ocean through Afghanistan, British Baluchistan, and Iranian 
Baluchistan but not through Iran. 
26 
Upon his return to Moscow, Molotov submitted to the 
German Ambassador, Schulenburg, the Soviet counter proposals 
and amendments to the German draft. According to the Soviet 
Union proposals, the German draft " would have to be amended 
so as to stipulate the centre of the aspirations of the 
Soviet Union south of Batum and Baku in the general direction 
of the Persian Gulf". 
27 
Molotov received no reply from Germany in respect 
to the amendment. On various occasions, his enquiries about 
25. Secret, Nov. 18,1940. German Foreign Policy, No. 329, 
vol. XI, p. 565. 
26. Political Report, May 19,1940. German Foreign Policy, 
No. 277, vol. IX, p. 383. 
27. Top secret, Nov. 26,1940. German Foreign Policy, 
No. 404, vol. XI, PP- 714-15. 
14 
the lack of response were answered by the German 
Ambassador, explaining that Germany had to discuss the 
matter with her allies. But the truth was the German 
Government desire to avoid if possible any final 
formulation and commitment. 
However, the Iranian Government's tension slackened 
when the German Minister, Ettel, in Tihrän assured the 
Government that Iran had not been discussed at the time 
of Molotov's visit to Berlin, and that propaganda was 
part of British intri: gLre-s, 
, 
15 
III. Relations with the Soviet Union. 
I 
Still, when the war broke out, the commercial 
agreement which had lapsed in 1938, had not been concluded 
between the two countries. 
The origin of this dispute must be sought in the 
economic treaty of August 27,1935, of which different 
interpretations were made by the two countries. In June 
1939, the Iranian Government informed the Soviet authorities 
that they no longer considered the treaty to be in effect. 
For many years Russian markets had been a natural 
outlet for agricultural products of the northern provinces 
of Iran. This dependence on Russian purchases had grown 
since the beginning of the century so that Russia's share 
in Iran's foreign trade in 1938, before the termination 
of the treaty, had reached an exorbitant figure of 38 
percent. Therefore, the Iranian Government, partly because 
of the adverse effects on the economy, endeavoured to 
re-open negotiations, through their Ambassador in Moscow, 
in late 1938, for a new trade agreement more in conformity 
with Iranian wishes. But they failed. Hence, the relations 
between the two countries further deteriorated. The outbreak 
of war made it advisable for the Iranian Government to 
approach, once more, Moscow for frosh mutual understanding 
on the basis of the treaty of 1935. The Iranian Government 
16 
proposed that the treaty of 1935 be put into effect 
until a new agreement had been negotiated. Moreover, 
the Government demanded that the principle of complete 
compensation should be made the basis of trade between 
the two countries. The Soviet Government rejected it 
and asked Iran to abolish the quotas on Soviet imports, 
allowing them to make purchases from individuals or firms 
direct instead of from the Iranian monopolies. It was 
blatantly obvious that the Iranian Government could not 
concede to such an inexorable demand, partly because of 
its political implications. 
However, the negotiations dragged on for months 
with little hope of success, In October 1939, the Iranian 
Foreign Minister approached the German Minister, requesting 
Germany to exert pressure to bear on Russia in Moscow and. 
possibly from Berlin "so that they would arrive at n 
economic understanding with Iran". 
28 Germany weloomed the 
Iranian request. The Reich Government considered that 
economic co-operation between Iran and Russia would 
eventually benefit German - Iranian trade. Mpreover, they 
realized that the growing tension between Iran and Russia 
.. S 
i A, 
might lead the latter to resort to an agressive ät: c
lion 
against Iran, such action would doubtless drive her into 
the hands of the British; i. e., Germany's enemy. Therefore, 
Germany seemed to be particularly concerned to see less 
28, German'Foreign Policy, No. 312, op. cit. 
17 
friction between Iran and Russia. A German official 
wrote: 
".... considering Turkey's strong ties 
with England and France it appears 
politically especially important at 
this particular moment to continue 
to strengthen Iran in her absolute 
neutrality for the time being. Should 
the Soviets pursue aims with reference 
to Iran bound to affect Iranian 
neutrality, it would be advisable for 
Germany to make representatives in 
Moscow that these be abandoned". 29 
However, the German Ambassador in Moscow was 
informed of the Iranian request. He consented to cooperate 
on the ground that " such cooperation would naturally stop 
whenever support of the Iranians would affect adversely 
German-Russian relations". 
30 
In October, there appeared the conclusion of a new 
commercial treaty that would be seen soon between the two 
countries. But the latest formulation of fresh demands 
by the new Russian Ambassador, Matveir Y. Filimonov, in 
Tihrän, concerning the release of all communist prisoners 
and the use of Russian oil in the northern provinces of 
Iran, once more hampered the cönclusion-6f a treaty. 
31 
Meanwhile, rumours were current that the Soviet Government 
had also demanded recognition of Russia's "special rights" 
in Äzerbacßjän and Gilän, oil concessions and even air base. 
32 
The Iranian Government did not deny these. 
29. Ibid. 
30. Ibid. 
31. Engert to the SOS, Oct-39 1939" US P. R., vol. III, 
19+0, p. 621. 
32. Ibid. 
18 
Tensions between the two countries continued soaring. 
The Iranian Government kept a wary eye on Russia. The 
Soviet's attack on Finland on November 29, caused great 
uneasiness among the Iranian officials. They realised 
that the Soviet Union would turn to-Iran next. For instance, 
the Iranian Minister of Finance, Khusrauvi,, whose wife was 
Russian, expressed his deep fear of Russia by saying: 
.... the news from Finland was again 
causing the Government to take an 
extremely grave view of the immediate 
outlook.... although Iran had furnished 
no pretext whatever for a change in 
her relations with Moscow, all Iranian 
overtures towards a commercial agreement 
had recently been coldly rejected.... 
with an eye on Kirkuk and the Iranian. 
oil fields Moscow would doubtless like 
to accuse Iran of resisting legitimate 
Soviet demands because encouraged by 
the British to do so presumably in 
order to become a base for the invasion 
of Russia". 33 
To the Iranian Government almost every moment seemed 
to develop new embarassments. Between 16th and 21st 
December the Soviet Union's media had ignored all new 
developments of the war but Stalin's. birthday. Messages 
of congratulations were pouring into the country. Rila 
Shah apparently missed the occasion, and his message was 
not sent until New Year's Eve. 
The beginning of 1940 signalled improvements in 
solving the deadlock with respect to the negotiations of 
f 
33. Conversation with Engert, December 1,1939, US F. R. 
vol. III, 1940, p. 625. 
I 
19 
the treaty. The failure of Russia to consolidate the 
authority of her puppet government in Finland, and its 
eventual collapse, had softened Russia's attitude towards 
the negotiations with Iran, although it had not eradicated. 
Russian pressure on Iran whatsoever. For instance, when the 
representatives of the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey, 
Lawrence Anderson, arrived in Tihrän in, late December 
1939 to seek an oil concession, he discovered that the 
Iranian Government were prepared to negotiate the grant 
of oil concession in any area but the North. He was 
eventually informed by the Prime Minister, on January 11, 
that the Government had decided not to grant any oil rights 
to any company "in view of the uncertainties of the 
international situation while the war lasts. " Later on, 
the Prime Minister informed the American Charge d'affaires 
that for "political reasons" he had been obliged to give a 
negative reply to the Standard Oil application. 
34 But in 
fact the Soviet Union had warned the Iranian Government 
that they would not permit granting of oil rights to an 
American company "anywhere in Iran". 
35 
However, it was not until March 12 that the new 
commercial treaty was initialed in Moscow and signed on 
March 25, in Tihrän. The Iranian Government claimed 
diplomatic victory over the signature of the treaty which 
34. Engert to SOS, Jan. 17,1940. US F. R., vol. III, 1940, 
pp. 660-61. 
35" Engert to SOS, May 5,1940. Ibid, p. 661. 
20 
took place in Tihran instead of Moscow. The instantaneous 
outcome of that was obvious slackening of tensions between 
the two countries. 
The mere fact that the conclusion of a new treaty 
took almost two years can be found in Russia's wanting an 
agreement of much wider scope than a simple commercial 
treaty. Moscow had several times hinted that it desired 
a so-called non-aggression pact or even a military alliance. 
Her lack of success in the Finnish War had stiffened the 
Iranian attitude towards Moscow, who adopted a firmer tone 
and avoided being drawn into political discussions. It was 
believed that Britain and Turkey lent their moral support, 
and advised the Iranian Government to concede to Russian 
demands within her independence and integrity. 
36 
The terms of the treaty were not immediately revealed. 
The British Minister in Tihrän wrote to London that nothing 
striking was contained in the treaty. 
37 
But clauses 5(d), 
and 9 (8) of the treaty, 
38 
which gave the Russian trade 
representatives diplomatic immunity, and the right to 
establish petrbl stations respectively, were a source of 
anxiety for the members of the Iranian Government. It was 
suspected that the Soviet Union would eventually abuse these 
rights, and exploit them for propaganda aims. 
Moreover, the Iranian Government did not mention any 
secret clause, but it appeared certain promises were given 
36. Engert to SOS, April 17, Ibid. p. 629 
37" Bullard to Lord Halifax (FO), March 27,1940. 
E 1545/621/34, FO 371/24582. 
38. For the full text of Trade and Navigation Agreement, 
see, Degras (ed. ), Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy, 
1933-1941, vol. 112, pp. 424-35. 
21 
during the negotiations. The American Charge d'affaires 
confirmed that the Soviet Government had been granted 
"the right to use if and when required seven'Iranian 
landing fields and one at Khwash near the Afghanistan 
frontier", 
39 
and numbers of 'muhäjirs', expelled from 
Russia, had been employed by the Iranian Air Force as 
interpreters. 
4o 
Finally, in relation to the Russian demand for the 
abolishing of the quotas system, the Iranian Government, 
in April 1940, created, as a face saving policy, a new 
Economic Section in the Ministry of Finance, whose function 
was to take over the direction of the government monopolies 
and to make purchases and to sell without inviting bids. 
II 
The Irano-Russian detente was short-lived. The Soviet 
Government began to bring pressure to bear on Iran. Their 
unfriendly attitudes were the main topic of the Iranian 
officials in their meetings with the British, American, 
and German Ministers. The German Minister, on one occasion 
enquired about instructions to mediate between those 
countries. He received a negative reply from Germany, 
41 
The British and American Ministers believed that both the 
Russian and German Legations in Tihrän, were closely 
39" Engert to SOS, May 10,1940. US F. R., vol. Ill, p. 631. ` 
40. Engert to SOS, May 6,1940. Ibid, p. 630- 41. Ettel to the Foreign Ministry Berlin), July 9,1940. 
German Foreign Policy, No. 141, vol. X. See, f. n., for 
the Berlin reply, pp. 169-70. 
22 
collaborating, of course with different motives, to 
un-nerve the Iranian Government, and "to represent 
Great Britain as wishing to use Iran as a cat's paw 
for an attack on Baku, after which she would leave Iran 
to her fate . 
42 
In July 1940, it appeared that Russia had formulated 
new demands. The demands included: (i) the cession or 
occupation by Soviet troops of northern Azerbayija_n and 
Tabriz, part of Gilan and of Gorgan to the Gurgä. n River, 
and Bandar Shäh on the Caspian Sea, (2) control of the 
trans-Iranian Railway to the Persian Gulf, and (3) use 
of all Iranian aerodromes, 
43 
In pursuit of his policy, 
Riia Shah, desiring Iran not to become a protectorate 
either in form or in fact, and stubborn when aroused, gave 
instructions to his Foreign Minister to refuse the Russian 
demands. He had a strong commitment to hold the northern 
provinces at all costs. 
44 
In November 1940, once again Russia's intention with 
respect to Iran, was revealed 
report that the Soviet Union 
blanche to German and Italian 
return for Turkish Armenian, 
northern Iran. 
45 
in the American Charge d'affaires' 
had promised to give carte 
projects in the Balkans in 
if it was considered vital, 
42, Bullard to Halifax, confidential, March 27,1940 
E 1545/621/34, FO 371/24582. 
43. Engert to SOS, July 18,1940. US F. R., vol. III, 
1940, p. 634. 
44. Engert to SOS, Aug 9,1940. Ibid. p. 635- 
45- Engert to SOS, Nov 19,1940. Ibid, p. 637 
23 
The Russo-German understanding, which was regarded 
as the source of many dangerous complications for the 
world, eventually, proved to be nothing but smoke-screen 
camouflage. As to Iran, the Iranian Under-Secretary for 
Foreign Affairs, Javäd¶Amiri, 
46 
said to the American 
Charge d'affaires that " no reliance whatever could be 
placed on Hitler's or Stalin's promises. or guarantees". 
47 
III 
The commercial treaty did not in fact, produce practical 
results. The Soviet Government, exploiting the-constrained 
position of Iran, were demanding too high prices for the 
goods required by Iran. Besides this, the Soviet Government 
were deliberately trying to hamper the conclusion of 
transactions, and then, to give the impression of a certain 
malevolence on the Iranian side. Indeed, what the Soviet 
Government desired to achieve was a political gain rather 
than an economic one. The reasons for this Russian unfriendly 
attitude towards Iran on the part of Russia has to be sought 
in her foreign policy; the Tsarist-Bolshevist concept of 
expansionism. 
Practically speaking, the Soviet Union could only utilise 
one of its important ports on the open sea; Murmansk. The 
46. See Personalities, Appendix I, p. 522. 
47. Engert to SOS, Nov. 29,1940. US F. R., vol. III 
1940, p. 637. 
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The other major ports, among them Vladivostok, were 
(are) situated on an inland sea or in seas which, from 
the point of view of political power, were virtually 
under the control of foreign States. The ancient aspiration 
of Tsarist Russia, Istanbul and the Straits, could no'-longer 
be considered as vital, Possession of the Straits would 
not fulfil the Russian aim, since she knew that even the 
Mediterranean had become an inland sea dominated by those 
who possessed its approaches. It was no longer worth while 
for the Soviet Union to strive to possess the Straits, 
because the only satisfactory outcome of that would be to 
make Russia a riparian country of the Mediterranean but 
otherwise would not give her access to the open warm waters. 
The shortest route from Russia to the warm ocean was 
through Iran. Moreover, this, the shortest route, had for 
transport the great advantage of a railway line which was 
in excellent condition. The trans-Iranian railway stretched 
from Bandar Shah, a port situated on the southern shore-of 
the Caspian Sea, via Tihrän, to the Karin Valley through the 
centre of the region where the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company 
(AIOC) had concessions to Bandar Shähpu-r on the Persian Gulf. 
A new branch linking Tabriz to Tihrän should have been 
completed in 1941 - it was not completed until 1957-8. 
Tabriz was already linked with Tiflis by a railway line 
built by Russia via the frontier crossing-point of Julfä. 
25 
and was connected with the Russian railway network. 
Another important Russian railway line running from Baku 
into the Aras Valley, except for a stretch of 12 Km., to 
Julfä, had been ready for operation in early 1940. 
In pursuit of her policy, Russia, in 1940, was 
observing the position of Britain vis-a, vis Germany. 
Any weakening of Britain on the European scene would 
automatically harm the British position in Iran, 
consequently the position of AIOC which was vital to the 
British Empire. The Soviet Government were fully aware of 
this fact, probably waiting for the appropriate, moment to 
take advantage in Iran of a British defeat. An article in 
'Izvestia' of May 16,1940, may illuminate the Soviet 
intention. The article said: 
"Any rational argument as to the 
legality or illegality of measures 
against small states in an area when 
the imperialist Great Powers are 
waging a life and death struggle can 
only be regarded as naive". 
This concept of the Russian foreign policy was as much 
applicable in 1940 as it is today, i. e, in Afghanistan. 
The Shah and his government were clearly'aware of the 
dangers which threatened Iran from the Soviet Union. They 
also knew that in the event of a British defeat the position 
of the country in relation to the northern neighbour would 
become very much more difficult owing to the jend of British 
counter pressure. So it was not astonishing, that the American 
26 
Charge d'affaires wrote: 
" The ultimate safety of Iran oddly 
enough is now considered closely 
linked with the British cause". 
48 
48, Engert to SOS, August 9,1940. Ibid. p. 635" 
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IV. Relations with Great Britain. 
In the modern political history of Iran', Britain is, 
perhaps, the only country whose diplomacy would fairly be 
described as ambivalent. Her policy during the period 
1900-1914 which covers the Iranian Constitutional Revolution, 
of encouraging and supporting the democratic elements which 
in spite of Russian opposition and persecution succeeded in 
setting up the Iranian Constitution enjoyed unbounded 
prestige. The immense popularity enjoyed by Great Britain 
as a result of adapting her policy to the exigencies-of 
Iranian Public Opinion was eclipsed by the short-lived 
Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907 which divided Iran into 
spheres of influence. 
During the war period, 1914-1918, British policy in 
Iran was mainly to combat German influence and intrigues. 
At the end of the war, though weakened, British power was 
still comparatively formidable after the Versailles Treaty 
in 1919. In the same year, Britain found herself almost 
the only foreign power in Iran, as Germany had been defeated, 
and the Soviet Union was in the turmoil of civil war. 
The conclusion of the treaty of August 19,1919, which 
was never ratified by the Majlis, was another severe blow 
to British prestige in Iran. Since then, Britain experienced 
sharp reverses, and it would not be an exaggeration to say 
28 
that during the whole of Rizä Shäh's reign British prestige 
was at its lowest ebb. 
At the outbreak of the Second World War the British 
Government decided to seize German exports to southern ports 
of Iran. This decision caused serious concern to the Iranian 
Government, and was regarded as a severe blow to the Shäh's 
industrialisation plans, since Germany was the only country 
on which the Shah had almost entirely depended for the 
materials necessary for those plans. Moreover, Britain was, 
unable to supply Iran with more than a small proportion of 
her needs. Therefore, the Iranian Government was both 
perplexed and indignant at the workings of policy under which 
in effect Iran was no longer able to trade with her best 
customer, and was not offered alternative export or import 
markets of any consequence. 
Nevertheless, in 1939; political relations between 
the two Governments seemed to be cordial, though there were 
disputes arising from the differences between the Iranian 
Government and the AIOC, for which the Shah held the British 
r.. 
Government responsible. 
The Iranian Government's shortage of money found 
expression in an inspired controlled press campaign against 
the AIOC. Accusations were made that the company was 
deliberately restricting the production, thereby cheating the 
Government. The British Government was regarded as the chief 
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controller over the operation of the company, whose aim was 
to curtail production in order to store reserves for the 
future. 
The Iranian Government's dependence on the oil revenues 
was such that this income played a most important part in 
the economic growth of the country, particularly in the 
budget, and according to some arguments, in the extra- 
budgetary services which came under the Shäh's personal 
direction. In 1939 the financial situation of Iran 
deteriorated, the Rial fell on the 'bäzär siyäh - Black 
bourse, from 140 to 175 in the pound sterling, despite all 
artificial measures taken to restrict its fall. - The budget, 
for the first time since 1928-29, showed a deficit amounting 
to 683,385,287 Rls. Therefore, any decline in oil revenues, 
which was watched with meticulous interest by the Shah and 
his government, would cause adverse effects on the national 
economy. 
Notwithstanding, the company refuted all the accusations 
and Lord Cadman visit Tihrän in June 1939, and had an audience 
with the Shäh. He was later followed by one of the company's 
directors, Jamdson, who flew to Tihrän and made a full 
explanation in person, on February 15,1940, to the Shäh with 
respect to the company's policy. These visits temporarily 
repaired good relations between the Iranian Government and the 
company but the company's results were under close and 
30 
continuous scrutiny. 
In consequence of the drop which took place in 1919, 
strong representations were made by the Government. The 
decline in comparison with 193849was some 800,000 metric 
tons, of which about 400,000 tons occurred during the 
second half of 1939 and could be attributed to the effects 
of war conditions. . 
The company owned 90 percent of tankers to carry its 
seaborne trade and the remaining 10 percent was provided 
by chartered tankers. At the outbreak of war the company 
had to place its vessels at the disposal of the British 
Government for the Allied requirements. Therefore, it 
suffered from the alienation of the greater part of its 
fleet from the services. The result was a substantial 
reduction in off-take from Abadan, thus a decline in the 
royalty paid to the Iranian Government. R11 Shah was 
determined to accept no excuse for the reduction of the 
royalty owing to the effect of war conditions on Iranian 
output. "... England must want Iranian oil", said the 
Shäh, " the whole world must want Iranian oil". 
50 
In early 1940 the Shah appointed a new Minister to 
London, the position which had not been filled for two 
years after the departure of Suhaill. The new Minister, 
Muhammad Mugaddam51, a pleasant but not a strong personality, 
49. Production for 1938 amounted to 9.254,794 tons. 
Source; AIOC, FO 371/24572,1940. 
50. Jameson to Fraser (to) the Foreign Office (FO), 
Feb. 23,1940. FO 371/24572. 
51. See Personalities, Appendix I, p. 533. 
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was the Master of Ceremonies at the Court. His appointment 
signalled the Shäh's desire for closer relations with 
Britain. He brought the Shäh's messages concerning the 
problem of oil royalty and supply of arms. In fact, the 
Shah's desire for British assistance had been implied in 
the forms of arms purchase. But he did not openly ask the 
British Government for a joint plan, which his minister of 
war had suggested to the British Military Attache in Tihrgn. 
The British Government, though sympathetic to the 
Shah's problems, was considering "what action should be 
taken to avoid the adoption" by its representative at 
Tihrän "of too discouraging an attitude to the Shäh, wit. hout, 
however, entering into any embarrassing commitments". 
52 
However, the War Cabinet prepared to send a declaration 
to Bullard to be read in person to the Shah. With regard 
r- 
to the question of royalty, the declaration sounded vague 
if not unsatisfactory. Whereas in the primary draft of the 
declaration, in which it had been decided to pay the Iranian 
Government the sum of £3,500,000 as the compensation from 
the beginning of calendar year 1939 until the calendar year 
in which an armistice with Germany was to be signed. This 
clause was, of course, dropped in the declaration to the 
Shah. 
52. From the FO to the Secretary of the Sub-Committee, 
War Cabinet, March 7,1940, FO 371/24570. 
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In the case of a possible Russian attack on Iran, 
the declaration had committed Britain to help Iran not 
in defence of the northern provinces but only of the AIOC's 
oil fields. 
53 
In the event of Russian air attack and reprisal 
actions by Iran, the declaration had promised "to employ a' 
bomber force in conjunction with French and Iranian Air 
Forces to attack the sources of Russian oil supply in the 
Caucasus". 54 Apparently the permission for the Allied 
bomber units to use the aerodrome at Tihrän had to be gained 
from the Iranian Government. 
In spite of that declaration, the War Cabinet had 
approved the report by Chiefs of Staff who reported: 
"(l) that as a land advance by Soviet 
forces through Iran to Iraq and 
the Iranian oil fields is improbable, 
the Soviet attack would be likely 
to take the form, (apart from 
subversive propaganda) of air action; 
(2) that if we were at war with the 
Soviet Union we should at once send 
to Basra a force to protect Basra 
and the Anglo-Iranian oil company's 
oil fields and refinery; 
but 
(3) that unless a Soviet air attack 
actually developed (or there were 
internal disturbances threatening 
the oil fields or refinery) we should 
not need to compromise Iranian 
neutrality by moving the force into 
Iranian territory; 
(4) that from the purely defensive point 
of view, therefore, we do not need 
to co-ordinate plans with the Iranian 
Government; .... it 
55 
53" Draft Amendment, secret, D. C. O. S. (40)36, March 1940. 
FO 371/24570. 
54. Ibid. 
55. War Cabinet paper, Feb. 27,1940. FO 371/24570. 
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The British Government, according to the Chiefs of 
Staff, saw no reason to supply Iran with 60 bombers and 
20 fighter aircraft, which the Shah had wished to acquire. 
56 
It was obvious that the declaration, in which the 
British Government endeavoured not to turn down too flatly 
the Shäh's requests nor to engage in any explicit 
commitments, could not-satisfy the Shah. He, in such a 
defenceless situation, desired some sort of guarantees 
over the oil revenues and arms delivery. His survival 
was partly dependent on those. The economic situation 
was worsening, and there were reports of bread shortages 
and unrest in parts of the country, particularly, in Tabriz. 
57 
The Shah could not carry out his industrialisation programme 
and defence preparations alongside such 'unreliable' British, 
who failed to comply with his demands, in spite of Bullard's 
strong recommendations sent to London for the most favourable 
economic treatment for the Shäh. 
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Hence, the Shäh began to 
look for other sources. He approached the United States to 
procure armaments, and to adopt the American system for the 
military, particularly for the Air Force which was equipped 
mainly by the British. At the same time, he began to bring 
more'prdssure to bear on the AIOC, thus, on the British 
Government. His decision to dismiss all the British craftsmen 
and technical advisers employed in the Iranian airplane 
factory, and, to engage Americans instead, was interpreted 
56. Ibid. 




by the American Charge d'affaires as another instance of 
Soviet pressure. 
59 
But it was most likely caused by his 
displeasure with the British Government, because, he then 
turned to the AIOC to gain a better deal. His argument, 
his minister in London asserted, was, "why should he 
suffer because the concession was held by a company whose 
government found itself obliged to interfere with the 
company's operations? It was only the fortuitous circumstance 
that the Company was a British company which involved him 
in these difficulties". 
6o. 
The Shah's fresh attitude towards the AIOC began to 
cause anxiety among officials of the Foreign Office, that 
the Shah might resort to take measures against the company. 
The Foreign Office reported to the Cabinet: 
".... Any move against the concession 
would clearly have a disastrous effect 
at this time, quite apart from what 
might happen to the oil supplies. 
The fact that a ruler like the Shah 
felt able to offend us at such a 
moment would be a blow to our prestige 
in the Middle East. Nor would the 
fact that we might feel obliged, and 
find ourselves able, to take the oil 
by force improve matters much. 
Apart from the handle for propaganda 
which this would give our enemies, ' 
our Iranian interests would suffer in 
the future and the clock would be 
put back in6many other Middle Eastern 
countries. " 1 
59" Engert to SOS, April 27,1940. US F. R., vol. III, 1940, 
p. 641: 
60. Horace Seymour (FO) to Bullard(Tihrän), March 6, 
1940. E 909/25/34, FO 371/24570. 
61. The FO to War Cabinet, March 1940, FO 371/24570" 
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The Foreign Office anxiety mounted when the Iranian 
Government made another strong representation to the 
company in late June 1940. 
According to the company's predictions, a decline 
in the production of oil recurred from the outset of 
1940, owing to the diversion of tankers from the Persian 
Gulf run to the American run, and the company's placing 
its tankers at the British Government disposal. This was, 
of course, contrary to the stipulations of Article 21 of 
the concession, 
62 
according to which the company was bound 
to abstain from any action which might be prejudiced to 
the interests of the Iranian Government. 
The Shah's irritation at the lack of good will shown 
by the British Government, which had also been reflected 
in the cancellation of the Credit Agreement 
63 
in June, 
was expressed this time by pressing the company to raise 
the royalty. On June 27,1940, the manager of the company 
was orally instructed by the Ministry of Finance that oil 
royalties for the quarter should be paid in gold which was 
to be capable of being remitted to the United States. The 
manager, on June 30, informed the Ministry that royalties 
had been paid in the usual form, and explained the 
impossibility of compliance with the Ministry demand. 
64 
62, For the text of the 1933 concession, see; League of Nations 
Official Journal, 14th year, No. 12,77th Session, December 
1933, pp. 1653-1660. 
63. The Agreement was signed between the Iranian and British 
Governments on February 6,1940, to enable Iran.. to make 
purchases in Britain up to £5 million. This credit had 
been secured on future oil payments. Full details can be 
found in E 540/31/34 and E 2155/51/34, FO 371/24572,1940. 
64, Bullard to FO, July 1,1940, No. 206. E. 2221/64/34, 
FO 371/24572,1940. 
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On the same line, the Minister of Finance, Khusrauvl, 
told the Tihrän manager of the AIOC that if the 
company failed, somehow, to satisfy the Government 
within a week, the cancellation of concession would 
be proposed to the Majlis on Sunday 7th, July. 
6!; 
On June 25, the Shah dismissed the Prime Minister, 
Dr. Matin Daftarl, who had acquired the reputation of 
being definitely pro-German. For this reason he had not 
reported to the Shah certain German propaganda and fifth- 
column activities of which he had been fully aware, and 
at which he connived. When the Shah realized: this, and the 
fact that his own position might be jeopardized by these 
activities he dismissed him, and publicly censured him in 
a speech to journalists and deputies of the Majlis on 
June 29. He and his-; two brothers and his father-in-law, 
Dr. Muhammad Musaddiq were arrested and detained. He was 
released after two weeks, while the others remained under 
detention. 
Matin Daftari's successor was Rajab °Ali Mansur. 
66 
It was, however, believed that this move had been to bring 
in a 'neutral cabinet' in order to appease Britain. 
65. Bullard to FO, No. 210, Ibid. 
66. See Personalities, Appendix I, p. 534. 
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The oil company welcomed the dismissal of Matin 
Daftari who was regarded as "pro-German amd consistently 
opposed" to the company's interests. In a telegram sent 
by the Company to Britannic House, the Company's 
headquarters in London, the British Government had been 
strongly urged to ease dollar exchange difficulties. 
The telegram also added: 
IV... '. Although previous Prime Minister 
and Minister of Foreign Affairs were 
consistently blocking Khosrovi in his 
efforts to support the company and 
British interests, I would emphasize 
his' former attitude and efforts in 
'extremely difficult local circumstances 
to avoid obstruction to our interests. 
The. new Prime Minister will probably 
support him if he can produce immediate 
gesture to take advantage of effort 
which is obviously being made by the 
Shah to thwart fifth column activities 
and to assert Iranian independence of 
Germans. I would emphasize new Prime 
Minister is sole remaining representative 
of that group which was habitually accustomed 
to former British predominating influence 
and whose records suggest that if encouraged 
he would be prepared to appreciate its value 
today". 67 
However. the genuine demand of the Shah and his 
government. could simply be found in the letter from the 
Ministry of Finance to the company, which was royalties 
at pre-war or higher rates together with full liberty to 
transfer funds to the United States at privileged rates. 
68 
67. Rice to BP, to Baggalay (FO), June 29,1940, 
confidential. E 2192/830/34, FO 371/24582. 
68. Letter No. 11.2985. Received FO July 17,1940 
E 2221/64/34, FO 371/24573,1940. 
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But the British Government were bewildered as to 
whether the Shah merely wished to blackmail the company 
into offering better terms or proposed to replace the 
AIOC by another company or by direct management. So, 
instructions were sent to Bullard to be conveyed to the 
Iranian Government, threatening that there were limits to 
the patience of the British Government, and if the 
unfriendly attitude remained unchanged the British 
Government would exercise complete control over all 
exports of oil from Iran. 
69 
It is not evident whether 
the threat alarmed the Iranian Government, but the Prime 
Minister, 'A1i Mansur, assured Bullard that the Government 
" 
had no intention of cancelling the concession. 
70 
Nevertheless, negotiations between the two sides 
carried on. Finally, the Chancellor of Exchequer approved 
the suggestion that the Iranian Government should be able 
to transfer into gold sterling received from all sources, 
subject to a total limit of £3 million. 
71 The Iranian 
Government, however, did not accept the offer as it was 
looking for a substantial deal in royalties. 
69. From the FO to Bullard (Tihrän), July 4,1940. 
E 2221/64/34, Fo 371/24573- 
70- Bullard to the FO, No. 215, July 5,1940. 
E 2221/64/34, FO 371/24573. 
Turkish Ambassador in Tihran implied the Iranian 
view on the same line in his conversation with 
Bullard, July 27,1940. E 2288/64/34, FO 371/24573- 
71- Baggallay to Bullard, July 6,1940. E 2221/64/34. 
FO 371/24573. 
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On July 7, Khusrauvi rehearsed, in the Majlis, the 
Government's grievances against the AIOC and its failure 
to fulfil Articles 10(5), 16('1), and 21 of the concession. 
He accused the company of the breach of promises that the 
production ought to have reached 14 million tons instead 
of diminishing. The only concrete proposal made in the 
Majlis was that the Government should demand either 
increased royalty at a fixed rate, regardless of output, 
or that the company should cede to the Government those 
fields which they could not exploit to the full. 
72 
The question of the cancellation of the concession 
was, however, not proposed to the Majlis, but the fear 
of it still lingered in the background. Meanwhile, another 
suggestion was made by the company that the Iranian 
Government should be offered an interest-free loan of 
some £42 million to which the British Government would 
have been asked to contribute. This offer was, of course, 
not communicated to the Iranian Government on the ground 
that the Shäh would, then, undoubtedly insist on the 
sterling being converted into dollars. An official of the 
Foreign Office wrote: 
72, For full text see, Muzäkirät-i Majlis, Daura-yi 
Daväzdahum, 16 Tir, 1319. Short extracts in, 
Bullard to the FO, July 8,1940. E 2221/64/34, FO 
371/24573- 
When the account of the Majlis discussion reached 
London, Sir William Fraser, the company's director, 
asked the News Department to get a 'stop' put on 
the dissemination of any news about the Iranian 
deputies' discussions on the company's affairs. 
See also, FO to Bullard, August 2,1940. E. 2288/64/34, 
FO 371/24573. 
ho 
".... my strong feeling is that we 
should not recommend the Company 
to make such an offer. I think 
that the right course is for His 
Majesty's Government to make it 
clear firmly, but of course 
unprovocatively, that, if the 
Company's concession were given to 
another concessionaire we should 
feel obliged to take steps to 
prevent the movement of oil from 
Iran. This possibility must be 
known to the Shah as well as to 
possible concessionaires and we 
should make the most of the argument. 
I dislike the idea of yielding to 
blackmail. Coming on top of our Far 
Eastern trouble, to give way to the 
Shah would create a feeling throughout 
the East that we are in so perilous 
situation that we are ready to submit 
to any bullying or blackmail, even by a 
" small and poorly armed state such as 
Iran". 73 
In pursuit of a satisfactory formula, . proposals 
and counter-proposals were exchanged between the Iranian 
Government and the company. Finally, a new agreement was 
signed on August 21st. According to this agreement, the 
company undertook to pay to the Government the sum of 
£1,500,000 on August 31,1940, and would have to make up 
the sums on account of royalty, tonnage, dividend participation, 
taxation and gold premium to £4 million in total respect of 
each of the years 1940 and 1941.74 There appeared no 
mention of the exchange question nor did the agreement 
contain guarantees to modify the concession after 1941. 
73" Sir H. Seymour to Lord Halifax, July 22,1940. 
E. 2288/64/34, FO 371/24573. 
74. Exchange of letters between the Iranian Government 
and the AIOC, August 21,1940. E 2532/64/34, FO 
371/24574. 
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But, at the last moment when the agreement was to be 
initialled "Mr. Rice received a message from the Court 
which amounted to a threat by the Shah that he would 
modify concession whenever he wished°75 
The Foreign Office, though satisfied by the way in 
which the negotiations had gone and the agreement had 
been reached, did, however, not hesitate to remark; 
... it is strength of H. M. Government in the Middle 
East that will count and situation should be very 
76 
different by 1942. 
Indeed the situation was different in 1942. Iran 
had ben occupied, the Shah chased into exile, and the 
British troops present in the country. 
The period 1939-1941 was marked by a mounting 
propaganda campaign carried out in Iran by Germans, 
British, and Russians on an unprecedented scale. 
75. Bullard 
lard2457FO, 
August 24,1940. E 2489/64/34 
76. FO to Bullard, No. 206. Ibid. 
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V. Propaganda in Iran. 
Unlike the British and Russian, German propaganda 
could easily penetrate into Iranian society, whose people, 
still had a strong aversion to the'treaties of Gulistan 
(1813), of Turkumanchai (1828), and of 1919, and had 
developed a deep mistrust and hatred for both Great 
Britain and Soviet Russia. Conscious of this fact, German 
propaganda sought to capitalize on the discontent of the 
people, and to turn Iranian nationalism into a 'pro-German' 
feeling. The Germans'tone of propaganda was mainly to 
put emphasis on the revival of strong nationalistic 
aspirations of the people. Consequently their propaganda 
could permeate those institutions which had basically 
nationalistic attachments, e. g., the Military. For instance, 
one of their propaganda promised "a victorious Germany 
would see that Dahrein was returned to Ilan". 
77 Moreover, 
the Germans knew of the fundamental orientation of Iran, 
being towards the West rather than the Soviet Union. Since 
Britain could do little for Iran against Soviet aggression, 
Germany was believed to be the 'only' saviour. This popular 
view was held by many Iranians including the Foreign Minister 
who believed: " it was useless to put döwn Hitler only to 
let a much worse enemy - Russian Bolshevists - of society 
r 
77" Engert to SOS, June 1,1940. US P. R., vol. 111,1940, 
P. 632. 
43 
take his place". 
78 Therefore, this Iranian idiosyncracy 
had furnished ample ground for pro-German circles to 
rhapsodize over Hitler, that when the war was won, he 
would not permit Russia to expand southward. 
Soon after its advent to power, the Nazi regime set 
up a highly organized propaganda machinery. Various 
institutions were founded such as the Deutsch-Persische 
Gesellschaft which was concerned with organizing social 
and cultural activities between Iran and Germany. 
79 
Newspapers were also subsidised, among which was 'Näma-yi 
Iran Bästan' in Persian, published in Germany. The paper 
contained articles praising Hitler, and drawing analogies 
as much between the Iranians and Germans as Hitler and 
Riza Shah. 
By expanding trade with Iran, the Germans had penetrated 
into those influential classes of society, who most benefited 
from such trade, namely the 'bazaris' - merchants-, and 
a sector of the clergy linked to the 'bäzär'. 
From the outbreak of war the Germans intensified 
their propaganda campaign in Iran. Towards the end of 1939, 
the German Foreign Ministry re-shuffled their staff at the 
Tihrän Legation. This was followed by the appointment of 
a new minister and counsellor. These strenuous efforts 
78. Engert to SOS, Oct-17,1939. Ibid, p. 623- 
79-! Lenczowski, op. cit., p. 159. See also, L. P. Elwell-Sutton, 
Modern Iran, pp. 164-81. 
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were made to increase their activities in Iran. Dr. Smend 
was'succeeded by Herr Ettel, an active Nazi. He knew Iran 
well, having served with the Junkers Company in Iran before 
1932, when its contract expired. He arrived in Tihrän in 
early 1940 as the new German Minister. But before his 
arrival another Nazi thruster appeared in Tihrän as the 
Counsellor. He was Herr Hubert Dittman, who had previously 
served in Jerusalem, and who came straight from the German 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs, where he was in charge of 
personnel. The British Minister reported that he was 
believed to be a Gestapo man, and there were ample reasons 
to substantiate this belief. 
80 
Herr Ettel's arrival was marked by unprecedented 
activities on the part of the Legation and the German 
community in Tihrän. The German residents were summoned 
to the Braun Haus, and instructed not to listen to any but 
the German radio, not to associate with German Jews, and 
finally keep themselves unspotted from the public.. Security 
and confidentiality measures were also tightened in the 
Braun Haus. For instance, all the Iranian servants were 
turned out, and the Germans waited on themselves* 
81 
Besides, German agents arrived in Iran under the guise 
of tourists and commercial representatives. In early 1940, 
80, Bullard to Halifax (FO), March 27,1940, Confidential. 
E 1545/621/34, FO 371/24582. 
81. Ibid. 
45. 
some 300 Germans arrived in Iran via Russia. By June 
1940, a total of approximately 2000 German males lived 
in the country, of whom about 1500 were in Tihrän. 
82 
They were followed by the arrival of two German Storm 
Troopers; Franz Mayr, and Roman Gamotta in October 1940, 
who were apparently the employees of the transport 
company, Nouvelle Iran Express. Another German secret 
agent, Major Bernard Schulze-Holthus arrived in Tabriz, 
as Consular Secretary, in May 1941. 
The German colony in Tihrän was very active and 
well organized. They employed as a method of propaganda 
a whispering campaign and disseminated rumours in the 
'bäzär', which "aided by the average Iranian's gullibility 
and ignorance of world affairs, proved an effective form 
of propaganda". 
83 
The effect of German propaganda was so successful 
that in June 1941 when Germany attacked the Soviet Union, 
"a loudspeaker giving the news on Sepah Square brought a 
crowd of listeners who cheered and applauded the announcement 
of each Russian town fallen into German hands"'. 
84 
However, 'the Iranian Government found the German colony 
too openly propagandist, and Rizä Shah was increasingly 
irritated by the hollowness and hypocrisy of German 
propaganda. 
85 
82. Engert to SOS, June 1,1940. US F. R., vo1. III, 19! 0, p. 633" 
83. Bullard to FO, Jan 17,1940. E 584/584/34, FO 371/24581. 
84. H. Arfa, Under Five Shahs, p. 272. 
85. Engert to SOS, Oct. 3,1939. US F. R., vol. III, 1940, p. 622 
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To offset German propaganda, the British Legation 
in Tihrän contemplated carrying out their propaganda 
campaign on the German model. In late 1939, the British 
Press Attache, Miss Lambton, wrote to the Ministry of 
Information, in London, ön these lines: 
".... I mentioned to you the difficulty 
we have in establishing contact with 
the local population. This is unfortunate, 
for personal contact is, in view of 
existing restrictions, one of the most 
effective methods of propaganda, and one 
of which the Germans make full use. 
The situation might well be improved 
if the Ministry of Information would 
allow us to expand a certain amount of 
money as payment, regular or otherwise, 
to selected individuals, Iranian and 
Indian, whose function would be to 
spread propaganda favourable to us 
among influential Iranians. I have at 
present someone in mind, who would, 
I think, be particularly useful in 
this connection. If this suggestion 
were adopted, I would propose a sum 
of C15-20 a month should be paid. I 
have discussed the matter with Colonel 
Underwood, who considers it of importance 
that some money should be put at our 
disposal to be used in this way". 86 
With respect to Russian propaganda, the situation 
was different from those of Britain and Germany. The 
communist propaganda were basically subversive, propagated: 
by ethnical and social minorities; Armenians, Muhäjirs, 
and intellectuals. 
86. Lambton to Prof. Rushbrook Williams, No. 444/32/39, 
Dec-13,1939" E 587/2/34, TO 371/24570. 
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Generally speaking, Russia was feared by most of the 
Iranians. The British Press Attache duly depicted the 
attitude of Iranians towards communism, she wrote: 
.... Communism, which is what Russia 
means at the moment in the eyes of the 
Iranian, is anathema to him whatever 
class he belongs. There is probably 
generally speaking little or no 
comprehension of what communism involves; 
the mere name is a bogey to the Iranian. 
The idea of sharing one's possession in 
common fills him with horror, while the 
idea that working for the common good 
is not for one's own personal gain 
(which is a common interpretation put 
upon communism) should be a basis for 
human society seems to him quite 
unreasonable, if not actually wrong. 
Even the poor man is not broadly 
speaking disposed to accept communism! ". 
87 
The Armenian community, the largest and most important 
religious minority in Iran, was divided into three parties; 
the "hai Heghapkhakan Dashnaktsoutun", the"Henchakian", 
and the "Ramkavar", of which the first party was the largest 
and most influential. The object of this party was to combat 
communist propaganda among the Armenian community. The party's 
attitude towards Germany changed from a sympathetic one to 
one cf dislike, when the latter attacked Austria, Czechoslovakia, 
and Poland. In their view the German action showed that German 
policy was virtually indistinguishable from Russia and that 
both were equally oppressive. 
87. Lambton to Prof. Rushbrook Williams, No. 308/14/39, 
Dec. 21,1939. FO 371/24570. 
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The other parties tended to be pro-German and 
pro-Russian. In fact the "Henchakian" was virtually 
a Bolshevik tool, and was used for the dissemination 
of Russian propaganda. 
88 
The "Ramkävar" party was very active in Tabriz and 
Isfahan, spreading Russian and German propaganda. Its 
activities increased particularly after the conclusion 
of the Soviet-Iranian Trade Agreement in March 1940, 
whereas those sections of the Armenians who were anti- 
6 
communist, notably the "Dashnak" panty were perturbed. 
89 
The police began to keep a closer watch on the activities 
of the party, which had previously been ignored. 
go 
Russian propaganda were also propagated by Russian 
agents in the guise of muhäjirs-refugees - and the Iranians 
who had been repatriated from Russia. There were, in 1939, 
some six thousand refugees and five thousand Iranians who 
had entered Iran and were dispersed mainly in the 
neighbourhood of Tihrän and major provinces. Many of these 
were said to be communist agents and to be in. possession 
of funds for propaganda. 
91 
Intellectuals or the educated class were among the 
social minorities who tended to be spreading communist 
propaganda not because of any love for Russia. They had 
turned to communism as offering the only means which might 
88. Lambton to Bullard, to FO, Jan. 23,1940, No. (218/2/l&0). 
FO 371/24570. 
89. Lambton to Bullard, to FO, April 8,1940. E 587/2/34, 
FO 371/24570. 
90. Lambton to Bullard, to F0, May 18,1940. FO 371/24570- 
91. Ibid. 
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improve their situation. Opposition to intellectuals 
came from a large number of people who owned property 
of some kind or other. This class, although often 
I 
discontended with the regime, feared that whatever was 
left by the Shah, would be seized by a communist inclined 
government with the support of intellectuals if such a 
change happened. 
Ironically, the sympathy for communism among 
2 intellectuals was accompanied by pro-German feeling. 
9 
This was not possible in the Iranian circumstances. The 
'logic' behind this constellation was not difficult to 
conceive, if one found out the origin of the prevalent 
opinion about the Shah. Rizä Shah was regarded by many 
as a British protege. This view is still held by many 
Iranians with peculiar obstinacy. 
3' The problem with 
this view was that it was not the result of a logical 
deduction. As it was explained, British prestige had 
been at its lowest ebb during Rizä Shah's reign. But 
if we believed Lambton's conclusion that " the Iranian, 
however, is not in the habit of applying logic to the 
political field" t94 the problem would then be. solved. 
However, the result of this attitude was to regard 
anti-British propaganda as a step in the direction of 
anti-Shah propaganda. Similarly, there was a tendency 
92. Ibid. 
93" For example, H. Katouzian, while assertingthe popular 
view that Rizi Shah owed his rise to Ironside, states, 
on the contrary, that"Rizä Shah was both pro-German 
, and pro-Nazi". But Katouzian fails to substantiate 
his statement. See, The Political Economy of Modern 
Iran, 1926-1979" P. 13 . 94. Lambton to Prof. Rushbrook tnilliams, Dec. 21,1940. op. cit. 
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in the public mind to associate pro-German propaganda, 
since Germany was opposed to Britain, with anti-Shäh 
propaganda. Despite this propaganda war, the Shah was 
in firm command of Iran's foreign and domestic policies- 
until the Anglo-Russian entry -, while growing popular 





The Failure of the Policy of Neutrality. 
1. The Anglo-Russian Occupation of Iran 
".... The background of Persia's relations 
with Great Britain and Russia........, is 
formed by the nineteenth century Anglo- 
Russian rivalry in Asia and the repeated 
attempts of Persia to play off one against 
the other; and a traditional belief that 
Persia suffers more when these two Powers 
agree than when they are rivals. Rivalry 
between them, it is argued may, and often 
has, caused loss and inconvenience to 
Persia, but when these two Powers agree 
over Persia her very integrity and 
independence may be vitally injured". 
l 
I 
Yet, in early 1941, Rizä. Shah had not perceived that 
the 'brutal force' of reality would make nonsense of his 
declared 'neutrality'. Theoretically, his policy could 
do no harm to belligerent powers but in reality it had 
somehow antagonized them. The geo-political significance 
of the country had made it impossible for: the. Government 
to refuse numerous demands of the concerned Powers without 
offending them. The Shäh and his government were aware of 
this, but what else could be done? Moreover, no proposal 
of an alliance was put forward by any of the belligerent 
Powers. 
1. A. K. S. Lambton, "Some of the Problems Facing Persia!!, 






The beginning of 1941 did not mark any change in the 
Government's policy. The German pressure to cancel the 
AIOC's concession, in April, was cunningly handled by the 
2 
Prime Minister, Mansur, expressing to the German Minister 
the desire of the Iranian Government "to rid itself of the 
British oil concession at the appropriate moment in order 
3 
itself to take over these greatest riches of the country". 
Again, in May, Germany's demands, concerning help for 
ammunition. and fuel for the Baghdad Government, were turned 
down by the Shah-. 
On April 2,1941, Rashid Ali Gailani carried out a 
coup d'etat in Baghdad. The Germans had, of course, 
practised their method of infiltration and intrigue inside 
Iraq and from Tihrgn to build up a pro-German party there. 
Already in November 1940, Bullard had reported to the Foreign 
Office a German attempt based on Tihrän to bring about a 
coup d'etat in Iraq in favour of Germany. 
4 
In early May 1941, 
the German Minister in Tihrän received instructions from 
Derlin to approach the Iranian Government for its consent 
to Germany's arms deliveries to Iraq through Iran. According 
to the German plan, additional arms shipment would have been 
designated with respect to Turkey5 as earmarked for Iran 
2. N. I. D. 0830, secret, April 16,1941. E 1682/G. FO 371/27199. 
3. Ettel to the Foreign Ministry (FM), Berlin, secret, April 
12,1941. German Foreign Policy, No. 326, series D, vol. XIII, 
1941, p. 532. 
! #. Bullard to FO, No. 392, Nov. 29,1940. E 2942/2/34, 
FO 371/24570,1940. 
5. Turkey had permitted shipment of arms for Iran through 
her territory. 
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but would have actually been left in Iraq by the route 
of the Baghdad railway to Iran or sent on from Iran to 
Iraq by the route to Iran through the Turkish Black Sea 
ports'. 
6 
Germany's second demand, in late May, was concerned 
with supply of fuel for aircraft in Iraq. The Germans 
demanded the 'Iranian Government to deliver aircraft fuel 
to Iraq either from its own stock or to buy it from the 
Soviet Union on its own account and then ship it to Mosul 
via Tabriz. The Shah refused those demands on the ground 
that they were contrary to principles of his policy. 
Subsequently, the Prime Minister made a statement to the 
German Minister on this line that Britain might soon find 
out about the Iranian cooperation with the Iraq Government, 
and would regard it as a hostile act and take military 
measures. . 
The result of a British invasion of Iran would 
be the immediate entry of Russian troops. Therefore, this 
would mean the end of Iran. Moreover, Turkey's attitude, 
he remarked, was of decisive importance for Iran's foreign 
policy. As long as Turkey did not openly support the Axis 
powers, Iran had to maintain a strictly neutral stance with 
respect to the belligerent powers. 
? 
6, The Director of the Political Department to Ettel, 
Top secret, May 6,1941. German Foreign Policy, No. 466, 
vol. XII, 1941. p. 727. 
7. Ettel to the FM, Berlin, May 25,1941. No. 552, Ibid, p. 877. 
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The fact must, however, not be overlooked that some 
members of the Iranian. cabinet, among whom the Prime 
Minister were on the side of the Iraqi Government. Both 
Bullard and Ettel confirmed this, 
8 
and Bullard reported 
that the Iranian Prime Minister believed the German 
control of Iraq might be a safeguard against Soviet 
aggression towards Iran. 
9 
In May, the Finance Minister, Khusrauvi, was dismissed. 
The Germans desired the return of Matin DaftarI'and formation 
of a pro-German cabinet. But the Shah was determined to 
maintain a neutral cabinet. 
II 
The failure . of Germany to encourage Turkey' to adhere 
to the Triple Alliance, or to secure the transit of German 
troops across Turkish territory and postponed Germany's 
traditional 'Drang nach Osten', towards the oil fields of 
Mosul. Therefore, in March, 1941, according to the Yugoslav 
Prime Minister, General Simovitch, Germany had concentrated 
large troops on the Turkish border to attack that country. 
Hitler's plan was to reach the Straits in 'blitzkrieg' 
fashion and, taking advantage of the Soviet Union's neutrality, 
8. Ettel to the FM, Top secret, May 8,1941. German Foreign 
Policy, No. 472, vol. XII., 1941, p. 737" 
9*. Bullard to FO, May 17,1941. E 2198, FO 371/27151,1941. 
i 
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to occupy Iran and Iraq. 
10 To implement this plan German 
propagandists and fifth columnists were preparing all the 
necessary grounds for a German invasion. They succeeded 
in Iraq when the coup was carried out in April, In Iran, 
their-attempts eventually failed but they had set up a 
fifth column organization at the Legation in Tihrän with 
branches located in German business concerns throughout 
the country. According to the American Minister's report, 
some five hundred tough and well-armed men could be placed 
on the streets of Tihrän within a few hours. 
ll Upon this 
report the activities of these Germans increased among 
White Russians, Armenians, and disaffected elements in the 
north of Iran when Germany attacked the Soviet Union. 
III 
Great Britain's attempts to establish a close-r 
relationship, in 1940, with Russia against Germany had 
failed. Even as late as June 1941, any avowed rapprochment 
between London and Moscow was yet invisible. Soviet foreign 
polity, which Churchill described as "a riddle wrapped in 
a mystery inside an enigma", was to avoid any impression 
of cordiality between Moscow and London. The Foreign Office, 
disappointed with such a Soviet attitude, summoned, on June 7, 
1941, their Ambassador in Moscow, Sir Stafford Cripps, to 
10. ; BBC broadcast of August 10,1941. Cited in Dallin, 
Russia's Foreign Policy 1939-1942. PP: 277-8 ft(2). 
11. Dreyfus to SOS, June 28,19F1. US F. R., vol. III, 1941, 
P. 383. 
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London, The Times of June L3,1941, in its editorial wrote; 
"Cripps had been sent to Moscow in'the 
hope that his-appointment would bring 
about a closer understanding between 
Great Britain and Soviet Russia. 'This hope, 
though' no fault of the 'Ambassador himself, 
has not been fulfilled. Sir Stafford 
Cripps'has been received in Moscow' 
courteously but without enthusiasm. 
At no time has he been admitted to 
the confidence of the Soviet Comätisar 
of Foreign Affairs. 
Therefore, it appeared that any Russo-British 
rapprochement could be perceptible only if and when the 
'objective' moment arrived. 
At four o'clock in the morning of June 22,1941 
Germany attacked Russia. The month before, Church±ll, however, 
had openly warned Soviet Russia of a German strike at the 
"granary of the Ukraine and the oil fields of the Caucaus". 
12 
The German attack brought about, the 'objective' moment, 
Sir Stafford Cripps returned to Russia, this time as an ally. 
The immediate force which cemented the Anglo-Russian 
alignment was the mutual desire to defeat Germany. To achieve 
this, Russia had to be supplied with war mat, erials. Only 
three routes were open for such supply. The arctic route 
by Archangel, which might be hampered by the winter ice; the 
Far Eastern route via Vladivostok, which was watched by the 
Japanese and operated over only seven thousand miles of 
12. Quoted in Dallin, op. cit. pp-326-7 
I 
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railway; and, finally, the route across Iran, which led 
over a five hundred miles stretch from the Persian Gulf 
to that great inland sea, the Caspian, upon which the 
Soviet Union maintained a strong naval force and which 
again gave access to the very heart of Russia, the Volga 
Basin. 13 Thus, Iran was practically the only route for 
supplies to Russia from the British Empire and the United 
States. 
Iran's neutrality was not the real problem to prevent 
the'British or Russians from asking her to allow transport 
of troops and war materials through the country. Even if 
the Iranian Government had consented to such a. request, Iran, 
as we will discuss, would have been occupied anyway as 
indeed she was. Therefore, a pseudo-legitimate excuse had 
to be found as a pretext to occupy the country. The expulsion 
of Germans from Iran as such, on which the Russians insisted, 
could not satisfy the British, whose policy was concerned 
with the security of the Iranian oil fields. If the Soviet 
Union had lost control of the Caucasus the threat to the oil 
would have become immediate, and this was indeed, the case 
whether the Germans in Iran had been expelled or not. 
Germany's attack on Russia required the British and 
Soviet Governments to examine possible developments in-the 
Middle East, particularly in Iran, and to consider the impact 
of the 'new' situation on their policy with respect to Iran. 
13. For more information about the Iranian route, see 
G. ISirk, "Strategic Comminications in the Middle East". 
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The British Government's long term policy with relation 
to Iran, as outlined, was; 
" (1) the maintenance of fully independent 
Iran, 
2 the promotion of Iranian prosperity, 
3 the maintenance of Iran's fre. edom 
from undue influence of any power". 14 
In spite of this outline, the 'new' situation required 
short-term modifications in the policy. The first modification 
was when the British, Chiefs of Staff decided to move troops 
into Iran if the Russians failed to contain Germans 
approaching the Caucasus. In fact the Chiefs of Staff 
had reached this decision long before. The occupation of 
Iran was part of a 
, 
comprehensive plan concerning the security 
of the Middle East, which had been designed by Chiefs of 
Staff in July 1940: 
" The retention of our position in the 
Middle East remains of the utmost 
importance to the successful 
persecution of the war, particularly 
in view of our policy of an economic blockade 
of Europe. It is also important to secure the 
Anglo-Iranian oil fields". 15 
Nevertheless, the German Minister, Ettel, reported to 
Berlin that the news of imminent British occupation of Iran 
had reached Rizä Shäh on July 1,1941 through the Egyptian 
Ambassador, Zulfaqar Pasha, whom had been instructed by 
King Faruq. 
16 
Ettel's report was, however, denied later on 
14. The FO to Bullard, (Foreign Office meeting of July 11), 
July 14,1941 E 3780/933/34-, FO 371/27196. 
15- Lord Caldecote to Sir' Geoffrey Whiskard, U. K. Iiigh 
Commissioner in Australia, most secret, July 3,1940. 
Document on Australian Foreign Policy 1937-49, vol, IV, p8. 
16. Ettel to FM(Berlin), top secret, July 3,1941. German 
Foreign Policy, No. 66, vol. XIII, 1941, pp. 77-8. 
-r 
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by Egyptian authorities 4s a false report. 
17 
Whether or not the report was really a false one it 
is still difficult to ascertain. But it seems that Rizä 
Shah had received from "a" source certain information about 
such possible occupation, because extensive defence measures 
were immediately taken. The reinforcement., of troops in the 
provinces of Äzerbäyijän, Kirmänshäh, and Khüzistän was 
accompanied by diplomatic steps taken both'in Tihrän and 
London. Bullard was told that Iran, according to her policy, 
would turn against 'the aggressor' of any side, and that, in 
the "event of any British attack, the Iranian Government would 
appeal to Germa ny for aid and enter the war on Germany's 
side". Bullard, impressed by the Shah's plain language, 
categorically denied such news, and declared that Britain 
had no intention of attacking Iran. 
18 
Soon after the rapprochement, the .. 
British Government 
abandoned its plan, and decided to join hands with Russia 
to occupy Iran. This was, of course, a clever manoeuvre, 
since it could serve, among others, an important object, 
which was to confine the Russian presence in Iran by an 
agreement. Meanwhile, the British Government. also took 
diplomatic steps, through its Ambassador, Viscount Halifax, 
in Washington to prevent the US Government from delivering 
aircraft to Iran. The Ambassador claimed that his government 
18. Ettel to FM (Berlin), July 3,1941, No. 66. op. cit. 
17. See Egytian Gazette,? September 1947. Cited in 
Survey of international Affairs 1939-1946. 
. The Middle East in the War, p. 141(ft. 1) 
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had information " which led it to believe that aircraft 
sent to Iran might be utilized, in view of changing 
developments in the Near East, against the British forces 
there... ". 
19 
The American authorities were not convinced 
by his argument. The facts emerged later, from the 
Minister-Counsellor of the British Embassy in Washington, 
Neville Butler, when he revealed to the State Department 
that: 
".... when the Ambassador spoke to you 
recently about the desire of the 
British Government that further 
aircraft exports to Iran be held up, 
the latter (Ambassador) had in mind 
the general unsatisfacory Iranian 
attitude towards Great Britain rather 
than any particular development". 20 
Finally, the State Department and the British authorities 
agreed on the. shipment of only spare parts of obsolete planes 
"in order to maintain the goodwill of Iran in view, of the 
possibility of a deterioration of Anglo-Iranian relations 
in the near future", 
21 
Although the problem of German nationals was used as 
a pretext preparatory to aggressive measures against Iran, 
it had to be taken into account, at any rate. The growing 
concern about the numbers and activities of Germans in Iran 
was first expressed in 1940 by Bullard. He, in May 1940, 
instructed the British Consuls to report the number and 
organisations of Germans in their areas. 
22 
Then, in June 1941, 
19. Memo of conversation by the Under Secretary of State 
(Welles), July 8,1941. US F. R., vol. III, 1941, p. 360. 
20. Memo by the Chief'of Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Murray) to the Under Secretary of State (Welles), July 
16,1941, pp. 362. See also the same file, Document No. 248125, 
July 29,1941, PP. 364-5 US F. R., vol. III, 1941. 
21. 'Document of July 30,1941. Ibid, P-365- 
22. Bullard to all Consuls in Iran, May 21,1940. E 2043, 
FO 371/27571,1940 
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The Foreign Office discussed a plan to curb the Germans' 
activities. According to this plan there should be an 
increase in the number of British subjects employed by 
the Foreign Office on political work in Iran; " in fact 
have recourse'to tinfiltration', more or less on the 
German model"* 
23 
"Plan is an excellent'one", The Government 
of India commented, "(? but) F. O. have produced it five 
years too late. It is not possible now to acquire British 
subjects with intimate knowledge of Persia and Persians, 
and without it they will be of little-value"". 
24 
Therefore, 
The Foreign Office asked the Governemt of India It to 
consider the desirability of sending specially selected 
pilgrims to Meshed", in order to gather information about 
the Germans. A certain Sayyid Muhammad Räzi left India 
on August 14,1941. The Government of India then sent 
a telegram to Bullard as follows; 
" He will travel as an ordinary pilgrim 
via Zahidan, (? Meshed) and Tehran to 
Iraq. He will return to India by same 
route after spending two or three 
months in Iraq and Iran (Persia). He 
has been instructed to keep in touch 25 
with you and follow your instruction". 
Meanwhile, the managers of the Imperial Bank were 
instructed to pass information about the general situation 
and activities of Germans to British consuls or the Legation*26 
23. FO to Tihrän, No. 262, June 8,1941. E'3004/G, Ext 3361 
IOR: L/P&S/12/3517" 
24. Govt. of India, Dept. of External Affairs, to SOS for 
India, June 14,1941. EXT 3446, JOR: L/P&S/12/3517" 
25. Govt. of India, Dept. of External Affrs., to SOS for India. (Addressed to H. M. Minister at Tihrän No. 260 and H. M. 
Ambassador repeated to Secy of State for India and British Consulate at Meshed, August 17,1941, EXT 4999, 
26. Bullard to Foreign Simla, Repeated to FO, Secret, June 28, 
1941, No. 266. IOR: L/P&S/12/3517. 
62 
Suggestions, in connection with the problem of German 
nationals, were madetrhat the British Government should 
take certain measures to put economic pressure on Iran, 
whose result might be the expulsion of Germans. Similar 
suggestions had been made in 1940 by the Ministry of 
Economic warfare. 
27 
In July 1941, Bullard proposed 
certain economic steps to be taken against Iran. 
28 
But the general view, with which the Foreign Office agreed 
was that the economic pressure on Iran would not for some 
months produce sufficient inconvenience to causethe Iranian 
Government to get rid of Germans from Iran. 
29 
Therefore, 
it appeared the alternative would be a military aation. 
30 
N 
In July 1941, there was every indication that Itan 
would be occupied by British or Russian forces. The Iranian 
Minister in Washington reported to Tihrän the article, sent 
from London, in the Washington News; that Britain would 
send troops to Russia through Iran. The Minister added: 
27. British Economic Policy towards Iraq and Iran, 
Nov. 11, 1940. E 2916, FO 371/24576,1940. 
28. Bullard to FO, July 21, 1941. E 4006, FO 371/27150, 
1941. 
29. Minute by Sir H. Seymour (Eastern Dept), secret, 
July 26, 1941. E 4141/34 44/34, FO 371/27201. 
30. Ibid. 
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ýý.... in my conversation with the officials (US) here, 
they confirm the possibility of such British action". 
31 
A similar indication reached Tihrän from the Iranian 
Ambas'sador,. Said in Moscow. He wrote ".... my understanding 
is this that they (British and Russians) want to revive 
the spirit of the 1907 Agreement at least for the duration 
32 
of war". There also appeared an article, 11 Iran Weak 
Link on Way to India", in the News Chronicle of July 5, 
in which their correspondent in Istanbul, Mr. Patmore, 
wrote; 
"The weak link in the countries barring 
the Nazi way to India is believed to be 
Iran. It is felt here that Britain and 
Russia must bring pressure to bear on 
the Iranian Government to check the 
definite pro-Axis tendencies of Iran's 
rulers. The Shah of Iran is known to be 
a cynical, ruthless and money-loving 
dictator, but Britain and Russia are in 
a strategic position to threaten Iran, 
and only firm measures will impress 
Iran's ruler, who started his career 
as a soldier-adventurer". 
V 
It was in late July that the British Chiefs of Staff 
presented the plan for their actions in Iran. The C-in-C 
of India was assured that the requisite forces for such 
actions would be available soon. 
33 
The initial draft of 
this plan seemed to consist of two phases; 
32. Said to Tihrän, No. 1190, Murdäd 16,1320 (August 7,1941), 
Ibid. For the text see Appendix II, p 543 
33" Chiefs of Staff (War Office) Plan, ciphered to C in C 
India, July 28,1941. E 4179, FO 371/27200. 
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Phase (i) the British and Russians would assemble forces 
and then tell the Shäh to expel Germans from Iran. The 
Shah would not like this, but would either give in under 
protest or would temporise, in which case the British 
should then proceed to; 
Phase (2), the occupation of the oil fields and the bombing 
. of 
Tihrän. At the same time the Russians would come in 
from the North. 
It was obvious that this plan would have created a 
general state of chaos and confusion, which was, of course, 
not in the British interest. There was no mention of the 
occupation of Tihrä. n in the plan, and it seemed, however, 
that no concurrence of any kind on this matter was 
officially concluded between Russia and Britain prior to 
their entry into Iran. But they had definitely reached a 
'de facto' agreement on the basis of the 1907 convention, 
since an official from the Foreign Office in his comment 
on the Chiefs of Staff plan wrote; 
".... there is an unoccupied area between 
the zones occupied by the Russians and 
ourselves and if enemy agents are free 
to intrigue, perhaps with the encouragement 
of such Persian authorities as remain 
and of Persian public opinion, the 
consequence for us might be very serious ". 
34 
34. Minute by P. H. Curshworth (F0) on Chiefs of Staff 
plan. Ibid. 
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Soon after the Anglo-Russian entry into Iran, the 
Viceroy of India wrote to Eden, reciting the German menace, 
and hoped the British would decide with Russia to control the 
whole, of Iran until the end of the war. Furthermore, he 
commented on area of occupation by saying; 
" Perhaps the general line of Anglo-Russian 
Convention of 1907 would be a useful 
precedent. But there is important question 
of joint occupation of Tehran, and should 
have to extend the British line under 
the Convention further to the north and 
to the west so as to include the oil fields 
in it and also curtail or eliminate the 
neutral zone... We ought to do our utmost 
to keep rso-Afghan frontier in our own 
sphere". 
vi 
The first joint Anglo-Russian demarche was made in 
Tihrän in the last days of July 1941. The Iranian Government 
had been asked to deport four-fifths of the Germans in 
Iran at once. The representation was formal and not backed 
by military or economic threat. In its formal reply, the 
Iranian Government declared that Iran had been a sovereign, 
independent, and neutral country, which for her development 
programmes had to obtain foreign citizens' assistance. Soon 
after this'non-commital' reply, the official Iranian news 
agency issued a statement, on July 31, in answer to foreign 
35. Vicery (India) to Eden, personal, Aug. 28,1941, 
IOR: L/P&S/12/552. 
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press and radio reports about the danger to Iran from 
the Germans. The statement refuted such reports as 
baseless and exaggerated, and added that the Government 
had a list of foreigners and all were under the I 
surveillance of the police. None would be permitted to 
commit illegal acts, and the Government was the guardian 
of the legal rights of the inhabitants, the statement 
said. This statement was much more conciliatory than 
the former strong and bellicose statements that Iran would' 
defend her neutrality at all costs. 
Besides the formal reply, the Iranian Prime Minister 
promised Bullard the expulsion of thirteen Germans at 
once and eleven in the following week including those 
employed in the radio station. 
36 
Meanwhile, discussions 
between London and Moscow continued over their subsequent 
steps which had to be taken in Iran, and whether or not 
to put their real aims to the Iranian Government? 
At the Foreign Office, conflicting views were propounded. 
One official wrote; 
.... It seems to me, therefore, that we 
should now consider afresh what our real 
aims in Persia are and how far the use 
of force will advance them. I take it 
that far the most important of our aim 
is the security of the oilfields, and 
after that, but a good way after it, comes 
our desire to open up the trans-Iranian 
route to Russia.... 
Would it not be best, when we are in 
a position to talk sternly to the Persian 
Government, to come out into the open and 
36, Dreyfus to SOS, July 29,1941. US. F. R., vol. Ill, 
1941, p. 385. 
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say frankly that we ourselves look 
after the oilfields for the duration 
of the war, and (if we and the Russians 
feel equals to the task) take special 
steps to ensure that the railway 
functions in accordance with our 
requirements... Even if we do this, we 
could of course keep up pressure 
about the Germans in Persia, but I 
cannot help thinking that it would be 
a mistake --to. make the presence of 
these people the main issue between 
us and the Persian Government. I submit 
that even if the Shah turned every one 
of them out of the country, it would 
not really get us much further... "37 
The Russian Ambassador in London, Ivan Maisky, a. 
cultured and talented man, suggested that their demands 
on the Iranian Government should be firstly, the eviction 
of the Germans as it had been proposed in the first demarche, 
and. secondly, the right of free transit for Russian troops 
and war materials across the trans-Iranian railway. 
Eden, not impressed by this suggestion, pointed out that the 
request for the use of the railway had not been mentioned 
in their previous note to the Iranian Government, and yet 
it was contrary to their respect for her neutrality. Maisky 
argued that they had to cite the example of Sweden, who had 
been neutral but she had given Germany the right to cross 
troops. 
38 
37" Minute by P. H. Curshworth, op. cit. 
38. Eden to Cripps (Meeting with Naisky), No. k95, July 
29,1941. E 4306/3691, FO 371/27196 
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Eden's argument was, of course, rather an excuse 
than the expression of truth. The fact was this that 
Maisky's suggestion had disadvantages on the'political 
side. First of all, the British objectives could not 
be realised by that about which Sir Horace Seymour 
wrote; 
.... I think, that our own abject, as 
distant from that of the Russians, will 
not be accomplished simply by the 
removal of Germans from Iran if we 
obtained it". 39 
Secondly, any demand upon Iran for passage of troops and 
war materials would influence the situation in Turkey 
against the Allied benefit, 
4o 
because the German Government 
would then, no doubt increase its pressure upon Turkey, 
particularly with respect to transit. Hence, Maisky's 
suggestion was abandoned, and the preparatory measure 
taken for the second representation in Tihran. 
The second note was more or less similar to the former 
one but with more implications and backed by an oral 
declaration. The note emphasised that the British and 
Soviet Governments had accepted Iranian neutrality and had 
no design against Iran's independence. No time limit had 
been inserted for the expulsion of the Germans, since the 
British and Russians, obviously, did not desire to give it 
the character of an ultimatum. 
39o Minute by Sir H. Seymour, secret, July 26,1941, op. cit. 
4+0. Sir H. Knatchbull Hugessen(Angora) to FO. secret, 
Aug 2,1941. E 4375/G, FO 371/27200. 
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The British Government informed Turkey of their 
measures, which would be taken in Iran with Russian 
collaboration. The Turks obviously did not like it, 
because' of their suspicion of the Soviet Union's 
aspirations in Iran, and they also did not want to have 
the Russians on or near their undefended southern borders. 
The British were aware of Turkey's uneasiness, so they had 
to give her assurances over this matter. Finally the British 
Government agreed with the Soviets to give the Turkish 
Government, 'futatis mutandis', assurances that they had 
no aggressive design against Turkey, particularly the 
Stra its, and both Governments would confirm their fidelity 
to the, Montreux Convention. 
41 
Declarations were made, on 
this basis, to the Turkish Government on August 11,1941. 
The second representation had to be made on August 16. 
Meanwhile, British and Russian troops took positions nearer 
the southern and northern borders of Iran. The Iranian 
Military Intelligence appeared well aware to these movements. 
The Pahlavi Infantry Regiment together with twelve medium 
and twelve light tanks were sent to the South. 
42 
In the 
North the Army was reinforced and the Shah departed for 
inspection of troops on the northern frontiers. 
Anglo-Russian troop movements were interpreted as 
part of the war of nerves accompanied by increasing force 
41. The American Ambassador in Great Britain, Winant, to 
SOS, Aug. 8,1941. US. F. R., vol. III, 1941-, - p. 388-90. 
Montreux Convention signed July 20,1936, regarding 
the regime of the Straits. See League of Nations 
Treaty Series, vol. CLXXIII, p. 213. 
42. Military Attache to the War Office, Most secret, 
Aug. 13,1941. E 4716, F0 371/37200 
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in form of daily broadcasts from New Delhi, Baku, Ankara, 
I 
and other stations. Ankara radio praised the Shah for 
the defence of the country. But other radios broadcast 
false news, particularly the BBC and Baku radio. For 
instance, the BBC broadcast report items such as; a 
train-load of Germans had arrived in Iran, rebellion in 
the Iranian Army, tribal uprising, and distorted news on 
the activities of Germans in Iran. The American Minister 
in Tihrän confirmed that those reports were distorted, 
and added, ... the American representative of the Associated 
Press informs me that most of the news sent by press men 
in Ankara comes directly from the British Legation. The 
Iranian side of the story has never been told". 
43 
The second Anglo-Russian notest were delivered to the 
Iranian Government on the afternoon of August 16. They 
were supplemented by verbal demands, which implied a threat 
of military action, making the notes a virtual ultimatum. 
But Bullard emphasised that they were not intended as such. 
44 
A, reply to the notes was expected within three days. It 
was not difficult to speculate on the Iranian reply that 
demands would be refused. 
On the eve of the delivery of notes, the American 
4Dreyfus to SOS, No. 89, Aug. 12, and No. 99, Aug. 21,1941. 
US F. R., vol. 1l1,1941, p. 395, pp 401-3. 
44. Dreyfus to SOS9 No. 92, Aug. 15,1941. Ibid., P-397-8. 
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Minister, who was instructed by the State Department to 
disassociate himself from the joint Anglo-Russian 
representation, had gained the impression from Bullard 
that unless the demands were complied with the Anglo- 
Russian troops would occupy Iran. He wrote; 
"I consider it not unlikely that 
if invasion comes tie Shah will 
lose his throne... " 5 
In London, Eden and Maisky, did not even wait for 
the Iranian Government's reply. " We must work on the 
basis that the answer we receive from the Persians on 
the 20th would be negative", said Eden, " we should 
therefore consider our next step in detail: "now". 
46 
Maisy thought that two. alternatives were open on the 
receipt of a negative reply. They could tell the Iranian 
Government to modify its attitude within forty-eighlt 
hours otherwise they would resort to other measures, or 
they could take military action without an ultimatum. 
After a lengthy discussion both Eden and Mais1y agreed to 
discard the idea of giving an ultimatum, because an 
ultimatum of 24 or 48 hours " would give the Persians 
time to appeal to Turkey and to the world for help, and 
to make the most of their case with their own people". 
47 
1. Ibid. 
46. Eden to Cripps (Meeting with Maisky), Aug. 18,1941. 
-E. 4791/3691/G, FO 371/27231- 
47. Ibid. 
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Therefore, it was preferred to act without previous 
warnings or time limits. 
48. 
One remaining problem was that of the security of 
British subjects at the time of occupation. This problem 
was discussed at the War Cabinet, and the decision was 
made that if they were maltreated, "Persians resident in 
Iraq and Egypt would be taken as hostages for the 
reprisal". 
49 
In Tihrän, the Government was parrying to gain time, 
without realizing the gravity of the situation. Still, 
they were in search of a 'magic formula' to satisfy both 
the Germans and the British. The Government's initiative 
to obtain an official utterance from the Turkish 
Government-in favour of Iran was not answered. Turkey 
refrained from speaking out. Meanwhile the German 
Minister, conscious of the Russo-British demands, suggested 
to the Prime Minister that a number of German specialists 
employed in Iran should return to Germany because they 
were needed there. The Prime Minister did not accept the 
suggestion, and added that the Government was not interested 




49. War Cabinet meeting, secret, Aug. 4,1941. E 2.478/34 . x"/". 34, FO 371/27231. 
O. Ettel to the FM (Berlin), Most secret, Aug. 19,1941. 
German Foreign Policy, No. 215, vol. XIII, 1941, p. 337. 
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He had realized that the British and Russians had 
other aims and that if the Germans were sent away, it 
would merely encourage them to make further demands and 
use a new pretext with the Government. Therefore, he 
and definitely the Shah desired the departure of Germans 
to be carried out in consequence of economic difficulties, 
rather than because of political circumstances. 
The Iranian Government's reply to the notes was 
madeýon August 19, according to which the Government had 
undertaken to deport Mayr, Gamotta, and Eilers, and to 
send away thirty Germans a month. On receipt of the 
reply, Bullard said to the Iranian Foreign Minister that 
he believed that it would not be acceptable, since it 
would take more than a year to effect the departures of 
a considerable number of Germans. 
51 The Government's 
reply was followed by the Shah's personal message sent to 
the British Legation in the late evening of August 23, 
reassuring the British that the expulsion of Germans 
would be carried out with accelerated pace. 
This conciliatory attitude was at variance with the 
52 
Government's replies, the tenor of the Shäh's*speech 
at Aqddassiya, the Military Academy's Summer camp, and 
51'. 'Drefus to SOS, Aug. 19,1941. US F. R., vol. III. 1941 
p. 1400. 
52. Arfa, op. cit., p. 297. See for the Shah's speech. 
74 
with the tone of Itti lä rat's editorial of August 23; 
which in referring to the Shah's speech had called on 
the people to be ready for sacrifices. 
The Shah's personal message revealed the fact that 
his Government's defiant attitude had only been a face- 
saving policy. The British had presumably realised it. 
Instead of offending the 'amour propre' of the Iranian 
Government and people they should have approached the 
Iranians to suggest a closer cooperation, or the forming 
of an alliance. They did not, The German question was, 
from the international law point of view, the internal 
affair of the Iranian Government and the Russo-British 
demand consituted an infringement of the sovereignty 
of Iran. 
At four o'clock in the morning of August 25,19419 
`the British Minister and the Russian Ambassader delivered 
the Iranian Prime Minister a note which (1) expressed 
disappointment thatthe Iranians had not heeded their 
demands, (2) expressed regret that they were to take the 
matters into their own hands to protect their interests, 
(3) reiterated that they had no designs against Iran's 
integrity or sovereignty, and (4) expressed the hope 
that Tran would not resist since they had no desire to 
cause harm to the country or its citizens 053 
53" For the full text see Documents on American Foreign 
Relations, 4: 674-76. World Peace Foundation, Boston. 
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According to the Iranian Prime Minister, Mansur, 
the Anglo-Russian troops had moved into Iran four 
hours earlier than the delivery of the note. ` 
Later in the morning, Bullard and Smirnov were 
summoned to SaCdäbäd Palace. They'were received in 
audience'by the Shäh. While leaning against his desk, 
be began the conversation; 
"What is this? I have given my assurance 
that most of the Germans will be 
expelled from Iran. I find this 
morning that you have attacked both 
the north and south of my country 
and have seized eight Axis ships 
in the Gulf. It seems that Germans 
want to take all of Europe and 
now the Russians and British want 
to take Iran". 55 
Iran was too--: weak to defend herself against the 
two powerful neighbours. The army put up a puerile 
resistance which soon ceased. Finally, the Shäh's 
request to President Roosevelt that he should endeavour 
to stop hostilities received a'non-commital' reply 
56 
54. `Ali Man*ür'; s memoire about the Anglo-Russian 
Occupation-is kept at 'Markaz-i Tah igat, Tihran, 
cited in Valizada (ed. ), Khatirahä*ZMemoires), p. 256. 
55"a Dreyfus to SOS, Aug. 25,1941: US F.. R., vol. III, 1941. 
b see also Bullard to P0, Aug. 26,1941. E 5005/3326/34 
FO 371/2721891941. 
c)Somewhat detailed description of this event is 
found in Javäd`Amiri's memoire, cited in Välizäda, 
op. cit. 
56. -Mansur in his memoire, writes about Bullard's 
audacious behaviour at the meeting at the Palace. 
For the full text of Roosevelt's reply to the Shah 
on September 2,1941, see US F. R., vol. Ill, pp. 446-7. 
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Reactions to the Anglo-Russian occupation-of Iran 
varied. The American State Department expressed relief 
that the British Government had decided to invade part 
of Iran and not to give a free hand to'the Bolsheviks'. 
The Turks were embittered by the action. The Turkish 
Ambassador in Washtington, Mehmet Minir Ertegün, 
complained that the US Government was only endeavouring 
"to rescue the British without regard for the welfare 
of other countries and to preserve the ruling caste of 
England, for which", he said he had, "only contempt 
because of their utter selfishness and readiness at all 
times to sacrifice others for their own interests. "57 
Moreover, the Turkish newspaper 'Cumhuriyet' of August 
27,1941, wrote, "Iran is quite capable of controlling 
or expelling any element considered guilty of subversive 
activity". 
The main weight of German citicism was directed 
against British 'hypocrisy' rather than 'Bolshevist 
imperialism'. 
58 
The Italian Government strongly 
condemned the Angle-Russian occupation of Iran. The 'Stampca' 
of August 26,1941 accused the US Government of supporting 
the Anglin-Russian move in Iran, and said that US statements 
57" Memo of conversation by the Chief of the Division of 
Near Eastern Affairs (Murray), Aug. 25,1941. US F. R., 
vol. 111,1941, p. 417. 
58. The Charge in Germany (Morris) to SOS, Aug. 26,1941. 
Ibid, p. 424. 
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on Iran were made for domestic consumption press. The 
article concluded that the move was unmistakable 
evidence of what the Anglo-Saxon meant by freedom and 
sovereignty of nations. 
59 
Finally, a British view on the occupation may be 
gauged from this extract from Sir Oliver Harvey's 
(late Lord Harvey of Tasburgh) diary; 
" our first act of "naked aggression". 
A. E. rather ashamed of himself, so 
too. is PM. But I tell him it is 
essential for us to get our base 
and the oilfields secure while the 
going is good. " 0 
The Prime Minister, Mansur, resigned on August 27, 
and Muhammad 
Ali 
FuruZhi was appointed in his stead. 
. 
Furixjjhi's appointment was regarded as a conciliatory 
move towards the British, as Bullard remarked. The 
prevalent public calm rapidly gave way to nervousness. 
The fear of Russian occupation of Tihrän had disposed 
the publie to look to the British as at least preferable. 
It was, however, a rude awakening when the Iranians found 
the perennial bogey of Russian invasion had become a 
brutal reality. 
The next Anglo-Russian move was to tackle the 
'problem' of the Shäh and the future regime of Iran. 
59" The Ambassador in Italy (Phillips) to SOS, Aug. 26, 
1941. Ibid, p. 425. 
60. John Harvey (ed. ), The War Diaries of Oliver Harvey, 
p. 36, London 1978. Also cited in David Carlton, 
Anthony Eden, p. 186. London, 1981. 
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CHAPTER THREE. 
The Aftermath of the Occupation. 
1. The debacle of Riza Shah and his exile 
"Machiavelli showed that the 
subject's will is, negatively, 
the rock on which the Prince's 
power, unless he steers wisely, 
will be shipwrecked. He did 
not also show that, positively, 
it is the rock on which that 
power can be built. " 
(R. G. Collingwood, The New 
Leviathan. 1942. p. 180) 
I 
The occupation of Iran by Anglo-Russian troops 
caused some surprise but little resentment. The general 
belief was that Rizä Shäh had been responsible for the 
mis-management of the affair and that he should have 
agreed to Anglo-Russian demands, thus avoiding an open 
break, which could only end in the humiliation of the 
country. As a result his prestige rapidly fell and 
criticism became increasingly outspoken. Ironically, 
the public still believed that the British were behind 
him, and it was not until the second week of September 
when the BBC Persian broadcast started the campaign 
against him that the people became convinced that the 
British Government were not supporting the Shah. When he 
79 
finally abdicated, the British achieved considerable 
popularity, as having forced him to do so. 
The Foreign Office in collaboration with the 
Government of India had designed a six-stage propaganda 
campaign to be broadcast from the BBC, of which the 
last stage was direct attack against the Shäh. 
' 
It would, however, be naive if it was thought 
that the British or British propaganda were the only 
factors which forced him to abdicate. Though it was 
believed that. t#le BBC broadcast was instrumental in 
bringing about the abdication, the determinant. factors 
were, however, the grasp of the unrelenting situation 
by the Shah himself, the surge of his unpopularity, and 
the pressure put on him by the Iranian Government. 
II 
The idea of the restoration of the Qajar dynasty, 
contemplated by the India Office in June 19+0,2 appeared, 
in August 1941, to have been under meticulous consideration 
again. The Government of India held the view that if the 
Shäh's downfall was brought about by the British and the 
Soviet Government in collaboration, the enemy propaganda 
would no doubt set out on a fresh course of glorifying 
1. The Government of India to SOS for India, Simla 
Aug. 29,1941. Ext 5301, IOR; L/P&S/12/552. 
2. Amery to Halifax, June 17,1940. E 214l/G, FO 
371/24582. 
80 
the departed ruler in the hope of appealing to Muslim 
3 
sentiments particularly in India. Hence, it seemed 
that the Government of India would confine itself only 
to the six-stage propaganda campaign if needed. 
The staunch advocate of Ri E Shäh's removal was 
Bullard. He was aware that the British had been long 
held responsible for the Shah's misdeeds. Moreover, he 
found out that this universal belief had been strengthened 
by the fact that the Shah, after being severely shaken 
by the crisis, was still firmly in power. He complained, 
".... the Shah is once more interferring 
in every department, beating Ministers 
and behaving generally like the greedy 
ignorant savage.... " 
Then he continued; 
"It was believed that we could not 
come to this country with troops 
and dictate an agreement and yet 
leave the peopl33 under their 
greedy tyrant". 
Therefore, he recognised that if the British did 
not give encouragement to the idea of a constitutional 
government, and profit from the popularity achieved by 
the occupation, because the rule of the Shah seemed 
shaken, and partly because the British troops had behaved 
so much better than the Russians, the tide, would turn 
3. Govt. of India to SoS for India,, Ext. Affrs. Dept. , 
Aug. 29,194I. IOR: L/P&S/12/ 552. 
4. Bullard-to FO, Most secret, No. 650, Sept-3t 1941. 
E 5372/3326/34,1OR: L/P&S/12/552. 
5. Ibid. 
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against the British as the Shäh was behaving as before. 
Ile suggested some such statement as the following to be. 
broadcast from London and Delhi; 
"Recently Tehran radio for the first 
time for a very long while referred 
to the Constitutional Government of 
Persia. This reference to the 
constiution seems to have aroused the 
greatest interest throughout Persia 
where it is proposed that great changes 
of administrative control of public6 
finances etc. may be contemplated. " 
Bullard believed such statements would be sufficient 
to encourage the cabinet and the people, and to make' 
the Shah hesitate. He finally suggested: 
"we really must show sympathy with 
popular opinion in Persia or the 
weight of hostility to us will clog 
our efforts. This is not (grp. undec. ) 
opinion of one man, it is the opinion 
of our, all(sic. ) Persian allied and 
neutral friends and my staff without 
exception- Counsellor, Diplomatic 
(grp. undec.? adviser) and commercial 
secretaries, Military Attaches and 
press attaches. Indeed my staff and I 
have now got to the point when we 417 
believe the Shah is in fact incorrigible... 
In the early part of September, the Government of 
India appeared to have been taking a stronger stance 
vis-a-vis the Shah. They expressed a view on the Shah 
similar to that of Bullard. The Government of India 




of authority in Iran and was in the position to treat 
his ministers in an unpleasant manner and so long as the 
belief remained that the British were his ultimate support, 
it would be improbable that an Iranian cabinet however 
well disposed to the British and anxious to serve the 
best interest of the country would construe and implement 
the armistice terms in the way that the British 
Government desired. The Government of India felt that the 
Iranian adminstration had to come into existence with a 
friendly population behind it. "We can only secure this", 
wrote the Government of India, "by eliminating the Shah 
or by rendering him impotent. Once this is assured, there 
should, we feel, be little difficulty in securing our 
full desiderata. If we fail to grasp the nettle we shall 
be faced by a breakdown of administration and a hostile 
population". 
8 
Despite these dispatches from Tihrän and India, the 
Foreign Office, though admitting their argument, walstill 
reluctant to take any serious steps against the Shäh. 
Therefore, Bullard was informed by the Foreign Office in 
the following terms; 
".... hitherto it has seemed to us best 
not to take steps against the Shah, 
unless we can satisfy ourselves that 
his disappearance would not lead to 
worse confusion". 9 
8. Govt. of India to SOS for India, No. 4766, Simla, 
Sept. 4,1941. IOR: L/P&S/12/552. 
9, 
EPO5327/3326/34to 
Bullard L/P&S/12/55zept. 6,1941. 
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Certainly, Bullard could not advise the Foreign 
Office of better prospects after the Shah had been 
removed. So, he thought it would be wise if he left it 
to the Iranians. He knew that more British involvement 
would create more adverse results., Once, he wrote; 
"I have only contempt for those 
Persians who expect the British 
to change their Government - 
and would then accuse them of 
intervention. 1110 
Finally, he received instructions that he should 
avoid giving the impression that the British Government 
were supporting the Shähll 
From the second week of September, opposition to the 
Shah began to grow stronger and more open. The former 
antagonized traditional classes became outspoken. There 
was a, general feeling amongst the younger men that the 
country had lost face through the Shah which could only 
be regained if he went. The Prime Minister, Furüghi12 
an honest man of converted Jewish descent, believed that 
the Shah ought to go. He told Bullard that the Shah 
would leave of his own free will if his policy was 
seriously criticised in the BBC broadcast, and that any 
cabinet in office could carry on if there was an 
interregnum. 
13 
10. Bullard to FO, No. 650, op. cit. 
11. FO to Tihrän, No. 637, op. cit. 
12. See Personalities, Appendix I, p. 527" 
13" Bullard to FO, secret, No. 704, Sept. 10,1941. 
E 555/3326/34, IOR L/P&S/12/3520. 
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Similarly, the Foreign Minister, 'Ali Suhaili 
14 
a very reasonable, matter-of-fact, and an approachable 
person, told Bullard thatthe Shah could be persuaded 
to adbdicate. Then he ventured to ask the British 
Government's attitude before they took any action. 
Bullard, who had waited a long time for such a moment 
to come, expressed his opinion by saying; 
"".... that if they considered that the 
Shah ought to go, H. M. Government 15 
would not interfere to prevent it. " 
Then'Bullard reported to the Foreign Office: "Idid my 
best to make him (Suhaill) believe that it is for Persians 
to initiate a policy.... " 
16 
to get rid of the Shah. 
The Government's persuasion, and particularly the 
news of the Russian troops approaching Tihrän, (on Sept. 
17) hastened the Shah's decision to abdicate. On 
September 16, he abandoned the throne on favour of the 
Crown Prince, and left for Isfähän. 
After his departure from Tihrän, the Government 
considered that he should leave the: country, but they 
thought that the Shah's property should be secured before 
he left. Hence, Ibrahim Qaväm17 was sent to Isfähän to 
obtain the deed of covenant. According to Qaväm, the new 
14. See Personalities, Appendix I, p. 521. 
15. Bullard to FO, No. 742, Sept. 15,1941. IOR: L/P&S/12/553 
16. Ibid. 
17. See Personalities, Appendix I, p. 531. 
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Shah wished all his brothers without exception to leave 
with the Shäh. 
18 
Furüi had, like Dullard, thought of India for the 
Shah's first destination, and of South Africa as the best 
place for his permanent exile. 
19 The Shah, on the 
contrary, had wished to be allowed to go to America, 
possibly to Canada. 
On September 15,1941, on the eve of the abdication, 
Bullard took steps to secure a place for the Shah. He 
wrote; 
"If the Shah abdicates where is he 
to go? He ought not to remain in 
Persia. It would seem that he can 
only go to India in the first place 
though I am aware that the Government 
of India do not want him. , 
20 
The Foreign Office had considered that in case of 
abdication and his departure from Tihrän the Shah must 
go to some area under Allied occupation otherwise he 
might create trouble. Therefore, the military authorities 
had been instructed to use force to detain him if he 
showed any resistance. 
21 
The Government of India was informed of, the Shah's 
proposed destination, and asked for approval, 
22 The Viceroy 
18. Bullard to FO, Sept. 21, 1941. E 5854/3326/34, FO 371/27219 
19. Bullard to FO, Sept. 21, 1941. E 5862/3326/34. FO 371/27219 
20. Bullard to FO, Sept. 15, 1941. No. 743, EXT 5706. 
IOR: L/P&S/12/3518. 
21. FO to Bullard, Sept. 15, 1941, No. 718. E 5666/3326/34, 
IOR: L/P&S/12/3518. 
22. Draft telegram from SOS for India to Viceroy, 
Sept-15,1941. EXT 5706, IOR: L/P&S/12/3518" 
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strongly rejected it. He feared that the presence of the 
Shah in India would cause discomfort among the Moslem 
population, and Jinnah would certainly capitalize on his 
presence to show the Shah as the victim of the British 
policy. Furthermore, the Viceroy warned that the Shäh 
should not be sent to any country in the Empire with a 
substantial Mohammadan population. 
23 
Despite th-e Viceroy's reluctance, the Foreign Office 
still hoped that the Government of India would admit the 
Shah. "The Government of India can hardly refuse admittance 
to the ex-Shah... ", Pink commented. 
24 
Certainly there existed conflicting views between the 
Foreign Office and the Government of India over the Shäh's 
immediate destination. The Government of India had- 
decided not to allow him to land at Bombay. 
25 
On September 22, the Viceroy, putting an end to the 
Foreign Office hope, confirmed his position vis-a-vis 
the Shah's entry to India. He wrote; 
"(? As I) have already made clear I 
fully appreciate inconvenience. but 
I cannot take risks involved in 
having Shah in India for however 
short period. Jinnah is most anxious 
to work up this Persian business and 
a good deal of the Mohammedan press 
is (no doubt under his influence) 
showing greater signs of sympathy 
for Shah and his regime. One cannot 
wisely, in these circumstances face 
23. Viceroy to SOS for India, Sept. 16,1941. IOR: L/P&S/12 
/3518. 
24. Minute by*Pink on Dullard, telegram No. 794, Sept. 20, 
1941. E 5866, F0 371/2719. 
25. Govt. of India, Ext. Affrs. Dept., to SOS for India. 
Sept. 24,1941. EXT. 5928, IOR: L/P&S/12/3518. 
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possible dangers involved, I am 
arranging for Shah to be put on 
a ship in Gulf and we can keep 
him at sea until a decision is 26 
reached as his final disposal.. " 
On September 22, S. S. Bandra was instructed to sail 
for DandarAbbas. The message from F. O. C. Royal Navy 
to C-in-C East Indies S. N. C. Persian Gulf reads as 
the following; 
"On arrival to embark ex-Shahcf Persia 
and party of approximately (? 25) which 
includes (corrupt group) sons and 14 
servants. After embarking party GRMX 
(Bandra) is to be sailed for Bombay 
direct. S. N. C Persian Gulf inform 
(? BANDRA). Final destination of Shah 
not yet known. "27 
By September 24, the decision had been reached to 
send the Shah to Mauritius. This time the Colonial 
Office showed its concern over the decision. There were 
in Mauritius some forty to fifty thousan3Moslems. The 
Colonial Office suspected that the Shah might endeavour 
to cause trouble among the Moslem community and might 
also obtain some help from the small but influential 
pro-Vichy elements among the Franco-Mauritians. Hence, 
the Governor was instructed to take firm action in the 
event of such trouble. This. instruction was stronger 
than 'the former that the Shah and his party" would have 
Viceroy to SOS for India, Sept. 22,1941. EXT 5878. 
I0ß: L/P&S/12/3518. 
Bullard gives a contradictory version of this;. he 
writes; "He (Rita Shah ) wanted to go to India, but 
his anti-clerical policy had made him so unpopular 
there that the Government of India could not allow it". 
See "The Camel Must Got, p. 230. 
27. E 5866/332/34t FO 371/27219. 
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to be kept under observation though not necessarily 
closely guarded. " 
28 
In the morning of October 2, S. S. Bandra arrived 
zLt Bombay. The steamer was kept six miles out at sea. 
The passengers and crew were not älowed, to disembark. 
Clarmont Skrine, who knew Persian, had been-appointed 
to accompany the Shäh. He met the Shah on board and broke 
the news of the destination. The Shah was furious. He 
requested that this message should be sent to his son in 
Tihran; 
"We have arrived at Bombay. 
Representative of Government of., ' 
India(? and) some soldiers have 
come on board to tell us no one(? is) 
permitted to disembark and that according 
to British Government's decision, I 
shall have to (? go) and live in 
Mauritius. In other words we are 
being treated as prisoners"althoügh 
I left Persia of my own free will 
and British Government expressed 
to me their approval of my going to 
America. Please ask reason for this 
sudden decision. We are in(? good) 
health. "29 
The message was of course not sent to Tihrän, 'because 
at that stage the British Government did not want to 
inform the world of the Mauritius decision . 
3ýR1 Shah 
sent a similar message to the Viceroy, asking him whether 
28. A. B. Acheson (Colonial Office) to Mr. Pink (FO), 
, Oct. l, 
1941. IOR: L/P&S/12/3518. 
29. Govt. of India, Ext. Affrs. - Dept., to SOS for 
India, Oct. 3,1941. EXT. 6229, IOR: L/P&S/12/3518. 
30. Ibid. 
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the decision had been taken after he left Iran, and 
why he was not permitted to go to America. 
31 The 
decision to send him to Mauritius had been taken while. 
he was in Kirman, and refusal to disclose the ultimate 
destination was certainly deliberate. 
In his reply to the Shah, the Viceroy stated; 
.... I must make it clear that the 
British Government have never agreed 
that your Majesty should go to America 
with your family and it would therefore 
appear that there has been some 
misunderstanding on this point. 
The decision now divulged that you 
should proceed temporarily to Mauritius 
is based on requirements of the war 
situation and according to my 
information was taken before your 
Majesty embarked at Bandar Abbas. I 
must assure your Majesty that there 
is no intention of (? treating ou 
as a prisoner in Mauritius ... "3K 
Meanwhile the Argentine Government instructed its 
consul in Cape Town to issue a visa for the Shäh and his 
entourage. Accordingly the Iranian Legation in 
Washington was informed of the Argentine decision. The 
Legation, not knowing the Shäh's whereabouts, requested 
the British Embassy to convey their message to the 
British Government so as to be passed on to the Shäh. 
33 
In its secret telegram, the Foreign Office informed the 
31, Govt. of India, Ext. Affrs. Dept., to SOS for India 
(undated, but presumably Oct-3,1941), EXT 6261, 
IOR: L/P&S/12/3518. 
32. Govt. -of India, Ext. Affrs. Dept., to SOS for India, 
Oct. 6,1941. EXT 6303, IOR: L/P&S/12/3518. 
33. Viscount Halifax (Washington) to FO, No. 4572, Oct, 
5,1941. E6380/5952/34, ICR: L/P&S/12/3518. 
9o 
the Washington Embassy of the decision that. the Shah 
would not be permitted to go to South America. 
34 
Perhapsone of the reasons why the Shah had not 
been allowed to go to Argentina was that some members 
of the Imperial family, particularly, the second son, 
`Ali Rizä, might become instruments of German propaganda. 
35 
Prince`Ali Rizä, while at Bombay, sent letters to 
the new Shäh, Queen, and ex-Queen, accusing the British 
of breach of faith. His letters were intercepted by the 
British authorities there and they found certain extra- 
vagrant phrases such as " the English have played their 
traditional' trick of St. Helena and Napoleon", "Indian 
and English soldiers took us into custody", "failing 
Divine intervention my father will probably become the 
slave of these people", It if my brother will Ao nothing 
for us the life of every one of us is in danger". 
36 
The letters were detained and never reached Tihrän. 
Tt was typical of Iranians, Bullard thought, that, 
by the middle of October 1941, Rizä Shah had begun to 
achieve popularity. The people regarded him as the 
alleged victim of British cruelty. The myth had been 
created that the British got rid of him because he 
defended the independence of Iran, and wanted to modernize 
34. FO to Washington, secret, No. 5498, Oct. 10,1941. E 6380 
/5952/34, ICR: L/P&S/12/3518. 
35" Bullard to FO, No. 1037, Oct. 24,1941. EXT. 6820, 
E 6943/5952/34, IOR: L/P&S/12/3518. 
36. Govt. of India to SOS for India, Oct. 13,1941. EXT. 6511, 
IOR: L/P&S/12/3518. 
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the country, whereas the British wished to enslave it 
and make it "return to camels". Bullard argued this 
new development by saying; 
'!... * it has arisen partly because it 
flatters (grp. undec:? s the) Persians 
to compare the ex-Shah with Napoleon 
and makes him seem less ignoble to 
believe that the ruler who, (sic. whose) 
slave3they were for so long, was a great 
man". 
At seven o'clock in the morning of October 16,1941, 
the Shäh and his party arrived at Port Louis in Mauritius. 
The villa 'Valoryl, prepared for them was a large three- 
storeyed building belonging to the head of the local P. W. D., 
M. Regnard, and stood in a fine garden with plenty of 
trees and a stream running through it. it was about 1200 
ft. above the sea in a region which was regarded as the 
best in the island from the climatic point of view. The 
three youngest Princes and Mr. Izadi, the Shah's secretary, 
were installed in the garden annexo and the ethers in 
the main house. The only discontented member of the party 
was Princess Shams, who insisted on a separate villa for 
herself and her husband, Firaidixn Jam. Skrine complained: 
" She is about the most selfish and spoilt 
young woman I have ever met but being a 
great favourite with the ex-Shah3ger 
nuisance value is considerable". 
37. Bullard to FO9 No-1037, op. cit. 
38. Letter from Skrine to Caroe, Oct. 22,191+1, IOR: 
L/P&S/12/3518. 
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Rizä Shah never liked Mauritius. To him life there 
seemed a gradual death. When Sir Bede Clifford, the 
Governor, at tea with him asked whether he was 
comfortable and receiving every attention, Rila Shah 
replied, "what shall I say? We are prisoners". On Sir 
Clifford'sremonstrating, the old man continued, " you 
say we are free, but Mauritius is a prison, albeit a 
big one. We are accustomed to great open spaces and 
mountains to which to escape-in the heat. To us this 
existence is unreal, a sort of death in life". 
39 
Upon his complaint and because of health reasons, 
40 
the British Government decided to move him to South Africa. 
Soon after, it was decided that the date of his arrival 
in South Africa should be delayed, in order to strengthen 
the British bargaining position vis-a-vis the Iranian 
Government in dealing with the conclusion of the Tripartite 
Treaty. 
41 
Rizä Shäh and his party arrived in Johannesburg 
on March 27,1942. He did not like the climate there 
either, and above all he found communication more difficult. 
In July 1943, he requested the British authorities to be 
moved to any country, under British control that was nearer 
Iran. 
42 
Bullard was informed of this, and he strongly 
39" Skrine to Wightam, Dec. 22,1941. EXT 599, IOR: L/P&S 
/12/3518. 
40. His illness was diagnosed' progressive cardiac 
failure secondary malignantCachexia. 
41. Letter from Young (F0) to Kimber (DO), Jan. 9, 
1942, E 22/22/34, FO 371/31392. 
1+2. From South Africa to Dominion Office, July 8, 
1943. IOR: L/P&S/12/3518. 
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advised the Foreign Office of undesirability of such 
a move. 
In July 1943 general elections were impending in 
Iran. Rumours were current that the new Shäh"was trying 
to secure a seat for his father at, the elections, which 
was, however, not true, because the electoral law, under 
which various close relatives of the reigning Shah were 
precluded from membership of Majlis, should have been 
rectified to include his father in this ban. And the 
young Shah believed himself in 1943, to be, a constitutional 
monarch. 
To transfer Rizä Shah to a country near Iran, 
Bullard thought, would however justify rumours, and 
certainly give the impression that he was on his way back 
to Iran under British auspices. 
43 
Moreover, Bullard 
regarded Rizä Shah's complaints about climate and 
communication as "ridiculous excuses". "From our point 
of view here", remarked Bullard, "the more difficult the 
communications are between the palace and the ex-Shäh 
the better. 
44 
Hence, Ri a Shah's request was refused, 
and the Dominion Office wrote to South Africa, informing 
them of the decision, adding; 




.... if we were to comply every time 
he expressed a wish for a change of 
air, there would be little hope of45 
inducing him to settle anywhere. " 
Rizä Shah died on July 26,1944. His reign was an 
example of moderising autocracies. 
6 
The organic crisis, following by the disappearance 
of Rizä Shah, could have rapidly driven the jerry-built 
Iranian society into a chaos that would jeopardize the 
Russo-British war endeavours. Hence the problem of the 
future regime had to be tackled in great haste. There was 
talk of a republic, which the Soviet Union no doubt 
favoured. 
47 
But no united party with a clear policy 
came forward. It was not known whether the British 
Government approved of an Iranian republic, but it was 
certain that the British did not wish for a drastic change; 
a transition from monarch to republic would only add more 
chaos and confusion. It might be argued that the British 
preferred, in 1941, to preserve the monarchy, possibly by 
the restoration of the Qajars. 
45. Dominion Office to S. Africa, July 13,1943. IOR: L/P&S 
/12/3520. 
46. For a theoretical and analytical work on the failure 
of modernizing autocracies see, for example, David, 
Apter, Politicsof Modernisation. 
47. (a) H. Hashiml, "Naq ha-yi Jumh5r1yat-i Iran va 
Ri äsat-i Jumhüri- i-Sacid", Khändanihä, Nos. l, 
3&4, Shahrivar 9,16 & 19,1330 (August 31, 
Sept-7 T-10,1951). 
(b) Military Attache to Bullard, to F0, No. 930, 
oct. 6,1941. E 6392/3444/34, FO 371/27233 
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II. Britain's Policy on Restoration of the QLj rs. 
It was on June 16,1940 that Prince Hassan visited, 
in London, the Secretary for India, Amery, to inform 
him of his desire to leave Britain for Canada. On the 
same occasion, the Prince pointed out that he might be 
able to reassert his claim to the throne if the war 
extended to Iran. 
48 
*Mohammad Hassan Mirzä, known as Prince Hassan, was 
born on Shavval 9,1316 (February 20,1899). He was the 
second legitimate son of Mohammed Alt Shah and full 
brother of the late Shäh of Qajar dynasty, Sultan Ahmad 
Shah, who was dethroned in 1925 and who died in Paris 
on February 27,1930. On the last departure of Ahmad 
Shah in November 1924, Mohammed Hassan Mirzä, known as 
Vali`ahd( heir apparent) remained in Tihrän as Prince- 
Regent. During 1924 he dealt with the Republican movement 
in a dignified and statesmanlike manner. But his struggle 
with Rizä Khan Sardär Sepah, then Rizä Shah, culminated 
in the decision of the Majlis on October 31,1925, 
dethroning Al. mad Shah and putting an end to the Qajar 
dynasty. Prince Hassan left Tihrän the same night. After 
remaining for some time in Baghdad he went to Europe with 
48. Amery to Lo liIalifax (F0, June 17,1940 op. cit. 
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his mother, Malikeh Jahan. He lived in Paris for a while, 
later moved to Britain. After the death of his brother 
in February 1930, he published a declaration in''Le Matin' 
of July 20, claiming his rights as successor to the., 
sover eignity of Iran. Three days later 'Les Temps' 
published an announcement, inspired by the Iranian 
Government, that the Qajar dynasty had come to an end, 
and that the pretensions of Mohammed Hassan Mirzä were 
49 
unfounded. " ti 
He had several children; his elder son Hamid Mirzä, 
was born about 1909, educated in England, and became a 
British subject. He worked for a while in British 
Columbia, felling timber, then at the headquarters of 
the Shell Company in London, under the name of Drummond. 
His younger brother went to sea in the merchant service 
for three years under the name of David Drummond, and in 
1941: was longing to be allowed to serve in the British 
Navy, 
50 
, After his meeting with the Prince, Amery wrote to 
the 'Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Lord Halifax, saying: 
.... if the war extended to Iran, as it 
may any day, a situation might well 
arise in which it might be possible 
for him to reassert his claim to the 
throne and indeed it might be of great 
importance to us to have him do so". 
Then Amery continued; 
".... From that point of view it might 
be important for us to have him handy 
49. Adapted from E 832/826/34, FO 371/24582,1940. 
50,, Letter from Amery to Eden, August 29,1941. IOR 
L/P&S/552. 
97 
here, whether to broadcast to Iran, 
or to put hint on an aeroplane and 
send him to Baghdad or Baluchistan". 
Finally, upon his character, Amery remarked; 
"He is still quite a young man... 
a charming fellow personally and 
wholeheartedly on our side". 51 
The Foreign Office certainly was not impressed 
by Amery's idea in 1940, Therefore, it remained in 
the background until nearly a year later when Bullard 
sent a hint; 
".... The Shah is the object of almost 
universal execration and we also as 
his supposed supporter. He could not count 
upon full support by the army. Movement 
for the removal of the Shah and even 
his dynasty would be popular... If the 
Shah was forced to leave his capital 
and failed to find Iranian support 
elsewhere it is conceivable he would 
retreat to the oil area especially if 
we had been forced by circumstances 
to embark upon its defense, or he might 
seek out protection elsewhere. In that 
case we should I think avoid any action 
which might be represented as supporting 
his cause and contemplating his return. 
As the Shah keeps order and maintains 
neutrality his continuance in power 
during the war probably suits us better 
than any practicable alternative but 
he was driven out, even if obviously 
by German action, we ought to act with 
the greatest caution and above all to 
avoid any suggestion that we class him 
with popular rulers of Norway, etc. "52 
51. Amery to Lord Halifax, June 17,1941. op. cit. 
52. Bullard to FO9 May 7,1941. E 2026, FO 371727150 
98 
The course of events, from July henceforth, changed to 
become different from what Bullard had pre-conceived 
in May (1941). 
August and September were the months in which the 
Foreign and India Office cogitated upon the restoration 
of the Qajar dynasty. Lord Linlithgow, the advocate of 
this policy, in his private letter to Amery recommended; 
"I think it might be well worth 
keeping our eye on the legitimate 
successor to the Kajar dynasty... 
Then he went on to express his anger with Rizä Shah, 
by saying; 
"I see no reason why we should let 
ourselves be saddled with responsibility 
for Reza Shah if Reza Shah is Unable to 
hold his own". 53 
Again, in late August, he recommended serious 
consideration of the restoration of the Qäjärs. 
54 
The Government of India and Amery argued'that the 
Qäjärs were not merely a family but a large tribe, 
numbering hundreds of thousands, mostly in Northern 
Iran. They had been badly treated during the reign of 
Riia Shah. Therefore, the restoration of the. old regime 
might succeed in some degree in rallying natives and 
hereditary leaders of the country. 
55 
53" Extrace from private letter of Lord Linlithgow to 
Amery (10), Aug. 11,1941 IOR: L/P&S/12/552" 
54. Telegram from Linlithgow to Amery, enclosed in Amery's 
letter to Eden, Aug. 29,19l1. IOR: L/P&S/12/552" 
55- Govt-. -of India, Ext. Affrs. Dept., to SOS for India, 
No. 4623, Simla, Aug. 29,19! +1. EXT. 5301, IOR: L/P&S 
/12/552. 
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In late August, Amery, while warning Eden to think 
the possibility of Russian suspicions of any restoration 
under British auspices, reasserted his view-but left the 
decision to be taken by Eden. He wrote; 
".... but I do strongly urge that 
you should at. any rate have5khe 
ajar candidates sized up". 
It would be difficult to state whether the Foreign Office 
had been convinced by the India Office and the Government 
of India. But it seemed that the matter was under 
careful consideration by the Foreign Office in early 
September, though they did not come forward with a clear 
policy. 
In the second week of September, the Viceroy of 
India seemed to have become less enthusiastic about the 
idea, while, on September 8, when asked by Amery to give 
more information about the Qajärs his reply was non- 
commital. Amery wrote to him; 
"If Mirza Ismail57 is in close 
touch with Persia I wonder if 
he has views on your suggestion 
of Kajarrestoration which might 
now possibly be considered". 58 
In his reply the Viceroy wrote; 
"I find it a little hard to judge how 
close Mirza's contact with Persian 
right is. But(after discussion with 
Caroe) I should on the whole 
reluctant to breach with him this 
matter of a possible Kajar restoration, 
56. Amery to Eden, Aug, 29.1911. op. cit. 
57" See Personalities, Appendix I. p. 53k" 
58. Telegam from SOS for India to Viceroy, No. 1053, 
Sept. 8,1941. IOR: L/P&S/12/552. 
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It is very touchy stuff, and if 
it were once to get out that any 
such idea was in your mind, I 
think you will probably feel with 
me that it would be dangerous, 
I would prefer therefore on the 
whole to mark time and do nothing 
for the moment. "59 
Meanwhile, the rapid developments of events in 
Tihri from September 10, to the 16th, were making it 
difficult to plan for a would-be successor of Rizä Shah. 
On September 10, the newspaper Itti"lä'ät published 
an editorial headed " Sentiments of the people". It 
said; 
"Nobody expected such severe 
conditions. The Iranian Government 
had tried to maintain neutrality 
but in vain. We are in face of 
great difficulties which we did 
not expect or deserve but the 
Government could not act otherwise. 
We had no dealings with the German 
and Italian Governments, except ordinary 
and commercial ones but we wished 
nothing to prejudice them. This also 
is in accordance with absolute 
neutrality. To our regret our 
Government is now obliged to close 
the German, Italian : Roumanian and 
Hungarian Legations in Iran but our 
missions in the capitals of those 
countries will remain and our 
political relations will continue. 
We expected better things in the 
way of freindship and neighbourliness.. " 
The article was regarded as anti-British and misinformed. 
It was believed that this had been inspired by the Crown 
59" Viceroy to SOS for India, personal, Sept 10,1941. 
IOR: L/P&S/12/552. 
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Prince. "I believe that this article was sent by the 
Crown Prince to the Cabinet", wrote Bullard, and that 
the Cabinet having refused to allow publication, the 
Crown Prince sent it direct to the newspaper with orders 
to publish. " 
6o 
This telegram left the Foreign Office 
in further consternation. It was, however, on September 
15, that Eden learned that the Crown Prince had not been 
involved in the publication of the article. 
The growing parallelism between Russian and British 
policy in Iran became apparent, particularly in the case 
of Rizä Shah. Maisky expressed his government's view that 
the sooner the Shah went the better. After further 
discussion the Ambassador agreed that Eden should instruct 
Bullard to approach the Iranian Government about a 
suggested successor to the Shäh. 
61 
Although both Eden and Maisky agreed on the removal 
of the Shah, there is no evidence to suggest that the 
Soviet Government considered the Qäjärs as the successor. 
On learning from Bullard, Furughi strongly rejected 
the idea of a Qäjär ruler. Moreover, there was no general 
or even considerable demand for the Qäjärs. 'Bullard 
quickly grasped the situation and wrote to the Foreign 
Office: 
60. Bullard to FO, secret, No. 706, Sept. 11,1941. E5557 
/3326/34, EMT. 5887, IOR: L/P&S/12/552. 
61. Eden to Sir S. Cripps (Moscow), (Meeting with Maisky), 
Sept. 14,1941. E 5613/3326/34, FO 371/27218. 
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ýý:... We could force the country. to 
accept Hassan (or anyone else) but 
I should have thought his ignorance 
of Persia a serious bar and his- 
English education a source of 
embarrassment sooner or later bgth 
with the Persians and Russians'äö2 
Of course, Bullard seemed to be pretty muddled about 
who Prince Hasan was, when he described him as ignorant 
of Persia and having an English education. He was 
evidently mixing him up with his son Hamid. 
Furthermore, Bullard pointed out; 
".... Another objection is that there 
are hundreds of (repeat hundreds of) 
Qajars in the country and they are 
all waiting hungrily many of them 
on my doorstep for (the) return of 
the days when the country was 
bled not by one leech but by hundreds". 
6ý 
On,. September 16, -Rizä Shah abdicated and left 
Tihrän the same day. The situation of the country was 
so critical that the Iranian Government was compelled 
to announce his abdication in favour of the Crown Prince, 
before receiving the approval of the British and Soviet 
Governments* 
64 
Bullard and the Soviet Ambassador knew 
of the gravity of the situation. Therefore, they did 
not object to the proclamation, moreover, they had not 
received any instructions from their governments. It was 
a 'fait accompli' but they did not commit their governments. 
62. Bullard to F0, secret, No. 767, Sept-17 1941. 
E 5754/3326/34, ICR: L/P&S/12/553. 
663. Ibid. 
64. Bullard to FO, Sept, 17,1941. E 5724/3326/34, 
FO 371/27218. 
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Of his talk with Furühi, Bullard wrote to the Foreign 
Office; 
".... I added that after all(the)' 
Crown Prince could also abdicate 
if necessary, but I hope it, will, 65 
not come to that just at present. " 
Finally, after a lengthy discussion with Furt hi 
over the Crown Prince, Bullard came to the conclusion 
that the acceptance of the Crown Prince would be least 
disturbing to the Country and Allied interests. In his 
despatch to the Foreign Office, he argued that for 
several reasons the British Government might expect the 
correct attitude from the Crown Prince, namely, the 
warning from the fate of his father, a consistutional 
procedure which would not allow him freedom to intrigue, 
and youth and inexperience which would place him under 
the influence of the Cabinet. 
66 
In the end, Bullard 
recommended to the Foreign Office; 
".... If the two Governments in conjunction 
give the Crown Prince a trial ( we could 
always get rid of him quickly if he 
proved unsuitable) I think that choice 
of a shah, President of Republic etc. 
had better be left to a constituent 
assembly, Let them meet in some out-of-,, 7 
.6 the-way place and wrangle by themselves 
Upon the Bullard recommendation and, apparently, the 
Soviet Government approval of the Crown Prince as the best 
65. Bullard to FO, No. 767, op. cit. 
66. ' Ibid. 
67. Ibid. 
io4 
candidate at that time, the Foreign Office gave its 
verdict, which reads; 
"We have no illusion about the character 
. of 
the Crown Prince, and the position is 
that we are prepared to give him a trial, 
but subject to good behaviour. r68 
68. FO to Tihrän, secret, No. 729, Sept. 179 1941. 
E 5726/3326/34, IOR: L/P&S/12/553. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
From Occupation to Alliance 
I. The Anglo-Russian Terms and Zones of Occupation 
.... we have rooted out the malignant 
elements in Tehran; we have chased. a 
dictator into exile, and installed a 
consitutional sovereign pledged to a 
whole catalogue of long-delayed sorely 
needed reforms and reparations; and we 
hope soon to represent to the House a 
new and loyal alliance made by Great 
Britain and Russia with the ancient 
Persian State and people ............. 
The Persian episode, so far as it has 
gone, would seem to be one of the most 
successful and well conducted affäirs 
in which the Foreign Office has ever 
been concerned" 
, 
The Anglb-Russian occupation of Iran strengthened 
the Allied front which ran in an immense crescent from 
Spitzbergen in the Arctic Ocean to Tobruk in the Western 
Desert in Autumn 1941. Besides, it served the important 
British aims in presenting a shield which could bar the 
eastward advance of Germany, while it also enabled the 
British to join hands with the Southern flank of the 
Russian Armies and to bring into action there both military 
and ' air forces. 
The Prime Minister (Churchill), Supply: Committee. 
;, 30 September 1941, H. C. Deb., Fifth Series, vol. 371. 
col. 15. 
lo6 
The Russian advance into Iran was accompanied by 
the bombing of open towns particularly nearby Qazvln. 
Riza Shah was reported to be very anxious about the 
Russians' hostilities and their continuing advance 
towards Tihr n. Some officers had advised him to take up 
arms again and fight to the end but Ibrähim Qaväm had 
discourag, cd the idea and said to him that'the Shah's 
only hope laid in doing whatever the British might 
advise. 
2 
On August 29,1941, Bullard and Smirnov had still 
not received instruction from their Governments as to 
whether Tihrän would be occupied. Bullard hoped that 
the capital would remain free from foreign influence. 
But in the event of Russian occupation of Tihrän, he 
suggested to the Foreign Office that the Iranian Cabinet 
should stay in Tihrän to negotiate with the Allies. 
Meanwhile, Rizä, Shah was so frightened of the possible 
occupation of Tihran by the Russians that Bullard reported; 
"I gathered ominous hints that the Shah 
had considered either taking refuge in 
the British Legation or fleeing to some 
British territory... To a question of 
what the British and Russians intended 
with regard to the Shah, I said that I 
could not comment on what was a matter 
for His Majesty and his people. " 
2. Bullard to FO, No. 622, War Cabinet distribution, 




The advance of Anglo-Russian troops; into Iran 
continued. The Iranian Ambassador in the Soviet Union, 
Sa id, on his own initiative prepared a note to Molotov, 
pointing out the incorrect interpretation of article VI 
of the Treaty of Friendship of 1921, and protesting 
against the entry of Soviet troops into the territory 
of Iran, and asking him to stop hostilities; 
"I beg you to be so good as to stop 
the advance of armed forces on the 
territory of Iran with a view to an 
amicable settlement of the question 
and by respect for the sovereign 
rights and neutrality of Iran. .. "4 
This note was overlooked by the Russians. They did not 
even transmit Sa'id's telegram which contained the report 
of this action to his Government, while he had asked for its 
Meanwhile, the US State Department was endeavouring 
to encourage both the British and Russians to make a 
statement with regard to Iran, reassuring the Iranians 
as well as other nations of their temporary presence in 
Iran'in order to combat IIitler. 
6 
Such a statement would 
have a very healthy impact on all the Moslem nations in 
particular, and on people's of small countries in general. 
But the Soviet Union declined to go further than their 
previous note handed to Sarid on August 25, which stated; 
".... The Soviet Government has no designs 
on the territorial integrity and state 
independence of Persia. The military 
measures taken by the Soviet Government 
4; The Ambassador in the USSR, Steinhardt, to the SOS, 
Aug. 27,1941. US. F. R., vol. 111,1941, p. 430- 
5. Steinhardt to the SOS, Aug. 27,1941. Ibid, p. 428 
6. Cordell Hull with the Soviet Ammbassador, Oumansky, 
Washington, Aug. 27,1941, Ibid, pp. 434-5" 
108 
are directed solely and exclusively 
against the danger created by the 
hostile activity of the Germans in 
Persia. As soon as this danger 
threatening the interests of Persia 
and of the USSR has been removed, 
the Soviet Government, in discharge 
of its obligation under the Soviet- 
Persian Treaty of 1921, will at once 
withdraw the Soviet troops from the 
confines of Persia. "7 
The British Government felt that Eden's public 
statement, on August 26, had made the British position 
clear, and, therefore, any further statement would serve 
no useful purpose. The lastparagraph of Eden's statement 
reads; 
"..... His Majesty's Government have no 
designs against the independence and 
territorial integrity of Iran and any 
measures they take will be directed 
solely against the attempts of the Axis 8 Powers to establish their control in Iran. " 
On August 28, the British Minister and Soviet 
Ambassador were separately summoned by the Iranian Foreign 
Minister, Suhaill, and told that the Government had given orders 
to the armed forces to cease all opposition, and was 
prepared to meet any terms. 
9 
This was partly because of 
the fear of the Russians who were making rapid headway 
and would reach Tihrän within the next twenty-four hours. 
7. For the full text see Appendix II. Text of Note 
presented to the Persian Ambassador in Moscow by 
M. Molotov on August 25,1941. Confidential, 
.E 5795/3326/34, Fo 371/27218. 8. Ambassador in the UK, Winant, to the SOS, Aug. 28, 
1941. US. P. R., vol. III, 1941, fin. p. 441. For the 
full text see 740.0011 European `dar 1939/14415. 
9. "Iran" (newspaper), 19 Shahrivar1320 (Sept. 10,1941) 
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, On August 
30, the British and Russian, terms were 
communicated to the Iranian Government, They were not as 
severeas the Government had been expecting. On September 
9, Suhaill reported the Allies' terms to the Majlis, 
according to which; 
1. The Russians would withdraw north of the 
following line; from the Iraq frontier to., Ushnü, thence 
in an easterly direction through Haidaräbäd, Miyänduä. b, 
Zanjan, and Qazvin, northeast to Khurramäbäd(on the 
Caspian); east to Babulsar, south to Zlrab, Simnän, 
northeast to Shährud, Aliabäd, and north to the Russian 
border. 
2. British would withdraw west and south of the 
following lines; Khänigain eastward to Kirmänshäh ; in 
an easterly direction through Khurramä. bäd (. Luristan), 
Masjid Sulaimä. n, Haftgil, Gachsaran; southwest to Bandar 
Dailam ( on the Persian Gulf). 
3. Occupation of both zones would be temporary. 
4+. The Iranian Government would expel all German 
nationals within one week, although a few technicians 
who were not employed in the communications and militaty, 
would be allowed to remain, but the Government would 
supply the British and Russian authorities, with the names 
of those who remained. 
5. The Iranian Government would undertake not to 
allow entry of Germans into Iran. 
6. The Iranian Government would provide full facilites 
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for transit through Iran of war materials and supplies 
but not troops. 
7. -Iran would maintain a policy of strict' neutrality. 
8. The British and Russians would maintain friendly 
relations with Iran, and would help her with economic 
needs. 
9. The British would continue to pay the oil 
royalties. 
10. The Russians would continue to pay the fisheries 
royalties. 
11. British and Russian troops would stop further, 
advance, and would withdraw at once when the situation 
permitted* 
10 
In its reply to the British and Russian terms, the 
Iranian Government accepted the terms in principle with 
few exceptions. The Government requested that the British 
zone be altered to exclude Dizfül and Khurramäbäd and that 
the Russian zone be amended to exclude Qazvln, Simnän, and 
Shährüd. This was mainly for fear of the Russians being 
so near Tihrän, who might seek a pretext to occupy the 
capital. In fact, Bullard had expressed this fear to 
Dreyfus. 
11 




11. ', Dreyfus to the SOS, Sept. 3,1941. US. F. R., vol. 111, 
: 1941, p. 448. 
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1. the Government hoped that Iranian independence 
and right to administer the country would cont=inue, 
2. the police would immediately resume their duties, 
3. the Government would not be expected to pay 
expenses of occupying forces, 
. in order to avoid conflicts the forces would have 
as little as possible contact with the people, 
5. the Allies would buy the goods formerly bought by 
Germany, 
6. arms and ammunition which had fallen into Allied 
hands would be returned, 
7, compensation would be made for lives and property 
lost after resistance ceased, 
8. prohibition on entry of Germans would last only 
for the duration of the war, 
9. the Allies would withdraw their forces when the 
situation permitted. 
10. the Government would agree to the expulsion of the 
Germans but expected the Allies to arrange for their safe 
12 
conduct. 
The Iranian Government had found the British proposed 
zone of occupation reasonable as it was obviously limited 
to the protection of the oil fields and the facilitating 
of railway transport. Besides, the Government did not 
apprehend the British occupation. 
13 
But the Soviet zone 
12s Ibid. 
13" Steinhardt (bieeting'with Said) to the SOS9 Sept 79 
1941. US. F. R., vol. III, 1941, p. 456-7. 
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was unreasonably five times greater than'the British, 
and the Government was fearful of both the Soviet Union 
and pommunism, and by no means persuaded that the Russians 
would ultimately withdraw. It was also concerned lest the 
Shah should refuse to accept the Soviet zone. 
However, the Russians refused the Iranian request 
for the alteration of their zone and the compensation, 
but the British approved of the stationing, of Iranian 
troops in Dizfül and Khurramäbäd, 
; Threatened with the occupation of Tihrän, the 
Government accepted the terms, hoping that, the advance of 
troops would stop. But later, on September 17, on the 
grounds that the Iranian Government had been unable to 
expel the Germans, Allied troops marched into Tihrän. 
Although the position of Furüghi's Cabinet in 
accepting the Allies' terms was not defensible, it deserved 
credit, Bullard reported; 
"Soviet Ambassador and I asked the Minister 
for Foreign Affairs today why Persian 
Government allowed their cause to go 
undefended: only articles had been on 
other side, viz, those written before 
military resistance ceased and objectionable 
one summarised in my telegram No. 706 (E5554). He said that this had not' 
been overlooked and implied that it 
1114 would part of campaign for reform... 
14. Bullard to FO, Sept. 14,1941. E 5623/3326/34, 
, FO 371/27218. 
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This action and Suhaill's subsequent talk with Bullard and 
Smirnov could only be interpreted as the Cabinet's attempts 
to rid-itself of the Shah's influence. 
II. Internment of Germans 
Ri a Shah and his Government were seriously concerned 
with the safe return of the Germans from Iran. The Shah 
suggested to Ettel that Germany shoui1take steps with the 
Turkish Government so that the latter would bring 
influence to bear upon the British and Russians to grant 
safe conduct for the return of the Germans. The German 
Foreign Ministry did not like this suggestion. They 
commented on Ettel's report; 
"It would be out of the question for 
us to approach our enemies through 
Turkey in this manner, in the role 
of supplicants, as it were; but a 
friendly talk would be held with the 
Turkish Government to the end that 
it should on its motion and on the 
strength of its treaty obligation 15 
do everything which is possible. " 
Therefore it was suggested that Ambassador von Papen 
be instructed to undertake such a dernarche with the Turkish 
Government, and at the same time the Turkish Ambassador 
in Germany be informed. Meanwhile, Ettel had approached 
16 
the American Minister in Tihrän to request his good offices 
15" ; Meizsficker 
(comment on Ettel's, Aug. 25, Top secret) 
'No. 240, Aug. 26,1941, fn. German Foreign Policy, 
vol. XIII, p. 380. 
16. Ibid. 
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"with the Dritish and Russian authorities to ensure humane 
treatment of the 900 Germans" who had taken refuge in the 
German-Legation. The American Minister reported; 
"He seemed honestly to fear the lives 
of Germans on the arrival of the 
Russian troops and stated that he 
much preferred to have them turned 
over to the British rather than 
the Russians. "17 
In late August Ettel had made a statement to Suhaili 
that the German colony would have made the journey to 
Turkey through Iraq and Syria, as Germany had preferred 
to have the Germans travel from Iran to Turkey through 
that-route rather than through the Russian-occupied 
area. 
18 But Bullard had offered a suggestion which would 
have prevented the Germans falling into Russians hands. 
According to it, the British Government was prepared to 
receive the Germans in Ahväz; they would there have been 
taken over by British military authorities for ultimate 
internment in India. 
19 
Suhaili put the British plan to 
Ettel and explained that the Iranian Government would 
endeavour to find a solution acceptable for the parties 
concerned. But Ettel had gained a very gloomy impression 
of this plan so he wrote; "I am no longer in any doubt 
that the Iranian Government is prepared to throw the 
17" Dreyfus to the SOS, Aug. 31,1941. US. F. R., vol. III, 
1941, p. 444. - 
18. Ettel to FM, Most secret, No. 263, Sept. ]., 1941. 
German Foreign Policy, vol. XIII, -p. 420. 
19. Dreyfus (Meeting with Bullard, to the SOS. Sept. ]., 1941, 
US. F. R., vol. 111,1941, p. 445. 
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German colony to the wolves if Tihrän is threatened with 
"20 enemy occupation. 
On September 1, the Turkish Charge d'Affaires in 
Tihrän received instruction from his Government to give 
the, Germans refuge in the Turkish Embassy from where they 
would go to Turkey with a view to facilitiating their 
eventual return to Germany. 
21 This step, on the part of 
the, Turkish Government could definitely cause the British 
to stiffen their terms since it had interfered with the 
British Plan for the disposition of the Germans. Andindeed, 
it did. On September 2, the Turkish Charge' d'Affaires 
received new instructions authorising him to grant refuge 
only to those Germans who were in the occupied areas. 
22 
In other words refusing the protection of the Germans, 
since Tihrän had still not been occupied. Although the 
Turkish Government was quick in changing its former offer 
in order to avoid serious consequences from which Iran 
might suffer, it did not stop the British departing from 
their original plan. 
On September 5, the British and Russian notes for 
the expulsion of Axis nationals were delivered to the 
Iranian Foreign Ministry. According to the notes, the 
expulsion of the German, Italian, Hungarian, Bulgarian 
and Rumanian nationals had been required. Moreover, the 
20. Ettel to FM, No. 263, 
-op. 
cit. 
21. Dreyfus to the SOS, No. 130, Sept. 1,1941. US. F. R., 
vol. III, 1941, p. 445-6. 
22. " Dreyfus to the SOS, No. 132, Sept. 2,1941. Ibid, p. 446. 
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legations of these countries had to leave Iran, and the 
German agents were to be surrended to the British and 
Soviet authorities in Iran instead of being., expelled. 
23 
These demands represented fundamental infringement 
of Iran's sovereignty. The Foreign Minister felt that the 
Cabinet should have to resign rather than submit to those 
4 
demands. When Bullard reported that the American Minister 
was also of the opinion that the Iranian Cabinet should 
resign rather than hand over the Germans to the British- 
and Russians, the Foreign Office commented; 1' the American 
Minister's experience of Persia is short. " 
24 
The Foreign 
Office was right, for they knew that they would make good 
their threat to the Iranians that the British and Russians 
would themselves come to Tihrän and get the Germans. On 
this line, Eden, in reply to questions about the closure 
of the Axis Legations in Tihrän, informed the House of 
Commons; 
" steps are being taken by the Iranian 
Government to hand over the German 
community in Iran to2ýhe British and 
Soviet Governments. " 
The request for closure of the German Legation in 
Tihrän was in fact welcomed by the German Foreign Ministry, 
though they apparently use this issue as a pretext for a 
23 "Iran", 19 Shahrivar 1320 (Sept. 10,1941. See. 'also Dreyfus 
to the SOS, Sept. 5,1941; ' Steinhardt (Moscow) to the SOS, 
Sept. 8,1941. US. F. R., vol. III, 1941, p. 452, p. 458-9. 
Because of Russian insistence the Bulgarians were allowed 
to remain in Iran, see Dreyfus to SOS, Sept-7,1941. T-bid, 
p. 455. 
24. Minute on Bullard, Sept, 8,1941. E 5419/3326/34, FO 371 
/27217- 
25* 10th Sept., 1941, H. C. Deb., 5th Series, vol. 374, co1.159 
(Answering Sir John Mellor). Also see, answer to Shinwell, 
Ibid. 
117 
propaganda campaign against the Allies. As early as 
September 3, Hitler had expressed the wish that, primarily, 
every effort should be made to get the Germans out of 
Iran, and then disband and withdraw the Legation. newel, 
of the German Foreign Ministry wrote; 
"The personnel of the Legation, he(Hitler) 
said, should be gradually withdrawn until 
no one was left. It did not matter what 
the Iranians would do then. The reason 
why the I? ührer is giving orders-to pull 
all Germans out of Iran is, apart from 
political motives, his desire to have 
complete freedom of action in Iran when 
our troops will have advanced further, 
Ile would like to prevent having his 
freedom of action restricted ýg the 
presence of Germans in Iran. " 
However, for technical reasons and because' of the 
refusal of Turkey to offer any protective measures to the 
Germans of the immediate withdrawal of the-Legation, it 
was decided that the plan would not be considered until 
safe conduct was assured for the departure of the German 
colony. Had the Anglo-Russian demands been restricted to 
only the closure of the Legation they would have been what 
the Germans themselves had planned. But the demand for the 
Germans to be handed over to the Allies was, of course, 
disquieting. So, when Suhaili told Ettel of the Allied 
decision he bitterly protested against it. 
26', Memorandum, Sept. 14,1941, No. 280. German Foreign 
Policy, vol. XIII, Series D. p. 452. .' 
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In Germany, a reprisal plan was proposed according 
to which the British subjects in the Channel Islands of 
Jersey and Guernsey and the Soviet subjects in the areas 
under'German control could be interned as the. retaliatory 
measure. 
27 
Hitler proposed that for every German deported 
from Iran, ten selected British, including the prominent 
Englishmen such as Churchill's nephew, be deported from 
the island of Jersey, and their property to be distributed 
among the population of French origin. there. '28 However, 
a communication on the proposed line was transmitted to 
the British Government through the Swiss Government, 
while "expressing the willingness of the German Government 
to refrain from deporting British subjects and also to 
grant safe conduct for 132 British volunteers from the 
Finnish war who were stranded in Sweden, provided that 
the British Government would refrain from interning the 
members of the German colony in Iran. "29 A similar telegram 
was also sent to the Soviet Government through the Bulgarian 
Government. The Soviet Government "rejected without 
examination the impudent reply of the German Government. "30 
27. Cf. documents Nos. 280,287, & 305 (Sept. 4,7, &12,1941), 
German Foreign Policy, vol. XIII. 
28. Memo b an official of the Foreign Minister's Personal Staff 
(Hewel) Sept. 12,1941, No. 306, Ibid. In document No. 317, 
5ept. 14, the sentence concerning the distribution of 
the property was crossed out. The following marginal 
notes on this reads; "To be witheld for the time being. 
(Ribbentrop). " 
29. Ribbentrop to Ettel, Sept. 7,1941, No. 287, see also fn(4), 
Ibid, p. 462- 
30- See document No. 305, f. n. (1), Sept. 12,1941. Ibid, p. 482. 
For the postponement of the reprisals by Germany,, and her 
new proposals for the exchange of civilian internees, see 
document No. 317, f. n. (2)Ibid, P. 507 
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On September 12, negotiations about the German 
colony were carried out after a short break down 
3l, 
on the Iranian side by the Director General of the 
Foreign Ministry, Sayyäh, and the Director of the 
Central European Department, intizäm, and on the German 
side by Ettel. The Swedish Charge d'Affaires attended 
as the neutral party. The purpose of this meeting was 
to clarify the list of persons who were to be surrendered. 
Apparently, Suhaili had promised Bullard that 10. p. m. 
of September 12 would be the final and last time limit 
for the departure of those Germans who were to be interned. 
Ironically, the meeting ended at 10. p. m. when Sayyäh 
announced that the persons who had been clarified in the 
list must be at the railway station by midnight. This 
was obviously impossible for technical reasons. Ettel 
wrote; 
"There ensued a discussion in which 
the representatives of the Iranian 
Foreign Ministry presented the 
highly pitiful spectacle of 
indecisive and despicable officials, 
lacking any sense of responsibility. 
The reason for this was the fact 
that once again the Iranian Foreign 
Minister had made binding promises 
to the enemy3powers which he could 
not fulfil. "---- 
31. The German Legation at Shimiran was surrounded by 
Iranian troops in connection with Iranian allegations 
that there were armed men inside the compound, Ettel 
protested against this and broke off the meeting and 
: told that he would not attend unless the troops were 
removed. An account of this event is cited in Khatirat-i 
siyasi Farukh (Mu'tasim-ul-saltani, p. 139" 
32. Ettel to, No. 311, Sept-13,1941. German Foreign 
Policy, op. cit, p. 49l. 
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Then, Ettel continued; 
"In the course of the conversation 
M. Sayyah admitted in tearful'accents 
that the British Minister had baldly 
stated to the Iranian Foreign Minister 
that if this limit were not observed 
the consequence would be the 
occupation of Tehran by English and 
Russian troops who would themselves 
then round up the German colony. "33 
Since all the Iranian authorities shied away from 
making another approach to the British Minister, the 
Swedish Charge d'Affaires, Ripa, at last, contacted 
Bullard and obtained his consent to an extension of the 
deadline to 5 p. m. of September 13. Finall'yj Ettel 
3 
wrote; 
"After the two (Sayyah and Intizäm) 
shaking and trembling, had left 
my office at 10.40 p. m, I called 
my staff together and explained 
to them that the moment now had 
come where further delay of 
departures of the comrades on the 
list would not only be useless 
but would jeopardize the safe 
conduct promised for women and 
children. ""35 
The first trainload of Germans, 72 for Ahväz and 
eight for Qazvin, left in the morning of September 13. 
Ettel left Tihrän for Turkey on September 17, accompanied 
by 250 women and 140 children. By September 21, about 
four hundred German men of military age had been turned 
over to the British and about 60 to the Soviets. Approximately 
33. " Ibid, pp, L 9k-5. 
34. ' , 
Ibid. 
3 5" Ibid. 
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100 men over 45 years of age were allowed to remain in 
Tihrän under the care of the Swedish Legation. 
36 
The German episode did not finish there. Despite 
Ettel's promise to Furuahi, some Germans went into 
hiding, and orangized a fifth column organization 
in collaboration with pro-German Iranians. This will 
be discussed in Chapter 6. 
36. Ibid. Suhaili had requested the American Minister to 
assign the Military Attache or some members of staff, 
with the British and Russian consent, to accompany 
the Axis diplomatic members and nationals to Turkey 
through the Russian occupied zone. The Soviet 
Ambassador. rejected this on the grounds that it would 
be a reflection on Soviet justice. See, documents; 
Dreyfus to the SOS9 Sept-13 and 14,1941. US. F. R., 
vol. III, 1941, pp 459-60. 
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III. The impact of the occupation on the internal 
situation and the introduction of reforms 
September-December, l9Lt1. 
I 
Once asked whether Madame de Pompadour's renowned 
phrase, "ApAs thous le deluge" reflected his own sentiments, 
Muhammad Rizä Shäh had, admittedly, nodded. 
37 
And indeed, 
similarly, after the fall of his father, Iran experienced, 
for a good period of time, the turbulent existence of a 
society in the throes of chaos, if not revolution. 
If the foreign powers were partly responsible for 
such state of affairs this was not to exonerate Rizä Shah 
from blame, for he was as much responsible as the society 
as whole for the predicament in which Iran found 
herself later. Ile had engineered the political system 
so as to necessitate the institutional centrality of 
him (the monarchy). His name was a magic one in the 
country in preserving law and order and, whatever the 
temptation to banditry, the tribal population had such a 
fear of him that they dared not move. quite predictably, 
when he fell, a power vacuum ensued. Disorder became 
prevalent, separatist movements were revived, political 
parties mushroomed. The last named were mainly based on 
personal and sectarian interests rather than national. 
37" Cited in Kambiz Afrachteh, "Theocratic Populism, 
Superpower Rivalry And The Balkanisation of Iran: 




All these had, however, their roots implanted in the 
barren political environment that had been created by 
coercion. In the final analysis, Rita Shah's policy was 
to subordinate political development to what he regarded 
as being the exigencies of economic trade-off. But it 
might perhaps be mentioned that, while Rizä Shah was 
disliked for the tyranny of his rule, there was a 
recognition among the more enlightened that under him 
Iran was able to achieve a very considerable measure of 
progress. There was no desire to go back on this, but a 
wish to preserve and continue what had been begun by him. 
Apparently, for many, the disappearance of Ri ra Shäh 
had opened up a new era for better social justice, reforms, 
and political grouping as well as intrigues. It is ironic 
to observe that progress brings destruction. 
II 
Apart from the impact of Rizä Shah's fall, the 
occupation of the country by foreign troops had its own 
effect in the internal situation of Iran. The general 
belief among the public which tended to grow day by day 
was that the Russians did not intend to leave the country. 
In contrast with the entry of hated Russians, the advent 
of the British forces was not viewed unfavourably. 
38 
38. Press Attache, Lambton, to Bullard (to FO) t confidential 
oct. 4,194i. E 721/42/34, FO 371/27157. 
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This more favourable attitude was, of course, relative. 
The Iranians did not like either, and many resented the 
presence of the alien forces in their country, particularly 
in Tihran, 
The popularity that the British had gained, resulting 
from'the abdication of Rizä Shah, began to wane rapidly. 
There was a growing tendency to blame them, this time, 
for the misdeeds of the Russians. 
39 
In the Russian occupied zone, the administration had 
broken down. Apparently, there was little open interference 
with : the civil government by the Russian authorities,, but 
the disarming of the police and gendarmerie and lack of 
respect shown to officials had made it difficult for the 
Iranian Government to function. To add to this, the 
corruption, inefficiency, and lack of public spirit among 
the government's officials had made this paralysis worse. 
In early September, large Russian forces arrived at 
Mashhad. They dropped leaflets, inciting the people to 
revolt. 
4o 
They soon began the Bolshevisation of Mashhad. 
Private cars were confiscated, Iranian Officers were 
arrested and removed. The British Consul in Mashhad 
reported; 
".... Throughout whole of Iran people 
are praying for British intervention 
and if early occupation up to Birjand 
were possible it would allay panic and 
prevent chaos that will inevitably 41 
follow further Russian encroachment. " 
39. Ibid. 
40. Britconsul to Bullard (to FO), Sept. 10,1941. 
E 5494/3326/34, FO 371/27217- 
41. From C-in-C India to the liar Office, Sept. 8, 
1941. E5510/3326/31, F0 371/27217. 
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In Äzerbäyjän the situation was more grave. On their 
arrival the Soviet forces armed many Armenian irregulars 
to keep order in Azerbayijan, but these Armenians were 
disarmed later. About early September, a large open-air 
meeting was held at Tabriz and was chiefly. attended by the 
Armenians, who demanded independence for Äzerbäyijän and 
its eventual federation with the Soviet Union, but the 
Soviet military authorities wisely prevented a second 
meeting from being held with the same object in view, A 
petition was, however, circulated in the same sense. The 
American Minister reported; "Russians in occupied zone 
in Iran are at least lending sympathy to Armenians and to 
others in separatist movements. " 
42 
This was an indication 
of Soviet activities inconsistent with the assurances 
respecting the territorial integrity of Iran. 
A certain Dr. Cochrane, an American missionary doctor, 
who was in Tabriz, gave a moderate account of-the events 
in T brit. While admitting the looting by Armenians and 
rabbles, mainly of premises of Germans and fleeing Iranians, 
his report held the view that public security on the whole 
was good and Soviet troops well disciplined. A'series of 
43 
reports by the British consul in Tabriz painted a much 
more gloomy and sorry picture of the situation in that 
area, including opening of jails, requisitioning of houses 
42". Dreyfus to the SOS, Sept. 19,1941, p. 461. Also see, Hull 
to Dreyfus, Sept. 25; Hull to Steinhardt, Sept. 25,1941. 
US. F. R., vol. 111,1941, p. 462. 
43. ! Dreyfus to the SOS, Sept. 26,1941, Ibid, p. 463. 
S 
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and crops, political intrigue, looting by mobs, and 
sympathy on the part of the Russians to separatist 
movements. Needless to say, the Iranian reports were 
similar to the British. However, when these reports 
reached the Foreign Office, Eden put the matter to Maisky, 
and added; "... It seemed to me most important that no 
encouragement should be given to the movement for autonomy 
in Äzarbäyijan by the Soviet Government. The effect of any 
such action on Turkey and on the Moslem population in other 
parts, of Persia would be deplorable, " 
44 
Maisky replied 
that he felt that the Soviet authorities had no such 
intention. 
45 
Obviously, any encouragement of such a 
movement would have, no doubt, given German propaganda an 
effective weapon for use in Turkey or Iran. 
The Russians had quelled the . zarbayljan 
independence 
movement in October. Nevertheless, they did not stop 
subversive activities in meddling in the internal affairs 
of Iran. For instance, in September, they had begun 
printing a newspaper in Persian called Afkär-i khalq 
(Thoughts of the people). Its object was to disseminate 
Russian propaganda, and to criticize the Iranian Government. 
In the middle of September the Soviet Ambassador 
presented to Suhaili a list of reforms that the Iranian 
Government should carry out, e. g., transfer of crown 
44. Eden (Meeting with Maisky), --to Sir S. Cripps'(Moscow) 
Confidential, Sept. 23,1941 E6000/42/34, FO 371/27153. 
45. ' Ibid. The US Government supported Eden's view, and 
instructed its Ambassador in London to discuss with 
Maisky that the US Government was concerned with the 
preserving the political independence and territorial 
'integrity of Iran. See, Hull to Winant, Oct. 8,194l. 
US. F. R., vol. III, 1941, p. 469. 
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property to the people and reduction of taxation. But 
two of them aroused much anxiety among the government 
officials, vis., (a) there should be a moderate 
constitution, giving to the majority of the population 
the right to elect the Majlis, (b) there should be, at 
least a minimum of local self-government. 
46 
One could 
understand the dislike of the Xzarbäyijänis for their 
central Government who had ignored them in the time of 
peace and ran away the moment danger appeared, and a 
minimum of self-government seemed to be the least they 
might expect to obtain under a constitutional regime. 
Moreover, the Soviet Government might have felt that they 
were forced to adopt an active policy to counteract 
German propaganda amongst the Armenians and the attraction 
of Turkey for the Moslems of . zarbäyi jän. This was, of 
course, the pessimistic version of the argument. , 
There is, of course, much to be said in favour of 
local self-government. But the Iranian Government, while 
admitting such rights for Äzarbayijän and other provinces, 
feared that in the chaotic situation in which the country 
was, such measures might have the undesirable. effect of 
encouraging the separatist tendencies in 
Zzarbäyijän. 
Bullard duly wrote; 
46. Bullard (Meeting with Suhaill) to FO, Sept. 19,1941. 
E 5871, FO 371/27219. 
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".... Possibly the separatist policy 
of the Soviet military authorities 
in Tabriz would be repudiated by the 
Soviet Government but the General 
Officer Commanding (grp. omt.? has) 
political officer attached-to him 
and would hardly act without 
authority .I will talk about this 
to the Soviet Ambassador but he 
has little influence with the Army 
Commanders even if he though fit to 
use it in this connection. " 7 
Quite predictably, Vishinski48 denied that the Soviet 
Government was lending sympathy to the Armenian separatist 
movement. He attributed the matter to German propaganda, 
and said, "the Soviet Government has no knowledge of any 
such activities by agents of the Soviet Government... "49 
The other proposed Soviet reform envisaged the 
extention of the basis on which the elections for the 
Majlis were held. Here again there might be much talk, 
particularly on a theoretical level, in favour of a wider 
franchise than was at the time in force under the Iranian 
constitution. To carry out such reform would have: -meant 
holding fresh elections. It is admitted that elections 
which were in progress at the time, had begun under Rizä 
Shah's contro1,50 and that some members who returned, 
might be considered as the Shäh's nominees, but to 
dissolve the Majlis wbuld have involved departure from the 
47. Ibid. 
48. Andrei Yanaurievich Vishinsky; Soviet Deputy People's 
Coar for Foreign Affairs. 
49. Steinhardt (Meeting with Vishinsky) to the SOS, Oct. 11, 
1941. US. F. R.,, vol. III, 19419p. 471- 
50- Farmän for the election of 13th Majlis was issued in 
lchurdäd 1320 (May 1941). 
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constitution, and it would be an unfortunate precedent. 
51 
Moreover, the Government knew that fresh elections would 
only produce communist deputies in the areas. occupied by 
the Soviet troops. 
The current belief among some people was that the 
Russian hdd been in favour of fresh elections, but later 
on they were told by the British that re-election would 
result in pro-German deputies being elected. Therefore, 
according to those, the Russians did not obtrude this 
demand on the Government. 
It was perhaps difficult to satisfy demands for reform 
without the danger of anarchy which would increase., more 
pressure on the Government and its task of observing 
interests of the country. Furu, hi was probably inclined 
to induce most objectionable deputies to resign, and hold 
fresh elections for their constituencies, but except for 
these changes, he ought to carry on with the'Majlis elected, 
and ask people to judge it by its works. 
In early October, Soviet authorities seized many goods 
wholly paid for by Iranian importers on the grounds that 
Dank Milli's list, which had been hurriedly prepared, 
did not mention these goods. Many of the imports belonged 
to merchants in other parts of Iran, with whom communication 
51. In reply to the petition sent to the Shah by a group of 
Tihran population, on Aban 19,1320 (Nov. l0,1941), 
asking re-election of the Majlis, Furughi sent a telegram 
to the Shah, which was published in Tihran newspapers 
on Aban 21, explaining(to the public) the unlawfulness 
of cancelling elections by the Government. 
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was not possible. The Russians ignored protests, and 
dispatched the imports to the Soviet Union. 
52 
The report 
of the British Consul in Tabriz reads; 
"Soviet authorities have taken every thing 
from the recently evacuated Government 
offices and schools on the pretext of 
furnishings needed for their own offices 
here, but I am categorically assured 
that the railway wagon-loads of 
miscellaneous furniture and household 
effects are being despatched to Russia. 
Searchers of private houses continue, 
sometimes unauthorized parties of 
1153 Soviet officers demanding money... 
By the middle of October, Bullard'sreports, however, 
showed better cooperation on the parts of the Soviet 
authorities in transportation, re-establishment of 
relatively free road communication between important cities, 
and an improvement in the general conduct of the Russians 
in Tabriz. Iranian police were also rearmed. But the 
Russians continued to spread communist propaganda. For 
example, on a Soviet invitation to sporting events held 
on October 12, in Tihrän the slogan "Proletariat of all 
countries unite", was printed. On October 9, the Tihrän 
newspaper, Ittilä'ät, published an article which described 
the Soviet occupation of Iranian towns in the most favourable 
light. Suhaili, confidentially, informed Dreyfus that the 
article had been published only under pressure from the 
Soviet Ambassador. 
54 
On the same day Tass refuted the 
52. Britconsul(Tabriz) to Dullard (to FO), No. 940, Oct-7, 
1941. E 6432 FO 371/27234. 
53" Dritconsul (Tabriz)to Bullard (to FO), No. 941, Ibid. 
54*. Dreyfus to the-SOS, 'Oct. 13,1941. US. F. R., vol. 111, 
1941, p. 473. 
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report circulated by Berlin and Rome radios that the Soviet 
Union was insisting on incorporation of North Western Iran 
and that General Sir Archibald P. Wavell, Commander in Chief 
of the British Armed Forces in India, had approved this 
demand 
55 
However, in the Russian zone, communist propaganda 
continued to be spread by word of mouth, motion pictures 
and in Tabriz by the theatre and registration of Soviet 
56 
sympathisers. 
In December there appeared again further disquieting 
evidence of Soviet separatist schemes in Iran. The Soviet 
political officer collected chiefs from Saqqiz and Savujbuläq 
areas, and some of Shähsavan tribesmen of Eastern Äzarbäyijän, 
and took them to Tabriz as "guests" and sent them to Baku 
57 
ostensibly for a week's cultural pleasure trip. 
however, the atmosphere of mutual distrust'between 
the Iranians and Dritish on one side, and the Russians on 
the other, continued to exist. Each side were accusing the 
other of lack of cooperation, as for instance, when several 
Äzarbäyijänis were murdered, in December, in Tihrän and 
Tabri4 apparently for political reasons, for which the 
Russi4n agents were accused. The Russians denied it, and 
55. Cripps to F0, No. 1277, Oct. 9,1941. E 5481/211/38, FO 
371/27185. 
56. Extracts from t1e Second Secretary of the US Legation, 
James S. Moose report of fact finding visit to the 
Russian zone, (to) Dreyfus to SOS, No. 210, Oct. 29, 
1941. op. cit, p. 474-5. 
57, Bullard to FO, Dec-3,1941, E 7974, and Dec. 6,1941. 
E 805/5068/34,. F0 371/21756. Minute on the former 
document reads "We are considering the possibility 
of appointing political officers one of whose functions 
would be to strengthen our influence with the tribes, 
particularly the Kurds and Bakhtiari. " 
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demanded that the Iranian Government should reduce the police 
force in Tabriz, withdraw Colonel Saif, Iranian police 
chief, and close the newspaper "Voice of Äzarbayijan". 
58 
III 
When the Anglo-Russian troops moved into Iran in 
August, they needed local currency for their expenses. 
The Iranian Government had, for some years, imposed 
different rates of exchange for sterling. While the official 
rate was 68 Ris. for a pound sterling, there were rates 
of 80,120 and 170 for sterling obtained from export of 
goods classified by the Government as the first, second 
and third. Tourists and foreign representatives could 
obtain 170 Rls to a pound, whereas the AIOC only got 68 
Rls. This discriminatory rate of exchange was, however, 
pernicious to the economy, and both fictitious rates of 
68 and 170 Ris. were unrealistic. 
The Soviet Government was not interested in Iranian 
rates of exchange, for they could obtain rials through 
the fisheries. When they invaded Iran, they, naturally, 
needed more local currency. The Iranian Government was 
asked to advance them 40 million rials credit in exchange 
for delivery of sugar and textile to the Government. The 
58, Dreyfus to the SOS, Dec. 11,1941, US. F. R., vol. III, 
1941, p. 476. 
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Russians promised such delivery, but they began to sell 
those goods to selected merchants, thus evading customs. 
The Iranian Government blocked the credit. Later on, 
the official request was presented to the Iranian 
Government to allow the Russians to sell goods to 
merchants. 
59 
The Iranian Government's problem in this matter was its 
dispute with the British over the rate of exchange. 
Abbas Qu: lI Gulshä'iyän was the Finance Minister in Furüghi's 
first cabinet. Before the occupation, being the Assistant 
Under Secretary of the Ministry of Finance, he was made 
Minister by Ri a Shah, according to Bullard, for his 
statement to the P Iajlis that the crown jewels were all 
60 
in the Bank Milli. A few days after the occupation, 
the meeting, which had been arranged between Gulshä'iyän 
and Bullard to discuss local currency needs of the British 
forces in Iran, did not result in any agreement between 
the two sides. Bullard was insisting on his demand; 
170 Rls. to a pound, while the Minister was not prepared 
to offer more than 90 Rls. 
61 
To concede with Bullard's 
demand would have brought a higher inflation rate which. 
had steadily been rising since 1937" 
59. Bullard to FO, Nov. 25,1941. E 7793, FO 371/27155- 
60. Bullard to FO, No. 818, Sept. 22,1941. E 5965, FO 
371/27153. According to Gulsha'"iyan. 's memoire' see 
Valizadeh, o . cit., Tagazaha Aghäz mishavad, pp. 365- 
383) his appointment as the Minister of Finance was 
made for his meticulous efforts to supply sufficient 
rice and coal for Tihran population during the first 
days of the occupation of Iran, on Rizä Shah's order. 
The question about crown jewels was raised in the Najlis 
on September 17, while he had been appointed to the 
Ministry on August 27. Therefore, his account of his 
rise to the ministerial post seems to be correct. 
61. In fact Gulsha'iya n's original offer was the official 
rate of 68 Rls. Later, upon orders from Ri29 Shah, he agreed 
to offer the rate of 80 Rls., then 90 Rls. - 
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As a retaliatory measure, the British troops in 
Khuzistän and Kirmänshäh stopped lorries. carrying wheat 
to Tihrän. When the news reached Tihrän, Gulshä'iyän 
told Bullard; "if you wish to cause famine in Tihrän, thus 
rioting and revolution, I will have nothing to say any 
more, otherwise you should order British troops not to 
interfere with the transportation. " 
62 
According to 
GulshaOiyän, Bullard phoned General Fraser and asked 
him to-send ordexsto British military authorities in 
63 
those areas to release the lorries. 
No concrete agreement was reached between the two 
sides until the removal of Gulsb iyan from the Ministry 
of Firace to the Ministry of Trade in Furüshi's second. 
cabinet, and his replacement with Dr. Musharaf Nafisi, 
64 
the legal Adviser to the AIOC. Nafisi raised the Official 
rate of, exchange from 68 to 140 Ris. Economically speaking, 
he de-valued the rial, thus causing higher inflation. 
65 
The currency question was one of those chronic problems 
which often caused disputes between the Iranian and British 
Governments. This will be discussed in the next chapter. 
62. Gulsha'iyan's memoire, op. cit, p. 372. 
63. Ibid. For the full account of this meeting, see 
PP"371-3. 
64. See Personalities, Appendix I, p. 535" 
65. When Nafisi was the AIOC Adviser, insisted on 
that the Government should agree to 90 instead 
of 68 rials for the company's sterling converted to 
the rial. Two articles on the rate of exchange, 
attacking Nafisi's policy, were published in 
Ra'd-i Imruz, No. 267,4 Aban, 1323 (Oct. 26,1943), and 




At 4p. m. in the afternoon of September 17,1941, 
after taking the oath in the Majlis, Muhammad Riia Shah 
Pahlavi 
66 
made a declaration, stressing'the necessity 
for closer cooperation between the Sovereign Government and 
the Parliament, if a consititutional Government was to be 
a reality. The declaration continued that formal orders 
had been issued to all officials, civil and military, 
reminding them that any infringements of existing laws 
and regulations and encroachment on the rights of others 
would be punished according to laws, and the Government. 
were specifically charged with ensuring the security of 
the individual in accordance with 'habeas corpus'. The 
Government must also work out and institute as soon as 
possible with the approval of the Majlis, a complete 
programme of reforms including social, economic and 
financial. Finally, the Shah pledged again to carry out 
his duties in conformity with the law and ordered the 
Government to solve existing problems and restore things 
to normal in close collaboration with "Governments of the 
countries whose interests are linked to ours. " 
67 
On the 
following day, the Shah issued a farman, granting a 
general amnesty to political prisoners. 
68 
66. See Personalities, Appendix I. (Hereafter cited as the- 
Sh2W. p. 512. 
67. "Iran", 26 Shahrivar 1320 (Sept. 18,1941'). 
68. According to articles, 54 and 55 of Iranian Public 
Criminal Law, the sovereign had the right to grant 
amnesty to political prisoners. 
I 
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It seemed, indeed, to be a new era. On the same day 
as the Shah's inauguration, the Majlis deputies, who 
were once described by Dullard as Rizä Shah's orphans, 
had spoken out in a private session in the Majlis. They 
discussed crown jewels, the restoration of justice, the 
return of property to former owners, publice security, 
the reduction of budget and taxation, the cancellation 
of the law abolishing religious endowments. When Bullard 
commented that the last named proposal seemed a 
reactionary attempt by mullas to get back their former 
influence, the Foreign Office reaction was; 
"We should ignore for time present. 
We are bound to interfere in so many 
directions that we hardly want to 
start defending the Shah's anti- 
mullah policy. 69 
Later in the month, the Foreign office changed 
its attitude towards the reactionary movements by mullas. 
Perhaps, they realized that they had commited a great 
blunder-in being indifferent on this matter, and the 
results of this blunder would soon come home to plague 
them. Indications of this realization became conspicuous 
after the BBC Arabic broadcast of September 7, 'which had 
spoken of the joy of Arabs in Southern Iran when after the 
entry of British troops they were able to resume their 
traditional dress and mullas their turbans. Disappointed 
69. Minute on Bullard, Sept. 21,1941. E 5863/3326/34, 
FO 371/27219. 
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with this broadcast, Bullard wrote; 
"To many Persians this had a 
reactionary ring and I think 
that great care must be 
exercised in this connection. 
Shah may have seized for himself 
some of the Mosque properties 
but return to days when revenues 
were dissipated by Mullahs is 
undesirable. Compulsion exercised 
by the Shah about abandonment of 
veil by women and national costume 
permitted, was bad but it would 
be disastrous if encouragement 
were given to complete reaction which 
would restore influence of Mullahs, 
veil all women, stop education of 
girls and so on. Subject is 
complicated by modernistic attitude 
of Turkey on one side and more 
conservative position of Moslems in 
(grp. undec.? Persia) on the other 
and I suggest that we avoid it un l 
we have worked out a policy..... " 
While agreed with $ullard, the Foreign Office 
commented; 
"... one of the few good feature of the 
ex-Shah's regime was his destruction 
of the power of the Mullahs. We have 
nothing to hope from them: their 
inclinations are naturally towards 
xenophobia and if we keep bringing 
them back to their old position of 
influence they will only turn against use 
71 
Therefore, then attempts were made to hold the 
ceremonies known as Rauzakhäni and TaO'zia in the open72 
in the British zone, Bullard sent instructions to Ahvaz 
70. Bullard to FO No-747, Sept. 16,1941. E 5808t 
Fo 371/27219. 
71. Minute by"Pink on Bullard, Ibid. 
72. During the last years of Rizä Shah's regime, these 
ceremonies had to take place indoors by the Government 
order. Taezia is an intense public demonstration of 
mourning on the anniversary of the-death of the Shia 
saints, viz., Imam Ali, Husain,.. The procession is 
marked by intense religiöus hysteria, flagellation, 
self inflicted sword (qama)cuts on head. Ta rzia has been 
widely revived since 1979. 
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and Kirmänshah, which read; 
.... if such an attempt should be 
made in your district I consider, 
subject to views of His Majesty's 
Government that the military 
authorities would be justified in 
discouraging it through local 
authorities on the grounds of 
public order. "73 
Having waited so long for the break down of the 
authority of R±! ä Shäh, the tribes began to revolt again. 
It had taken him twenty years to disarm these tribes 
and to start integrating them into the civilized life 
of the country. In early September, Iranian KurdistEn 
was suddenly invaded by Iraqi Kurds under the orders 
of Shaikh'Mahmüd. The invading force, numbering some 
hundred men, surrounded several Iranian frontier posts and 
penetrated about fifty miles into Iran towards Sannandaj. 
The British Government acted quickly, and sent instructions 
to Baghdad that if it became necessary the British troops 
would, have to take action against Shaikh Mahmüd. 
74 In 
October, the situation in Kurdistan was aggravated by the 
military set back in Saqqiz. Rebel tribesmen, who were 
supported by hundreds of Iraqi Kurds took Sagqiz for the,, 
second time. The Iranian army had to withdraw, leaving 
central Kurdistän in control of Kurdish rebels who set up 
a provisional administration to replace the central 
government administration which had ceased to function 
73, Bullard to Ahvaz and Kermanshah (to FO), Sept. 15, ' 
1941. E 5809, FO 371/27219. 
74. Minute by FO on H. M. Consul (Kermanshah) (to Tihrän), 
Sept. 8,1941, B. 5444/3326/34, FO 371/27216. 
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in a large part of Kurdistän. General Mugaddam, the 
army commander in Kurdistän, was recalled to Tihrän 
as the result of his failure to restore order in the 
district, and to disarm the tribesmen. It was alleged 
that he was anti-British and that he deliberately 
allowed the situation to deteriorate, hoping thereby 
to create difficulties for the British forces or to 




was appointed as his successor. When the rebels wished 
to establish their headquarters at Sannandaj, the British 
military authorities informed them that the entry into 
Sannandaj would not be allowed while British troops were 
there. But they were prepared to receive a deputation 
to djscuss Kurdish grievances with the central' government. 
77 
It was early in October when the policy which should 
have to be adopted in connection with tribes in Iran, was 
discussed among Bullard, General Wavell, and General 
Quinan. They agreed that it would be undesirable to give 
any encouragement to the tribes, because: (Bullard wrote); 
75. From consul (Kermanshah) to Tihrän, Reptd. to FO 
Oct. 13,1941, E 6626, FO 371/27155. 
76. See Personalities, Appendix I, p. 521. 
77" Consul to Tihran, Oct. 13,1941. op. cit. 
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" (a) it has been laid down by H. M. 
Government (your telegram No-740) 
that our object must be to get 
civil administration running again 
and we cannot at present have one 
policy at the centre and a different 
policy in tribal areas. 
(b) Otherwise we should find 
ourselves in endless family and 
sectional intrigues to little purpose, 
since serious tribal resistance to a 
German advance is not to be expected. 
(c) We must nbt hold out to the 
tribes promises which, as in the case 
of Sheikh of Mohammerah, might not be 
able to save them from the Central 
Government. " 78 S 
It was, however, agreed that this policy would not 
be against paying tribal leaders or elements for specific 
services such as handing over Germans or helping to 
protect the oilfields. The comment made by the Foreign 
Office' on this policy was; "This seems a very sound 
definition of the policy we should take towards tribes. "79 
This policy could be described as 'constructive' 
non-intervention. In other words, while giving no 
encouragement to tribes, the British Government wished to 
strengthen the authority of the Iranian Government vis-a-vis 
the tribes. For instance, when General Shähbakhti was fighting 
with rebels led by Muhammad Rashid in Kurdistän and 
Kirmanshah in December, the British planes dropped leaflets 
over the Kurdistan area, encouraging the rebels to cease 
78. Bullard to FO, Oct. 2,1941. E 6244/3326/34 FO 371/27220. 
In the House of Commons, Eden, answering-questions about 
Iran from the floor, said; "It is not the policy of the 
Allies to intervene in the administration of Persia 
except where circumstances make our intervention 
necessary in the Allied interest.... ". 1st Oct., 1941, 
H. C. Deb., 5th Series, vol. 374, co1.554. ' - 
79" Minute on Bullard. Ibid. 
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hostilities and surrender themselves to the Iranian forces. 
In the leaflet it was remarked that the British Government 
would not support the idea of an independent Kurdish 
State. 
80 
After the abdication of Rizä Shah, it was felt that 
British propaganda policy ought to be altered to positive 
propaganda in favour of a constitutional government. 
Bullard recommended that BBC Persian broadcasts should 
emphasize this point. In the meantime, Furü, ghi suggested 
to Bullard that if the British wished he would provide 
notes from time to time both on this subject and also on 
British and Russian policy with regard to Iran, which might 
be broadcast from the BBC. 
81 
On October 5, the BBC Persian 
service had a successful talk, "khatäb bi millat-i Iran", 
giving an account of British policy in Iran; 
".... British policy in Iran is based on 
friendship. Friendship is of two kinds, 
namely disinterested friendship, and 
friendship based on interest.......... 
As regards the British Government's 
friendship towards Iran or any other 
Government, it is not and cannot be 
of a disinterested nature. In policy 
one cannot be without any interest. 
We can only say that interest may be 
either genuine or malicious. The policy 
of the British Government towards Iran is 
based on genuine interest, that is, we 
have considered it fit that Iran should 
be independent, that its territorial 
integrity should be maintained and that 
80. "Iran", 3 Dai, 1320 (Dec. 25,1941). Sarlas ar: 
Nakhjavän's press conference at the Ministry 
of War, Tihran. 
81. Bullard to FO, No. 760, Sept-17,1941. E 57920 
FO 371/27217. 
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order and security 'should reign there; $2 
since Iran is the gate to Iraq....... 
This talk had been drafted by Furü, ghi, and it was 
meant to be written as from the British point, of view, 
but in such a manner to appeal to the Iranian. The British 
Legation, in Tihrän, cut out a short passage which, unless 
greatly amplified, might have been misunderstood by the 
Russians. Bullard wrote to London that Furüghi's name 
should not be associated with the talk. "... He even had 
the draft copied out by his son, so that the writing might 
not be recognized, " wrote Bullard, " but we have had the 
amended version in Persian typed so the identity of the 
writer is buried still deeper. "$3 
After the occupation of Tihrän what little prestige 
the Cabinet did enjoy seemed to be dying out, chiefly owing 
to the presence of the foreign armies in the capital. 
Therefore, in early October, the Iranian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs sent two identical notes to the British and Soviet 
representatives requesting them to take energetic steps 
towards the evacuation of Tihrän. 
84 
Before this note was 
communicated to London by Bullard, the Foreign'Office, had, 
on its own initiative, asked the Chiefs of Staff to consider 
whether the Allied forces could safely be withdrawn from 
82. For the full text, see Appendix II. Mustafa Fätih 
points to this talk as proof of his statement: 
It this is the best document which proves that England, 
in her relations with Iran, has never considered 
international. laws and traditions, and-she has 
always based her deeds on her own criteria. " See Panjäh 
sal: naft-I Iran, p. 1k69.. 
83. Letter from Bullard to Baxter (FO), No. 631/6/41, Sept. 
26,1941. E 6872/211/34, FO 371/27185. 
84. Bullard to FO, No. 942, Oct. 7,1941. E 4615 FO 371/27234 
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Tihrän and its immediate neighbburhood, or alternatively 
to what extent they might be reduced. The Chiefs of Staff 
Committee decided that they had to maintain control in 
Tihrän, and possibly elsewhere, by inserting their 
officials in plain clothes into the important posts, 
on the 'German model'. Then, there would be no need 
for the British troops to be in close proximity of the 
capital. 
85 
Afterwards, Eden suggested to the Soviet 
Government through Maisky that either at the time of 
signing the Treaty of Alliance with Iran or as soon 
thereafter as possible the British and Russian forces 
should evacuate Tihrän, and return to their zones. "To 
his surprise the Soviet Government indicated its-assent 
almost immediately* .. n86 
Tihran was, however, evacuated on October 18,87 
months before the treaty was signed. The Government 
regained a breathing space. But later in the month, the 
Cabinet became the object of much criticism. again, not 
only from place hunters and reformers in a hurry, but 
from persons who considered that in retaining several 
members of the ex-Shah's Cabinet and in not holding 
fresh election, Furü hi had not cut free from the former 
regime. There was also a whispering campaign, alleging 
85, War Cabinet, Chiefs of Staff Committee, secret, 
oct. 2,1941. E 654o, FO 371/27234. 
86. Winant to the SOS, Oct. 9,1941. US. F. R., vol. IIY, 
1941, p. 471. 
87, "Iran", 26 Mehr, 1320( Oct. 18,1941). After holding 
a special ceremony in 'Jalaliya Square' at Northwest 
Tihran, the troops left there. 
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that the Cabinet contained five Jews. The Rome radio 
had described FuruLlhi as a Jew (he was of Jewish origin) 
but local propaganda attributed a Jewish origin in one 
or two cases and possibly in all, to four other Ministers, 
including Gulshaliyan (Finance) and Vasigi (Industry). 
In-the meantime, there was a campaign in favour of' 
88 
Ahmad Vusüq for the premiership. Bullard discouraged 
attempts to involve the Legation into the controversy on 
his side, partly, according to him, because his personal 
reputation was not good, and partly because there seemed 
little likelihood, at the time, of getting keener- 
co-operation from him than from ruruphi's Cabinet. 
Also, as Bullard wrote; 
... If we begin cabinet making, the 
Soviet Embassy may have views 
different from ours. Nevertheless 
it may be necessary to find a 
Prime Minister with more energy 
and determination than Furughi. 
There is no obvious candidate in 
this country at present. Taqizadeh 
or Sayid Zia might do, but it 
would be fatal to either if it 
appeared that he had been brought 
back by us ..... "$9 
In November, Bullard's reports showed an improvement 
in Fur;, i's health. He, again, wrote; " we should not be 
in a hurry to change the Cabinet. "90 
88. See, Personalities, Appendix I, p. 536" 
89. Dullard to FO, No. 1038, Oct. 24,1941. E 6940, FO 371 
/27155. The Foreign Office, while approving Bullard's 
argument, instructed him; "Position will need careful 
watching and I shall be glad if you will give me as 
early as possible if you have any reason to consider 
that our attitude should be modified. " FO to Tihran, 
No. 963. Oct. 28. Ibid. 
90. Bullard to FO, Nov. 5,1941. F 7231, FO 971/27156. 
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On November 13, the thirteenth session of the Majlis 
was inaugurated by the Shah. After the verification of 
deputies' credentials, Furüjjhi offered the. traditional 
resignation of the Cabinet. But, before resignation, 
he had sought for support from the Piajlis and the British 
Government in order to be ensured of accepting Office again. 
In reply to his enquiry, Bullard sent, through the emissary, 
this message; "... we support those who support us and that 
he would deserve our support if he concluded treaty and was 
active in co-operation with the Allies. "9iHaving, been assured 
of the support, Furühi introduced his new cabinet to the 
92 
Majlis on December 3,1941. 
91. Bullard to FO, 
_Nov. 
25,1941, E 7758, FO 371/21756. 
92. List of Furu, hi's second Cabinet: 
*Majid Xhi Justice. 
*Sarlashgar Amanulläh 
Jahanbäni Roads and Communication 
* Dr. Iiasan Nafisi Finance. 
(Mushäraf-al-Daula) 
* Sipahbud Ahmad Aga 
Ahmadi(Amirahmadi) Interior 
*Sayyid Muhammad Tadayyun 
kne was zne miiizary 
Governor of Tihran 
after the Occupation. ) 
Education. 
(chosen for his influence 
with the Maleis) 
*'rAli Suhaj1I Foreign. 
Hamid Sayyah Post and Telegraph. 
*Sarlashgar A:; imad 
Nakh j avän War. ' 
*Bägir Kazimi Health. 
(Muhazzi1_al-Daula). 
- `Abbäs Quli Gulsha'iyan Industry & Trade. 
"Ali. Akbar Hakim. Agriculture, 
See Personalities, Appendix I. p. 119k9 
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IV. Tripartite Treaty of Alliance. 
Signing treaties with big powers has, often, been a 
nightmare for the Iranian Government. And yet, the people 
have regarded, because of their endemic mistrust of 
government, any treaty with suspicion. They cannot be 
blamed for this idiosyncrasy, for they have not had 
pleasant memories of the treaties in the past. Perhaps, it 
is because procrastination93 has practically, become a 
normative technique of Iranian diplomacy, which is used 
for getting better concession in return for the signing of 
treaties. 
The Treaty of Alliance which was suggested tb the 
Iranian Government in the early part of September 1941, 
took nearly five months to be signed while the British 
and Soviet Governments had anticipated its conclusion in 
October. The signing of the treaty which took place on 
January 29,1942, was apparently a departure from the policy 
of neutrality to one of alliance. " The change, however, was 
not so sudden as it might appear". 
94 The policy of neutrality 
had failed, not because of being under attack by the Soviet 
and British Governments as Ramazani describes, 
95but, because 
of the obvious reason that when the country was occupied by 
93. Cf. R. K. Ramazani, Iran's Foreign Policy 1941-1913, 
p. 48 (f.. n., 11). 
91}. Ibid, p. 45. 
95" Ibid. 
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the Anglo-Russian troops, camped virtually outside the 
government office, there remained no opportunity for 
the Government of Iran to pursue an independent foreign 
policy. It was shown that the policy of neutrality was 
11 
the only alternative, perhaps best at the time, to be 
adopted by Iran. Even when the Government showed its 
willingness to Britain for some kind of alliance, it 
did not receive a. positive response, while the belligerent 
powers were advocating its policy of neutrality. 
The apparent purpose of the treaty of alliance was 
for Iran to become allied with the Allies in order to 
facilitate the supply of war materials to the Soviet Union. 
But the truth might, perhaps, be sought in the age-old 
Anglo-Russian rivalry in Iran. It could be*argued that 
the real object of the treaty, which was initiated and 
drafted by the British, was to regulate the presence of the 
Russians in Iran during and after the war. However, the 
aftermath was not what the British had hoped for. 
It will be examined how this, to borrow Ramazani's 
words, "momentous change in Iranian wartime foreign policy, 
96 
were brought about, in Bullard's words, "under duress:!. 
97 
In early September, Bullard received instructions from 
London to suggest to the Iranian Government a treaty of 
96. Ibid. 
97. Sir. R. Bullard, "Persia in Two World Wars", Royal Central 
Asian Journal, 50, pt. l, 1963, P_-_1 T_- 
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alliance with the Soviet Union and Great Britain. Bullard 
believed that such a suggestion would encourage the 
Iranians in their task of handing over the Germans. 
98 
Meanwhile, a similar suggestion had been raised 
independently by Sa"i d in Moscow. The British Government 
had also communicated the idea to the Soviet Government. 
On September 9, Molotov informed Sir Stafford Cripps that 
they had accepted it in principle. 
99 
Soon after the Soviet 
reply, Bullard was instructed to put the idea of a treaty 
of alliance before Furüjhi and Suhaili. When Furughi was 
sounded out about the idea, he asked Bullard to keep the 
matter secret even from Suhaill while he thought it over. 
The first reaction of Furuphi, according to Bullard,, was 
that the proposal had many attractions but that many 
Iranians felt that they had merely submitted to force 
majeure-whereas if they allied themselves with the Soviet Union 
and Britain they would incur the vengeance of Germany if 
the Germans won. Noreover, Furüghi doubted that the Russians 
would observe the terms of such an alliance. Finally, he 
thought that if Rizä Shah became allied to the two great 
powers would he not feel his position stronger than ever? 
100 
Presumably, when it became apparent that Rizä Shah 
would abdicate, Furüßi intimated to Dullard his approval 
98. Bullard to FO, secret No-704, Sept. 10 1941. E 555 /3326 
/34, L/P&S/12/3520. 
99. FO to Tihran, secret, No. 681, Sept. 11,1941. E 5554/3326 
/34, L/P&S/3520. 
100. Bullard to FO, secret, Sept. 14,1941. E5678/3326/34, 
FO 371/27217. 
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of the proposed alliance and his intentions to work to 
that: end as soon as the constitutional crisis was over. 
101 
The first draft of the treaty was presented to the 
Iranian Government inlate September. The draft was 
inadequate, and the Government had many objections to it. 
The Iranians were asking the British and Russians for 
concrete assurances about Iran's political independence 
and territorial integrity during aril after the war, and for 
economic assistance. Obviously, until these legitimate 
demands were met, the Government had to resort to its 
procrastinating technique which was interpreted as 
"the Persians were still carefully watching the course of 
the war in southern Russia because Germany sympathizers 
still remained in official position. " 
102 
On September 27, Suhaill had asked Bullard, for 
assurances in connection with the proposed-treaty that 
Iran would be present at the peace conference after the 
war. 
103. In reply, the Foreign Office sent this telegram 
to Bullard to be read to Suhaili; 
101. Bullard to FO, Sept. 16,1941. E. 520, FO 371/27210. 
102. Survey of International Affairs 1939-1946, The Middle 
East in the war, op. cit, p. 139" 
103" FO, (Ref. to Bullard's No. 861. Sept. 27, ) Oct-15,1941 
E 6827, FO 371/27235. 
This demand was also made by a Majlis deputy in 
December 1941. See Journal de Tihran, 31 December, 
1941.1 
"This Persian sacro egoismo was admirably paralleled 
by the demand of their delegation to the Peace 
Conference of 1919.11 Survey of International Affairs, 
op. cit, P"139 (fn., 3). 
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Quoting article 6, para. l, of Treaty 
of Alliance and continuing: 
I have been authorized by my Government 
to give Your Excellency an assurance 
that the provisions of this article 
would apply to peace negotiations 
after the war, and that His Majesty's 
Government are of the opinion that 
this treaty provision ensures that 
Persia will be represented in any 
negotiations directly affecting her 
interests. His Majesty's Government 
will in any case not attempt to 
settle such matters without Persia's 
knowledge and consent. "104 
This declaration was followed by a confidential 
instruction from the Foreign Office to Bullard, emphasizing 
that the actual wording of assurance had to be carefully 
considered because: 
" (1) we want to avoid giving Persia 
a promise that she will be represented 
during any peace negotiations which 
may take place, seeing that these may 
not deal with any question directly 
concerning Persia; and (2) we must 
avoid any wording which would encourage 
our Egyptian and Iraqi allies to clamour 
for an assurance that they also will be 
represented at the peace conference 
(with the main object, in the case of 
the Egyptians, of ventilating publicly 
their claims and grievances against 
His Majesty's Government . *105 
During October, Iranian requests for amendments 
to the original draft of the treaty were piling up in 
the Foreign Office. For instance, Furürhi had asked the 
104. FO to Tihrän, No. 936, Oct. 20,1941. F. 6827, FO 371 
, /27235. 
105. FO to Tihrän, No. 995, Nov. 7,1941. E 710/3444/34, 
FO 371/27235. 
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British for these amendments that; (i) the Iranian Army 
should only be used for internal security, to which the 
Foreign Office agreed, perhaps because the Iranian Army 
was regarded as pro-German, and (2) the treaty should 
be one of association and not of alliance. This was not 
accepted. 
l06 
In early November, it seemed that patience had run 
out in London, and they would have to resort to the familiar 
but effectual method of ultimatum. So the Fore ign Office 
instructed Bullard to make threats to the Iranian Government; 
.... if they continue to try to fob us 
off with pretext, they will be responsible 
for re-occupation of Tehran which will 
certainly follow very soon unless they 
sign. "]-07 
The threat seemed to have been effective, Furüri 
began to take energetic steps to secure the consent of all 
political parties, although progress was still slow. 
Meanwhile, the Soviet Government was almost reticent about 
the whole matter. It was in November when Bullard reached 
to the conclusion that the Iranian Government and people 
saw little need for a treaty. He wrote: 
"... the public, who have not forgotten, 
ithe treaty of 1919 and the bribery 
by which we secured it, regard the idea 
of a treaty with deep suspicion, 
especially as one of the parties is the 
Russians. "108 - 
106. Dullard to FO, No. 1100, Oct-5,1941. E 7265, FO 371 
/27235- 
107. FO to Dullard, No. 983, Nov. 4,1941. E 7130/3444/34, 
FO 371/27235. 
108. Bullard to FO, No. 1122, Nov. 11,1941. EXT. 7274, 
E 7390/3444/34 L/P&S/12/3520. 
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Bullard, while citing the Foreign Office view that Iran 
would regard at least with equanimity the prospect of 
German invasion, continued; 
ýý... but Persian opinion on the whole 
believes that there would be no 
danger of a German attack, on Persia 
but for the presence of the allies, 
and a large proportion of the public 
would rejoice if the Germans or 
anyone else drove the Russians out. "109 
Bullard had also gathered that the Iranian Government 
would resign rather than accept the treaty as difficult 
to defend as the original draft. The resignation would 
certainly have been hailed as a German victory. In fact 
FuruZhi, who was naturally hostile to the German policy, 
had stuck to his difficult task in spite of. ill-health, 
in order not to give a handle to German propaganda. But 
it was obvious that he would eventually resign if the draft 
remained unchanged. His resignation might have been followed 
by chaos that only would delay the conclusion of the treaty. 
Therefore, Bullard begged the Foreign Office to examine the 
amendments required by the Iranian Government, and added; 
110 
"it will be found that the suggested price is low. " 
On December 5, the final draft of the treaty was 
submitted to the Iranian Government which put it before 




considerable resentment to the treaty. In defence of 
it, FurüZhi rehearsed, in the Ninth Meeting of the"13th 
Majlis, the advantages of the treaty, and said; "bäyad 
"r 
insäf dad "(in all fairness) that the economic assistance 
already given to Iran had been considerable and there 
were more to come after the conclusion of the treaty. 
The opposition to the treaty was mainly launched, by 
two Majlis deputies, viz., Dr. Musa Javän and Habibullah 
Naubakht. 
lll 
On December 23, the Shah received Greenway who 
stressed the point that so long as the treaty was not 
signed the Russians would become increasingly difficult 
to handle. The Shah agreed to his view. In fact the Shah 
himself expressed a similar view to the American Minister 
in October. 
112 
The Shah told Greenway that he had been 
impressing this view on all his Ministers for weeks but 
"unfortunately they were most lazy and moral cowards" 
though he was sure that they had all determined-that the 
treaty was a good thing. The Shah added that he would 
make a further effort and inform the President of the 
Majlis, Isfandiyärl ', that a way out of the alleged 
constitutional difficulties must be found and the treaty 
signed at least before-January 1942.113 Greenway wrote; 
111. For the full text of this session see, Muzäkerät-i 
Majlis daura sizdahum 1320. ForEnglish`resume of. 
Ramazani, op. cit. pp. 48-50, and Survey of International 
Affairs, op. cit. p. 139. 
112. Dreyfus to the SOS, No. 182, Oct. 9,1941. US. F. R., 
vol. 111,1941, p. 470. 
113" Greenway to FO, No. 1363iDec. 23,1941. E 8515/3444/34, 
L/P&S/12/3520. , 
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" The attitude of His Majesty throughout 
these difficult weeks has been most 
helpful though he is not yet able to'ý 
cope with such old foxes as the 
President of the Council (Majlis) and 
I should like to stress the fact thä, t 
all these delays"have been in-spite 
of his efforts. " 114 
In December, the Iranian Government expressed its 
desire that Iran's position vis-a-vis the allies might 
be improved, were the United States to adhere to the 
treaty. The US Government did, however, not find itself 
able to fall in with this suggestion. 
115 
The treaty was not signed before the New Year, and 
the debates went on throughout January. As reprisal the 
Foreign Office was hampering the departure of RiiR Shah 
from Mauritius to South Africa in order to exert, pressure 
on the Shah who, in turn, might have to press his people 
to sign the treaty, 
116 
In January, an incident in the Majlis in connection 
with the debate around the treaty, caused the breakdown 
of relations between the Iranian and Vichy Governments. 
In reply to a proposal to drop Annex II, in the Majlis on 
January 1st, Furufhi stated in error that the annex only 
required Iran to sever relations with any power with which 
the Allies were at war: Finding this statement incorrect 
114. Ibid. 
115" Dreyfus to the SOS9 Nos. 260, and 261, Dec. 20,1941. 
SOS to Dreyfus, No. 165, Dec. 29,1941, -US. F. R., 
op. cit. pp. 476-7 
116. FO to'DO, Jan. 9,1942. E 22/22/34, FO 371/31392. 
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i 
the French Charge d'Affaires addressed a hysterical letter 
to Suhaili, declaring that the Government was'acging 
against the wishes of the people. He also sent'copies 
of this letter to the press. Suhaili refused to accept 
the letter and informed the Charge d'Affaires that he had 
to'leave within three days as persona non grata. Subsequently, 
the Iranian Legation at Vichy was recalled and the Vichy 
Government was asked to recall its legation from Tingn. 
117ý 
On January 26,1942, the treaty was ratified by eighty 
votes out of ninety-two in the Majlis. January 27 and 28 
being solemn Shia holidays, the signature took place on 
January 29. 
After the signing of the treaty, the Soviet Ambassador, 
Smirnov, spoke of the defeat of German designs on Iran. He 
welcomed Iran among Free Nations, then he referred to the 
ancient friendship between Russia and Iran and quoted 
extracts from Stalin's speech, declaring that Soviet Russia 
had no 'ambitions of conquest nor intention to appropriate 
territory of others, either in Europe or Asia, or to rule 
over the population of other countries. 
118 
However, the Treaty of Alliance between the. United 
Kingdom and the Soviet Union and Iran was eventually signed 
after lengthy debates in the Majlis and endless attempts 
117. Fo summary, Jan. 15,1942. E 331/331/3k, FO. 371/31393. 
118. Bullard to FO, No. 1k9. Feb. 1,1942. E 701/23/34, 
L/P&S/12/3520. 
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at procrastination and amendment by the Deputies and the 
Government. For convenience of reference the following 
very brief summary of the treaty may be given, here. 
Great Britain and the USSR jointly and severally undertook 
(article I) "to respect the territorial integrityjý the 
sovreignty and the political independence of Iran", and 
(article III (1) 11 to defend Iran by all means at their 
command from all aggression".... Iran undertook (article 
III (2)(a) to co-operate with the Allied Powers in every 
way possible in order that they may be able to fulfil 
this undertaking; and (by article III (2)(b) to give the 
Allies, for certain military purposes, the "unrestricted 
right to use, maintain, guard and, in case of military 
necessity, control... all the means of communication 
throughout Iran; to assist in obtaining material and 
recruiting labour, and to establish a censorship. ' 
Article IV (i) stated that the Allied Powers could 
maintain in Iranian territory land, sea and air forces, 
but it was specifically stated that their presence did not 
constitute a military occupation, and would disturb as little 
as possible the administration and economic life of Iran. 
Under article V, the Allied forces were to be withdrawn 
from Iranian territory not later than six months after all 
hostilities between the Allied Powers and Germany and her 
Associates had ceased. 
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Under Article VII, the Allied Powers undertook jointly. 
"to use their best endeavours to safeguard the economic 
existence of the Iranian people against the privations and 
difficulties" resulting from the war. 
Finally, it is, however, safe to say that both sides 
were disappointed with the carrying out of 'the treaty. 
The Iranian Government showed no realisation of shipping 
and economic difficulties in the rest of the world, and 
tried repeatedly to interpret article VII as binding the 
Allies to supply huge quantities of lorries, motor tyres, 
spare parts, cereals and other commodities. The Allies, 
on their part, complained that they met with very, little 
co-operation from the Iranian Government and authorities, 
who were busy with intrigues amongst themselves, and made 
practically no effort to meet the grave internal difficulties 
resulting from the war, and demanded the Allies' aid at 
every turn. On numerous occasions the Allies were unable 
to get even their most essential military requirements 
without the application of the strongest diplomatic 
pressure and several times, virtual threats of force. The 
actual death of the treaty was conspicuous from the outset 
of the USSR's defiant attitude to article I. 
119 
119. For the full text of the Treaty see Appendix IIpp. 553" 
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' CHAPTER FIVE 
1942: The period of crises 
I. The Cabinet Crisis 
In spite of the signature of the Tripartite Treaty, 
Iran's relations with the other parties, Britain and the 
Soviet Union, remained almost unimproved, and many requests 
by each side on important questions remained unmet. This 
was because of the "high-handed" attitudes of the British 
and Russians on one side, and on the other, partly Furüghi's 
cabinet inertia and partly the Majlis obstructive attitude 
in dealing with the Government. 
In February 1942, the Cabinet was, once again, under 
attack by the Majlis. The general criticism of Furu hi's 
Cabinet were that it was inactive, having failed to solve 
the questions, of security, food supplies, return of lands 
acquired by Rita Shah, and so on; that it contained too 
many military-men (the Ministers of War, Interior, Roads 
and Communications); and too many of its members had held 
Office under the former regime, and could be regarded as 
Rizä Shah's men 
Furughi was personally popular because he had never 
sought office, had been in disgrace with Riia Shah for 
the last years of the old regime, and was admitted by all 
to be completely honest -a phenomenon almost as rare in 
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Iran as a two-headed calf, and attracting as much attention. 
Much opposition, however, gradually collected against him, 
some of it fictitious and malevolent, but some of it well 
founded. Therefore, he was under pressure by the Majlis 
to form a new Cabinet, though he had expressed his desire 
to resign in early February and thought of Tagizäda as a 
suitable successor, but Tagizäda's health was not good 
at the time. 
l 
The Cabinet, which he had introduced in December 1941, 
was the focus of objections by both the Allies and Majlis. 
Furughi had nominated Mirä. t2 as the Minister of Education, 
who was exceedingly unpopular with the more reactionary 
Iranians for having cleared a mosque to make room for one 
of Rizä Shah's scheme of town development, and, above all, 
for being identified with the policy of encouraging Iranian 
schoolgirls to take part in sports, including swimming in 
public. The clamour against him was so great that he resigned. 
Strong'and deep religious feeling was still alive. It was 
not to be halted by bargains between political parties in 
the Majlis and it had been unaffected by change of the 
governing class, for its roots were among the peasants, 
yeomen, shopkeepers, and artisans, obscure but tenacious 
people. 
1. Bullard to FO, Feb-4,1942, E 803/24/34, FO 371/31385. 
2. See Personalities, Appendix I, p. 532. 
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The Minister of Agriculture, Hakimi, was an honest 
but sick man, and at moments when the most ruthless 
efficiency was needed to encourage landowners and 
cultivators to use every effort to grow food-stuffs so 
as to reduce the dependence of the country on foreign 
imports, he did nothing. Eventually, Bullard pointed 
this out to FurüZIJ3, who did, in fact, discard Hakim! 
but only when the crisis had gone too far to be restored 
without a change of Prime Minister. 
3 
The Minister of War, General Nakhjavän,. was quite 
unable to re-establish the Army after its collapse and 
disgrace at the time of the Allied occupation. General 
Jahänbäni was supposed to be appointed to the Ministry 
of the Interior, but he went to the Ministry of Roads 
and Communications as his mild character was out of place 
at the former Ministry. General Ahmadi was an active 
and determined soldier but very unpopular. It was feared 
that he might attempt to obtain despotic powers at the 
Ministry of the Interior. Sajjädl, the Minister of 
Communications in the first Cabinet, was discarded in the 
second, probably because of his lack of co-operation with 
the Allies. Dr. Nafi. si, who became Minister of Finance in 
the second Cabinet was the subject of most violent attacks. 
3 Bullard to F0, Confidential, March 18,1942. 
E 2234/14/34, FO 371/313385. 
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Ile was not a man who courted popularity, and he could not 
escape the "double crime" of having worked for the AIOC 
and of reducing the rate of rial (140 rials to the pound). 
Fur; Zhi was not good at lobbying, he believed in the 
power of reason- a commodity in small demand among Iranians, 
particularly in the Majlis. When attacked he adopted a 
take-it or leave-it attitude, which, while it was a tribute 
to his disinterestedness, encouraged his critics to leave 
it. 
The Majlis Deputies, though they continued to support 
Furughi, had suddenly become conscious of their responsibility 
towards the nation. They seemed to think that every Minister 
must be approved by every Deputy. On March 4,1942, the 
Majlis, at a private session, voted on the premiership in 
the following way: 
4 
FurüghI 47 
Qaväm-al-Saltana (Qavam) 39 
Tadayyun 5 
Suhaili 4 
Later on, about seventy Deputies declared that they 
would support Furüghi in the formation of a Cabinet, but the 
Majlis then selected by lot a committee of fourteen to 
advise him on the formation of his Cabinet,. and, as it 
included an even larger proportion of his opponents than 
the riajlis itself, he was naturally unable to come to an 
4. "Iran", 13 Isfand, 1320 (March 4,1942). 
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agreement with them, and resigned on March 8. He was 
then appointed the Minister of Court -a position well 
suited to his education and character. A few months later, 
he died on November 25. 
Furughi's resignation created a period of great 
confusion. The Deputies were looking rather uneasily 
at the situation they had made. In the meantime, the 
newspapers and the public were realizing that, unless the 
Government could enjoy some freedom to carry out its work, 
the situation would be hopeless. Generally speaking, the 
opposition in the Majlis had little or no "vocation" for 
achieving national interests, and they took up. much time 
wrangling with the Government and among themselves over 
trivial matters. 
In view of the vote taken on March 4, it seemed 
probable that Qaväm might be called upon by the Shah to 
form a; Cabinet. He apparently had the support of the 
Soviet Ambassador and the American Minister. The British 
Minister's view seemed to be different from-his counter- 
parts, because Qaväm was suspected of having been 
connected with the newspaper "Igdäm', which had published 
a rather contemptuous article on the Tripartite Treaty 
a few'days after its signing. 
50; For more details about this newspaper, see L. P. Blwell- 
Sutton, "The Iranian Press, 1941-191+7", Iran Journal 
of the British Institute of Persian Studies, p. 78, 
vol. VI, 1968. 
It was believed that Ahmad Vusüq (Qavam's brother) 
subsidised this paper. *See, Bullard to FO, Feb. 4,1942. 
E i803/14/349 FO 371/31385. 
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Qaväm, howeever, denied all connection with the article 
ºº _ ýº in the Iqdam There were other candidates for the 
7 
premiership such as Husain Ala, the president of Bank 
Milll, who did not come forward; Vusüq, who seemed 
ambitious but he did not have a good following; Sayyid 
Zia, who did not seem to be enthusiastic to return to Iran; 
Suhaili, and Tadayyun who was disliked by the Soviet 
Ambassador because of the suppression of a newspaper when 
he was the Minister of Education, which Smirnov considered 
"anti-fascist". Also, Dreyfus regarded him as reactionary. 
8 
It was true that he was accused of being reactionary, but 
after the sweeping campaign of moderization under Rizä Shah 
a certain reaction was prolmbly as inevitable in Iran as 
was the reaction in England in 1660. In the Majlis, he had 
shown himself strong and able tm make himself respected, 
and while at the Ministry of Education he got rid of a 
considerable number of senior employees who had been 
occupying positions for which they were unfitted. In the 
Cabinet, he shared the views of the Cabinet in. general, and 
continued the Rizä Shah policy of preventing any religious 
excesses in public during the month of Murharram. 
6. Interview with Qaväm by A. C. Trott, the Oriental Secretary, 
British Legation, Tihran, March 13,1942. E 2234/14/34, 
FO 371/31385- 
7- See Personalities, Appendix I, p. 521k. 
8. Dreyfus to SOS, March 13,1942, US F. R., vol. IV, 1942, 
p. 227. 
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However, Qaväm withdrew his candidature. According 
to him, his withdrawal was at the request of the Shah 
who asked Qaväm to lend his support to Suhaill and to 
encourage Deputies to vote for him. 
9 
Whether or not 
Qavam recommended Deputies to vote for Suhaill is not 
cdrtain, but it seemed that Suhaill's election was not 
secured without considerable pressure. There was legitimate 
pressure from certain classes of the public., particularly 
the "bäzäris", who merely wanted to see in power a 
Government which would be more active than that of Furüghi, 
Also, Bullard reported that there was a rumour with some 
credibility that the police had canvassed Deputies on 
Suhaili's behalf, saying the he was the Shah's candidate 
and that they had better vote for him. 
10 On March 7, the 
Majlis, at a secret session, gave Suhaili a majority of 
105 to 2 votes. Two days later, he presented his Cabinet 
" to the Majlis, which was composed, on the whole, of as 
decent as possible a body of Iranians. 
9. Interview with Qavam, op. cit. In the interview, Qaväm gives 
an interesting account of this Cabinet crisis. 
10. Bullard to FO,: Confidential, March 18,1942.0 . cit. 
11. "Iran", 17 & 19 Isfand, 1320 (8 & 10"March 1942 . List of Suhaili's Cabinet Ministers. 
Suhaili, Prime Minister & Minister of Interior. 
*Majid Ähi Justice 
Ali Ashar' Hikmat Health 
* Mahmüd Badir Finance 
*Sarlashgar Jahanbani War 
*Mustafa Adl ' Education 
*Yadullah 'Azudi Roads & Communications. 
*Abdul Husain Hazhir Trade & Industry 
*Husain "Adl Agriculture 
*Fa. zlulla Bahrämi Post & Telegs. 
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See Perenalities, Appendix I. 491k. 
Said was appointed as the Minister*of Foreign Affairs, 
but pending his arrival from Moscow, Suhaili was the 
Acting Minister of the Ministry. 
* On the introduction of Badir to the Cabinet, Bullard 
wrote, " I was rather-apprehensive when I heard of the 
impending appointment of Mr. Badir as Minister of 
Finance, since he was closely identified in Riza Shah's 
time with negotiations with the Germans and has been 
said to be pro-German; but-'. after careful consideration, 
and consultation with the general manager of Imparial 
Bank of Iran, I decided not to. -object to his appointment, 
on the ground that a clever man who understood finance 
might be more useful to us in the matter of the rial 
rate, the increase in the note 'circulation' etc'., than 
an acknowledged partisan of the British, especially one 
not able to argue the point with knowledge. It was 
decided to watch his work and to object at the first 
sign of anti-British or even unhelpful conduct. " 
Bullard to FO, March 18.1942. o . cit. 
a.,.,,,, r,. ý..,... ý.. «. ý. i...,. 
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In his pronouncement of Government policies, Suhaill 
said that Iran's foreign policy would be to co-operate 
with the Governments to which Iran's interest was linked 
and to observe the treaties to which Iran was a partner. 
On the whole, his programme was a catalogue of good 
intentions: laws were to be revised: the army strengthened: 
the budget balanced, and food supplies secured. 
Notwithstanding, the failure to fulfil the latter was the 
Cause of his downfall. 
Interestingly, there was a change of attitude by the 
Soviet Government whose Ambassador in Tihrdn" had supported 
Qaväm during the Cabinet crisis, but, after Suhaill's 
appointment to premiership, the Soviet Ambassador in 
London talked of support for Suhaill; 
"We should support Suhaili and not sponsor 
Qavam or the Tudeh party, who might be 
intriguing him (sic. )". 12 
Why there seemed to be such a dichotomy in the Soviet 
policy is not known. But it is certain that the Soviet 
Ambassador in Tihrän had gained assurances from Qavä. m, on 
several occasions, 
l3that 
Qaväm would render his help at the 
right moment. And it was also certain that Suhaili's 
Government could not survive long. In fact nobody had such 
a hope. Knowing this, the Soviet Government probably wished 
12. FO to Tihrän; March 13,1942, No-346 E 1530/14/34, 
FO 371/31385. 
13" Bullard to FO, March 7,1942, No. 301. Ibid. 
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to pretend disassociation with Qaväm. It will later be 
discussed why Qavam did not wish to take the post 'at 
once. 
The Foreign Office, though aware of Suhaill's 
vulnerability, seemed to have fewer objections to his 
appointment; 
.... if Soheily is successful in forming a 
cabinet the best that could be said is 
that it will give us a little more time 
to look round for possible candidates. 
The chances of a complete breakdown in 
parliamentary government in Persia do not 
seem negligible, and we very soon have to 
ask Sir Bullard what he-considers the 
practicable alternative. "14 
II. The April Crisis and Rupture of Relations with Japan 
After less than a month in office, Suhaill. 's Cabinet 
was confronted with a crisis in its foreign policy. Despite 
the closure of the other Axis Legations in Tihrä. n in 
September 1941, the Japanese Legation was still open in 
early April 1942, and in the British and Russian notes of 
September 5,1941 to the Iranian Government, the closure 
of the Japanese Legation had not been requested. 
15 
Many of the difficulties which the Allies experienced 
in Iran were traceable to the activities of the Japanese 
Legation who were actively distributing German propaganda 
and also money among the pro-Axis Iranians. Therefore, the 
14- Minute on Bullard's'No. 301. Ibid. 
15 " See 
Chapter 4 p. 115. 
e. ý.. ýý 
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relations between Iran and Japan became one of the Allies' 
primary objectives on which progress in every other sphere 
seemed to depend. 
The first representation to the Iranian Government was 
made by Bullard in early January. He suggested to the 
Government "the desirability of effecting withdrawal of the 
Japanese Legation in Tehran. " 
16 
The Tripartite Treaty could 
not be quoted in support of the representation, owing to 
the fact that Japan was still in diplomatic relations with 
the Soviet Union. It was, however, urged upon the Iranian 
Government that the closing of the Japanese Legation could 
reasonably be expected as an earnest of goodwill amongst 
the Allies; that it would not harm Iranian interests in 
Japan or vice versa, both of which, to all practical 
intents and purposes, were non-existent; that the continued 
presence of the Legation in Tihran could serve no useful 
purpose, as all bag and cypher communication facilities 
had been denied to them and that the Japanese Legation was, 
in fact, nothing more than a centre from which military 
intelligence reports were sent to the Axis - they were known 
to have had a secret wireless transmitter. 
17 
The first representation, in January, did not result 
in any measures being taken by Furüi's Cabinet to sever 
16. Dreyfus to SOS, Jan. 13,1942. US. F. R., vol. IV, 1942, 
p. 325. 
17. Bullard to F0, Confidential, Annual Report for 1942. 
March 26,1943. E 2450/239/34, FO 371/35117. 
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relations with Japan. Furze hi was non-committal, and his 
Foreign Minister, Suhaill seemed to be reluctant to put 
the case to the Majlis. In fact, the Furüyhi Cabinet had 
discussed the matter but failed to take action because of 
the confused internal political situation, similar to, for 
instance, the Egyptian Cabinet which had failed to expel 
the French Legation. 
In spite of repeated representations made by Bullard, 
no progress was made with this question-for about three: 
months. Meanwhile, the Foreign Office asked the State 
Department to take parallel actions in Tihrän, which might 
persuade the Iranian Government to expel the Japanese. 
Dreyfus was then instructed to talk to the Prime Minister, 
Suhaill, on the line that "the presence of these officials 
is a grave danger not only to the interests of the United 
States and its associates in the war against aggression 
but also to Iran itself". 
18 
The British Legation was also 
repeatedly communicating to the Iranian authorities evidence 
collected from secret and other sources to prove that the 
Japanese Legation were indulging in undiplomatic and 
subversive activities. Finally, the Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, the Prime Minister, and the Shah were warned in 
categorical terms that the situation would seriously 
deteriorate unless early satisfaction were given. 
19 
18. The Acting Secretary of State (Welles) to Dreyfus, 
March 6,1942. US. F. R., vol. IV., 1942, p. 326. 
19. Bullard to Eden, March 26,1943. op. cit. 
170 
As a result of this pressure, on March 29, the Iranian 
Cabinet agreed to expel the Japanese, but the Majlis at 
the secret session of April 2 refused to sanction the 
Cabinet's decision. 
Several reasons could be found for the Deputies' 
refusal to agree to the expulsion of the Japanese. Firstly, 
there was widespread dissatisfaction in the Majlis with 
the manner in which the Soviet Union and Britain were 
carrying out the Trdaty; Russians were, taking cattle, 
Poles were being dumped in Iran, the British were failing 
to provide food. Secondly, Deputies might probably have 
thought in terms of a quid pro quo and wanted'to be assured 
that tangible aid to Iran would. be forthcoming. Obviously, 
Suhaill had failed to assure them of the grant of Lend-Lease 
facilities to Iran. Finally, the Japanese had managed to 
obtain some support among the Deputies, and most likely the 
Allies' defeats in the South Pacific in the spring might 
have made the Deputies feel that the Japanese and Germans 
would soon be in Iran. Moreover, the Deputies might have 
been influenced by Qaväm and his machinations against the 
Allies and his relations with the Japanese Legation, which 
will be discussed in the next chapter. However, when-the 
news of the Majlis refusal reached the American Minister 
he wrote: 
"In view of growing pro-Axis attitude of 
Iranians and their refusal to cooperate 
with British(see my number 97, April 6) 
tendencies which are now climaxed by 
refusal to expel Japanese Legation, 
17.1 
we should,, I feel take a strong 
line and refuse to furnish advisers 
or economic assistance on Lend-Lease 
or any other basis until Iran shows 
more inclination to cooperate". 20 
At this juncture, the patience of the British 
Government seemed to be exhausted. They decided to concentrate 
troops outside Tihrän and to occupy the capital if 
necessary and enforce the closing of the Japanese Legation. 
The Soviet Government was informed of the decision and told 
that the British would welcome it if the Soviet Government 
wished to be associated in the re-occupation of Tihrän. 
The Iranian Government, however, sensing, no doubt, that 
the British Government had taken a decision to take forceful 
action, Finally gave up the uneqal struggle. On April 8, 
the Majlis, at a secret session, approved expulsion of the 
Japanese but with the proviso that the consent of the Soviet 
Government be obtained. This rather unnecessary injection 
of the "Soviet Union consent" into the picture was apparently 
either the familiar norm of Iranian diplomacy-procrastination, 
or the last policy of reinsurance with the Axis Powers. 
However, the Soviet Ambassador first refused to make formal 
commitment, but later his Government agreed to inform the 
Iranian Government that they had no objection to their 
breaking off relations with Japan. 
20. Dreyfus to SOS, April 7,1942. US. F. R., vol. IV, 1942 
p. 329. 
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On April 12, Suhaili told the Japanese Minister to 
leave Iran with his staff in one week. The Legation, 
eventually, left Tihrän on April 23, via Russia, whereas 
the Japanese had asked to proceed to Turkey to which the 
Iranian Government had no objection, but the British did 
not approve of dumping further Axis diplomats in Turkey 
and insisted that the Legation had to return to Japan 
via Russia. 
21 
21. Dreyfus to SOS9 April 13,1942. Ibid, p. 333 
:. r, b.:,, ý,;.. vý ,.: f :.... ý....., 
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III. The Food and Currency Crisis 
I 
The conditions imposed by the war and occupation, the 
lack of sufficient communications between towns and villages, 
general insecurity, decline of exports and imports, increase 
of demand for food and basic essentials, partly as a result 
of the presence of the foreign troops, hoarding, and 
smuggling of wheat to Iraq and Turkey, altogether had created 
an organic food crisis throughout the country. Remote parts 
of the country often suffered from famine, while bread riots 
were prevalent in major towns. 
The Suhaili Government was unable to cope with this 
crisis, mainly because of many contradictions within the 
Cabinet, and the incessant struggle with the Majlis to win 
over Deputies' obstructiveness. Therefore, this infighting 
had been reflected inside the Government in general to make 
it an inert apparatus, incapable of dealing with the country's 
economic, social and political problems. Besides, numerous 
demands on behalf of the Allies., and agitation by feckless 
newspapers, pari passu, had aggravated the situation. For 
22 
instance, a pro-Tüda Party paper, Faryad , in connection 
22. For, 'details about this paper, see L. P. Elweel-Sutton 
The Iranian Press". . op. cit., p. 9L+ 
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with the Tabriz bread riot, wrote ".... starvation does 
stimulate human nature to strive for food, and the hungry 
stomach does not fear to be confronted with swords and 
bayonets.... women and children, young and old, naked and 
hungry were crying: we are hungry, we have not been given 
bread, we don't want to die, we want bread.... "23 
To tackle the press "problem", Suhaill introduced a 
Press Bill, but he eventually gave in to the general clamour 
against the unpopular Bill which would severely limit the 
freedom of the Tihran newspaper writers. 
To deal with the Majlis unsatisfactory behaviour 
Suhaili could do little. He oncehinted to the Deputies that 
they had better behave'if they did not wish to lose their 
jobs. He certainly implied that he would dissolve the Majlis. 
But he could not actually furnish a pretext to do so, and 
most likely he wished to use it as a screen whenever he 
wished. 
The idea of the dissolution of the Majlis had been 
welcomed by the parties concerned. The Shah supported the 
idea, probably thinking of getting rid of the Deputies of 
the old establishment who were attacking his father's regime 
and were not easily influenced by the Shah. Moreover, he 
probably thought that he could exert influence upon the new 
election since he had gradually built up strength and 
23. "Faryad", No. 21,22 Tir, 1322 (June 11,1943). The 
article appeared a few months after the riot had 
taken place. 
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and prestige in general, and particularly among young 
officers in the Army. But he and his Government did not 
wish to dissolve the Majlis on the grounds that it had 
been elected on the questionable basis of 1941 which 
Bullard had proposed. Obviously, the Shah would not be 
willing to mention the invalidity of the election as 
reflecting on his father. The Government, though 
dissatisfied with the Majlis, probably, thought that it 
would be better if protests were to be voiced in the 
Najlis rather than in the street. 
On the foreign side, the United States preferred to 
remain neutral on the matter. It seemed ironic to the US 
Government to support the idea of dissolution of the Majlis 
while it was the advocate of the Parliamentary system and 
the haven of democracy. The Russians simply considered 
that the time was not opportune to dissolve the Majlis. 
Bullard was the staunch advocate of the dissolution. He 
wrote; 
"It is doubtful if Soheily will ever be 
able to manage the Majlis... I think 
therefore that we should make one 
more effort to secure Taqizade as Prime 
Minister. 
2. As you know Majlis was nominated- 
by the late Shah and enjoys no prestige 
while invalidity of its title probably 
induces it to be more nationalistic 
than a properly elected assembly. 
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No one but deputies themselves would 
regret dissolution which could be 
justified about Furughi cabinet and 
especially (a popular point) by its 
slowness to deal with urgent bills 
such as those about hoarding and 
late Shah's lands....... It could be 
stated that new elections would be 
held but we could leave it to 
Taqizade not to hasten issue of 
writs". 24. 
To dissolve the Majlis upon Bullard's suggestion - 
the invalidity of the election of 1941 - would have, no 
doubt, : been a faux pas, since this argument would have 
thrown doubts on the validity of decisions taken by the 
Majlis, including the ratification of the Tripartite Treaty. 
The Foreign Office, however, commented; 
"It really looks as though the present 
Majlis will have to be dissolved unless 
we are prepared to put up with complete, 
chaos. Sir R. Bullard's suggestion that 
its dissolution should be followed by 
anfannouncement that new elections will 
be held without specifying the date is 
ingenious and might work. The chief 
objection to fresh election is that they 
would probably result in the election of 
a large number of communist deputies for 
the northern provinces. But communist 
deputies could scarcely be more mischievous 
than the present gang and anyhow the 
Constitution provides for the election 
of so many members from Tehran itself 
that the Russian nominees could not 
secure a majority. There is of course no 
guarantee that a new Majlis would be an 
improvement on the present one but the 
members would at any rate realize that 
they were liable to be sent packing, 
like their predecessors, if they misbehaved". 25 
24. Bullard to FO, No. 512, April 21,1942. E 2493/14/34~, 
FO 371/31385" Tagizada was the Iranian Minister in 
London. He had twice refused to return to Tihran. 
The Foreign Office preferred that the next approach 
to him should come from the Iranian side, viz. the 
Shah. See, FO to Tihran, April 28,1942. Ibid. 
25. Minute by Pink on Bullard, Ibid. 
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In another dispatch, Bullard requested the Foreign 
Office for permission to secure the dissolution of the 
Majlis in case the military situation in India or in the 
West were to become difficult for the Allies in the summer 
of 1942, and the Majlis, therefore, might have become a 
serious embarrassment. 
26 
The Foreign Office, then, 
instructed him; 
".... you should not commit yourself 
to any use of force to secure 
dissolution without further reference 
to me". 27 
Notwithstanding, the talk of the dissolution of the 
Majlis remained in the air during Suhaill's administration, 
and it was, again, considered once Qaväm became Prime 
Minister. Meanwhile, Suhaill still had to cope with the 
food situation. The general uncertainty and uneasiness of 
the general public concerning the food supply was reflected 
in a series of anti-Government intrigues in the Majlis. 
26, Bullard to FO, May, 21.1942. E 3234/14/34, FO 371/31385 




The 'problem'of wheat supply may be sought in the 
agriculture policy of Rizä Shah's regime. The policy was 
to buy wheat at a low price from the cultivators, in order to 
ensure cheap bread and thus prevent discontent in the towns, 
While the landowners secured a low price for their wheat, 
they compensated themselves by fleecing the peasants and 
were not much worse off. Nobody cared what the peasants 
felt about it. As they were completly unorganized politically, 
the Government could afford to disregard their views. 
When the war broke out, the price of wheat in Iran 
was still less than £8 per ton, which was the pre-war world 
price, whereas immediately after the outbreak of hostilities 
the price almost doubled. For instance, the British farmer 
obtained £16 per ton for his wheat. This was, of course, an 
artificially high price, designed to compensate him-for 
high wages and the loss of cultivating a good deal of land 
which was not particularly suitable for corn crops. 
Comparatively, the prices in Egypt, Iraq, Turkey, and particularly 
in Syria were grossly inflated. 
Already in the winter of 1940 and the following spring 
there was a wheat shortage which, although relieved by 
imports from India, left Iran with no reserves. The entry 
of Anglo-Russian troops just when the 1941 harvest operations 
were in full swing led to the collapse of the Government 
authority, especially in the major producing areas of the 
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south and north. Consequently, the Government failed to 
collect the normal share of the wheat crop which it had 
usually relied upon for the feeding of the capital and 
principal towns. Stocks were pillaged and either eaten 
or hidden by peasants, while the rich clung to what they 
might require and speculated with what they did not. 
Those near the western borders took advantage of the high 
prices in Turkey and Iraq to smuggle their gains and any 
other surplus grain they might have across the border. 
The Iranian Government seemed to be reluctant to raise the 
price to tackle the problem of hoarding, which would have 
effects on the future policy and on the economic life of 
the country as a whole. Later, the Government was, however, 
urged to raise the price to a level of £12 (1500 Rls. ) a 
ton. But the black market price had already risen 
considerably beyond this figure and the concession seemed 
to be too late. 
Two anti-hoarding laws were passed by the Majlis 
during the Suhaill and Qaväm premierships in the spring 
and summer of 1942, the second of which virtually gave 
the Government full powers to deal with hoarders. But, by 
no means, however, were measures taken to execubethe laws. 
The Government seemed unwilling to force landowners to 
sell at the official price or to pay them the price they 
demanded. Nor was the Government able to prevent smuggling 
into Iraq. Moreover, it was prevented by the Russians of 
transferring the wheat surplus from Xzarbäyijän and 




came over the public and the Government as to whether 
there would not shortly be another famine as in the last 
war. Consequently, the Iranian Government requested the 
imports of supplies of wheat and cereals and made 
representations both in London and Washington over the 
subject. In April, the dispute over the wheat supply 
between the Iranian and British Governments was brought 
to the surface. The Suhaill Government alleged that the 
British had promised to import 8000 tons of wheat on a 
monthly basis whereas only about 6000 tons were received. 
The British expressed annoyance that the Iranians would 
prefer seamen to endanger their lives to ship wheat to 
Iran rather than take steps to combat hoarding. Moreover, 
the British stated that they had supplied Iran with 
40,000 tons since the occupation mostly from India, and that 
they were sending 3000 tons monthly to East Iran from India. 
28 
The British and Iranians had not agreed on minimum 
requirements of wheat. While the latter insisted on 
60,000 tons up to the end of July 1942, of which 20,000 
immediately, and a further 100,000 tons from July 1942 to 
July 1943, the British believed that the April consignment 
of, 1700 (half of it for the Polish army in Iran) plus 
whatever could be sent in May together with other Iranian 
28. Dreyfus to SOS, April 6,1942. US. F. R., vol. IV, 1942, 
p. 122. 
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purchases of 7000 from the Russians and 10,000 from the 
United States, should be enough until the new crop came in. 
The dispute continued to remain unsettled, and 
relations between the two Governments deteriorated. The 
British, no doubt, used the question of the supply of 
essential goods such as tyres, wheat, etc., as a weapon 
to obtain more co-operation from the Iranians, particularly 
in the dispute over the issue of currency and exchange 
control. Both disputes were inter-twined, each side using 
them to bring pressure to bear on the other. 
In March, there was talk of the re-valuation of the 
rial against foreign currencies. Economically, there were 
ample grounds for the re-valuation: (a) large Allies war 
expenditure in Iran totalling about 400,000,000 rials 
monthly, sterling sales by the British at the rate of a 
million pounds per month; (b) the inability of Iran. to 
dispose of her foreign exchange because of the lack of 
importation facilities. These two factors had created 
naturally a tendency to raise the value of the rial, 
politically, the re-valuation was supported by the Majlis, 
owing to pressure from the merchants and press... 
The British Government viewed re-valuation as an 
attempt unfavourable to its interests and instructed Bullard 
to inform the Iranian Government that such an attempt would 
affect their attitude in the matter of food supply. At the 
same time, the US Government was requested to support the 
British Minister in Tihrän in resisting the re-valuation 
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of the rial. When the British demand was reportdd to 
Tihran, Dreyfus duly wrote; 
Any effort to prevent revaluation would 
undoubtedly and with some reason be 
resented by Iranian officials as 
unnecessary and unjustified interference 
in their internal affairs in a matter 
not essential to our war effort and 
would contribute little toward 
transforming Iran from a "passive 
appendage" into a willing partner': 29 
Avoiding involvement in the dispute, the US Government 
decided, while supporting the British Minister in Tihrän, 
not to join with the British in representationsto the 
Iranian Government. 
30 
This decision was probably taken 
for two reasons; first, to maintain the US prestige in 
Iran'intact; second, not to drive the Iranians further 
into the Axis hands. 
. The British representation only aggravated 
the 
situation. For it appeared that the Iranian Government 
were refusing to accept sterling balances and demanding 
either that more goods or gold be delivered to them or 
that sterling should be devalued in exchange for rial. 
They went so far as to refuse to give rials in exchange 
for sterling at the rate of 140 Rls., which had been 
fixed by Dr. Mushaaf Nafisi thus creating problems for 
British transactions in the country. 
29. Dreyfus to SOS, No. 82, March 28,1942, Ibid, p. 301. 
30, Memorandum of conversation by the Adviser on 
Political Relations (Murray), April 20,1942. Ibid, 
pp"304-6. 
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The British Government was opposed both to the 
sending of gold and any devaluation of sterling against 
rial. As to the sending of more goods, they were 
prevented by shipping difficulties. Moreover, the British 
argued that if Iranian demands were. to be met, it would 
set an undesirable precedent for other Middle Eastern 
countries" . 
31 
Thus, the British again asked their American 
ally that they would appreciate Anglo-American co-operation 
in exerting pressure on the Iranians, postponing the US 
Lend-Lease aid for Iran and threatening to freeze the 
Iranian balances in the United States. 32 
The US Government viewedthe British suggestions to be, 
economically, ineffective, although they might have been 
practicable on political grounds, for the amount of-Iranian 
funds in the US was very small, and a threat to withold 
aids under Lend-Lease from the Iranians would have hardly 
been an impressive weapon while no such aid had been granted 
yet. Furthermore, the State Department commented, " if we 
decided to send goods to Iran under Lend-Lease it would be 
for our specific advantage, @0,, 
33 
Therefore, the State Department saw no unreasonable 
behaviour on behalf of the Iranians. Reasonably, the Iranian 
Government did not wish to build up further blocked sterling 
31. The Chdrgd in UK (Mathews) to SOS, April 8,1942, 
US F. R., vol. IV, 1942, p. 302. 
32. Ibid. 
33" Memo by Murray, April 20,1942, Ibid, p. 304. 
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balances. But they were ready to sell rials for gold or 
dol]iars. So, it was decided to increase the British supply 
of dollars so that they would be able to pay in dollars 
for lthe Iranian currency. The Foreign Office, while 
agreeing to this arrangement, felt for reasons of prestige 
that, " it would be preferable if the actual purchase of 
rials could be made by the United States rather than by 
the British"34, and then be turned over to them. 
In late April, the British adopted a more conciliatory 
attitude in connection with negotiations over the supply of 
rial by the Iranians. The modification of their attitude 
was probably as a result of the US offer to buy rials for 
the British and also their unwillingness to join with 
Britain to put pressure on Iran, However, the British were 
now willing to send some gold to Iran, guarantee the Iranian 
balances in sterling with gold, and convert Iranian sterling 
reserves into dollars to the extent needed for Iranian imports. 
The negotiations were carried out between the Iranian 
Government and the British Legation in Tihrän until May 3, 
when an informal agreement was reached on these lines; 
"(1) Iranians to guarantee supply of. rials to 
be issued against sterling holdings, (2) British to convert sterling into gold 
to meet Iranian dollar imports, 
(3) British to convert 35% of remaining 
Iranian sterling holdings to gold., (4+) Exchange rate to be fixed at 32 rials 
per dollar and 128 per pound". 35. 
34. Meeting with Hayter and Bewley from British Embassy 
and Treasurjr. Memo by Division of Near Eastern Affairs, 
April 27,1942. US. F. R., vol. IV, 1942, p. 306. 
35. Dreyfus to SOS9 May 3,1942. Ibid., p. 310. 
185 
The informal agreement was the basis on which the 
Financial Agreement of May 26,1942, was signed between 
Ivan and Britain. According to this agreement the 
Government of Iran would fix the official rate of exchange 
as 128 rial to a pound (Article 6-a-), and would reqeive 
gold or goods equal to 40% of its balances of. foreign 
currencies on a six-monthly basis. The remainder (60%) 
would remain in the Bank of England until the end of the 
war. The gold would only be delivered in Ottawa or South 
Africa, and only be spent in the Sterling Area until the 
war finished. 
36 
In fact the Iranian Government undertook to fix the 
rate''of exchange far above the real one, had it been 
allowed to float freely, while it did not obtain assurances 
with regard to the food supply. In July, the wheat situation 
became very critical, causing a shortage of bread. The 
Dritish Legation had maintained a rather intransigent 
attitude, not agreeing to import wheat more than 60,000 
36, The agreement was composed of fifteen articles and an 
annex. It was presented to the Majlis on June 9,1942. 
The Majlis did not seem to be willing to ratify it. 
It was however believed that the Government was 
, implementing it even before the Majlis ratification. 
This had caused bitter feelings among the Deputies. 
A similar financial agreement was concluded between 
Iran and the Soviet Union on March 18,1943. It was 
,, ratified by the Majlis on May 29,1943, according to 
which the Soviet Union were to pay in dollars for the 
rial purchases. But the balance of dollars was to 
remain in the Soviet Union in the form of gold until 
the expiry of the agreement. 
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tons for the year 1942, and insisting that the Government 
should requisition stocks alleged to be in the hands of 
hoarders before demanding more imports. The British were 
so obsessed with the problem of hoarding as to ignore the 
underlying reality of the situation which was simply a 
lack pf sufficient wheat in the country. The American 
Minister reported; 
"Iranian views as to hoarding has 
been proved substantially correct 
by recent investigations which 
failed to reveal large stocks in 
hands of persons designated by 
British. "37 
In the middle of July the gravity of the situation 
was, however, realized by the British. Although the Suhaill 
Government had frequently brought to the Allies' attention 
the need for more wheat imports up to 100,000 tons from 
July . 942 to July 1943, they had ignored it. The Russians 
had allowed only small quantities of the surplus cereal in 
their occupied zone to go to the south and east of the 
country, while they were taking cattle and horses into the 
Soviet Union. 
38 
Meanwhile, bread riots began in Burujird 
and Maläyir, and it was feared that they might spread 
throughout the country. The British recognized the seriousness 
of the situation, and promised to lend the Government 5600 
tons of wheat from military stocks to be repaid by wheat 
37. Dreyfus to SOS, July 7,1942. US. F. R., vol. IV, 1942 
p. 143- 
38. Bullard to Eden, Confidential, July 28,1942. 
E 4619/3655/34, Fo 371/31443 
187 
bought from the United 
tons of barley were to 
bread. These measures 
new crop was harvested 
were taken too late to 
falling. 
States by Iran. Also five thousand 
be given to be mixed with wheat for 
would help the Government until the 
during July and August, but they 
prevent the Suhaill Government from 
188 
III 
From early July opposition to Suhaili began to grow 
stronger. He became the object of attack by the Majlis, 
many of whom were anxious to obtain ministerial posts and 
probably felt that they were being deprived of the spoils 
39 
of office. The introduction of Sayyid Mihdi Farukh, 
the Governor General of Kirmän, to the Cabinet as the 
Minister öf Interior on July 2, further aggravated Suhaill's 
position, and there were rumours of an interpellation which 
would unseat Suhaili. That, however, did not happen. But 
the`Adälat Party, led by ShaikheAli Dashti and Farajullah 
Bahrämi (Dablr A zam), made the strongest attacks on Suhaill 
for his inability to solve the transport and food supply. 
At the same time, rumours of a dispute between Suhaill and 
his Minister of Justice, Ahi, concerning the latter's 
departure as Ambassador to the Soviet Union, helped to 
spread the general feeling that the Cabinet was on its last 
legs. 
4o 
Meanwhile, a number of candidates for the post of 
Prime Minister were proposed. A group of Deputies nominated 
Mustafa Qull Bayat (Sahäm_al-Sultän) as their, candidate, 
but with little success, for Bayät had had little experience 
in Government office and could not command general respect. 
39" See Personalities, Appendix I, p"5 97- 
40. The dispute between Suhailiand Ahi was mainly due to the 
latter's reluctance to leave the country, a fact which 
might be the source of rumour that he hoped himself 
to secure the premiership. 
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Another group supported Ali Mansur, who was the Prime 
Minister at the time of the Anglo-Russian occupation in 
August 1941, and was then the Governor General of Khuräsän. 
Tadaýyyun was also active, but the Soviet Embassy considered 
him', too pro-British. Therefore, there was little hope 
for, his success. Käzimi was also on the prowl. Some Tihran 
politicians were talking of Sayyid Zia-al-Din TabätabV 
i 
l 
as the one person who could save the country from its ills. 
Finally, Qaväm was perhaps the most serious candidate who 
had also a considerable following. Moreover, the Russians 
appeared to regard him as strong enough to ensure a stable 
Government. 
By the end of July, Suhaili's position had deteriorated 
to the extent that there was no hope for his survival. 
t 
Bullard reported; 
"The Cabinet is very shaky. Owing to the 
incompetence and corruption of local 
officials the bread situation is bad in 
many districts and there have been bread 
riots. .... I know no one who now expects 
that Soheily, who is himself considered 
both corrupt and afraid to act, can 
reform his Cabinet in such a way to be. 
able to deal with this crisis... The 
general opinion seems to be that Qavam 
al Saltana is the only man on the spot 
who could hope to make some headway' 
against the difficulties which beset 
the Persian Geovernment. The Russian 
Ambassador would like me to join him 
in putting Qavam into power but I have 
--told him that apart from the fact that my 
latest instructions are to put, Lpwith 
Soheily for the present, our policy is to 
accept any Government which the Persians 
set up provided that it will work 
energetically with the Allies....... 
41. He was still in 1942 in Palestine, and had shown no 
interest in returning to Iran. He eventually came back 
to Iran in 1943. See Chapter Seven. 
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2.... The food situation and the German 
advance in Russia have created problems which 
I fear are beyond Soheily's powers and the 
Russian Ambassador and I have both come to 
the conclusion that his weakness and inactivity 
consitute a serious danger for the Allies. "42 
! Meanwhile, the Shah sounded the well-known elder 
statesman, Husain Pirniyä (Multamin-al-Mulk) 
43 
about 
forming a cabinet, but he refused on the grounds that the 
Najl'is was obstinate and intriguing. It seemed that nobody 
would accept office at this difficult moment, even Qaväm. 
But he indicated to the Oriental Secretary of the British 
Legation that however unattractive the prospect he would 
accept the Premiership if it was offered to him. Bullard 
wrote, 11 Qavam already knows that Soviet Embassy are in 
his favour though he declares that he has no particular 
relations with them". 
44 
Failing to reform his cabinet, Suhaili resigned on 
July 30. In his farewell statement to the Majlis, he 
attributed his resignation to the lack of sympathy shown 
by the Deputies and press to his Government's efforts to 
deal with current problems. He also pointed out measures 
taken by his Government in domestic and foreign policies. 
He said; 
142. Bullard to FO, July 28,1942. E 4+4+85, FO 371/31385. 
1+3. See Personalities, Appendix I, p, 513. 
44. ' Bullard to FO, July 29,1942. E. 44+9+, FO 371/31385. 
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"Most important of all, the good 
understanding between Iran and 
her two neighbours, which was 
created by the Three Power Treaty, 
has been confirmed during this 
period and relations between us 
have been strengthened, so that we can 
say that there is no cause for anxiety 
left in this direction. Our relations 
with America have fortunately become 
relations of close-co-operation and 
assistance of the American Government 
has been obtained for the engagement 
of civil and military advisors. " 45. 
Undoubtedly, certain Deputies, chief among whom were 
All Dashti, Bayät, and Dr. Malikzäda, opposed Suhaill and 
did their best to unseat him. The press also showed a 
hostile attitude towards the Government. But, the main 
reason for his downfall might, perhaps, be sought in his 
inability to deal with the food problem, and his feeling 
that he had lost the confidence both of the British and 
Russians. 
45. Summary of Statement in the Majlis by Suhaill, 




"We have had very considerable, 
difficulties with Qavam-es-Saltaneh, 
but we can not hope for complete 
subservience from any man with 
sufficient character to govern this 
most intractable and venal country.. "46 
(Dullard to Eden) 
"Qavam-es-Saltaneh is regarded-by the 
State Department in Washington as the 
type of all that is evil in Persian 
politics... "47 
Perhaps, Pareto would have found it difficult to 
group Qaväm into one of his categories of statesmen; 
s 
foxes and lions, as Qavam embodied the characteristics 
of both. This enigmatic politician of the old establishment, 
once ,a revolutionary during the Constitutic. nal Revolution 
of 1906, and a big landowner in Lähijän (near Rasht), was 
banished to Europe by Rizä Khan, being accused of having 
plotted against the life of Riza Khan, and allowed to 
return to Iran in March 1929. The Foreign Office 
Personalities Report described him as "a clever man, but 
sly, intriguing and unreliable". Regardless of his 
9 
personality, he made a great impact on Iranian politics. 
46. Bullard to Eden, Confidential, Sept. 22,1942. E6154 
/3655/34, FO 371/31443. 
47. State Department to FO, No. 1168, Feb. 28,1942. Cited in 
the minute on Bullard, July 28,1942. E 4485/14/34 
FO 371/31385. 
48. Vilfredo Pareto, Trattato di sociologica generale, 
S'2178,2480F, Barbera, Firenze, 1961. (English translation, 
The Mind and Society, US, 1935). 
49. FO, Feb-7,1940. E 832/826/34, FO 371/24582. Also see, 
Personalities, Appendix I, p. 536. 
j 
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On August 1, a ballot of the Majlis gave 53 votes to 
Qavam'against 22 to Suhaili, and the former agreed to 
form a Cabinet on the understanding that he was to have 
a completely free hand in the selection of his Ministers. 
50 
His foreign policy was, apparently, to establish 
closer relations with the Allies, particularly with the 
United States. He even went so far as to consult the 
selection of his Ministers with Bullard and also cancelled 
several names immediately when he heard that the British 
did not approve of them. 
51 
But, at the same time, he had 
secretly maintained his contacts with the Axis camp. 
52 
O. Qaväm introduced his Cabinet on August 9; 
*Sadiq Sädigi(Mustashar-al-Daula) Advisor 
*Ibrahim Hakim! (Hakim-al-Mulle) Advisor 
*Dr. Isma'il Marzban Health 
*'1k1i Rizä Qaraquzlü (Haha -al-riulk) Justice 
*Sayyid Hasan Tagizäda Finance 
(PA innfad tbn nnct) 
*Dagir Kazimi 
*Hamid Sayyah 









*Abdulhusain Iiazhir Trade & Industry 
*Muhammad Said Foreign 
*See Personalities, Appendix I. 491L.. 
The Ministry of War was offered to Ala who preferred to 
retain his non-political_post as the President of Bank 
Milli, and then to Kazimi, who refused it as too difficult. 
Qavam himself was therefore looking after the Ministry. 
KaVimi was then transferred to the Ministry of Finance, 
upon Tagizada's recommendation, and Javäd`Amiri was 
introduced as the Minister of the Interior. 
Bullard to Eden, Confidential, August 14,1942. 
E 5057/14/34, FO 371/31385. 
See ._' chapter 
6. 
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In the domestic field, his policy was what he said to 
the representatives of the United Press and Associated 
Press in his interview on August 4. When asked what his 
policy would be, Qavam picked up a piece caDf bread from his 
desk and replied "This: is my programme, if I can put bread 
of good quality in hands of all Iranians other problems 
will be easy to solve". 
53 
Like his predecessor, Qavam's domestic, policy was 
directly linked to his foreign policy where the problem 
of food and currency, and the "problem" of Majlis were 
mutually and simultaneously being used as the means of 
pressure and counter-poise. 
With the accession of Qaväm to power, the problem of 
the dissolution of the Majlis came, once again, to the fore. 
On August 5, Bullard hurriedly wrote; 
"I am confident Majlis constitutes 
serious danger. In case of immediate 
threat from North, deputies might 
e. g. make nationalistic declaration 
and perhaps cancel their ratification 
of Treaty. Soviet Ambassador agrees 
generally and promised to ask his 
Government not to oppose dissolution.. "54. 
According to Bullard, Qaväm had also expressed his 
desire to dissolve the Majlis. He made it clear that 
"he did not intend to stand any nonsense from Majlis". 
55 
53" Dreyfus to SOS, Au,. -, pst 5,1942. US. F. ß., vol. IV, 19L42 
p. 151. 
54, ; Dullard to FO, August 5,1942. E 4636/14/34, FO 371 
/31385- 
55- Bullard to' Fo, August, . 15,1942 E 
4827/14/34, F0 371 
/31385- 
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But, at the same time, Qavam's chief bargaining counter 
against the Allies was his threat to resign, if they 
did not help him to overcome the other problem, viz., 
the food supply. The Foreign Office was obviously not 
at ease with Qaväm, since he had such a strong intriguing 
personality that it was extremely difficult for them to 
handle. But, he was, half-heartedly, being supported by 
the Foreign Office or Bullard to be probably used against 
the Majlis. A recommendation of the Foreign Office was 
this; 
"With the Majlis gone, we need pay little 
attention to Qavam's threat to resign, 
since we should have far less difficulty 
in replacing him if he went. He would' 
have to be correspondingly more amenable 
if he wished to keep his job. "56 
But Qavam was able enough at handling both the British 
and the Majlis. While confiding his desire of dissolving 
the Majlis to the British, he affirmed publicly on 
September 27 his respect for the constitution and rights 
of the Majlis. 
Talks on the dissolution of the Majlis were, however, 
carried out between the British and Qavä. m. Meanwhile, 
the Soviet Government agreed to the dissolution but thought 
that the time and manner of it should be settled locally. 
57 
56. Minute by Young on flullard, Ibid. 
57" r0. to Bullard, November 8,. 19+2. E 6536/122/3+, 
'FO 371/31386. 
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mit the problem of finding convincing grounds to 
" dissolve the Majlis was an obstacle. According to 
Article 49 of the Fundamental Law of December 30,1906, 
the, new Deputies had to be elected three months after 
dissolution (one month in Tihrän) While the British 
had'desired the indefinite postponement of the election, 
there was a serious danger that it might have destroyed 
the original British aim; the dissolution. The Iranian 
Government might take the line that it could not conclude 
any binding agreement because it would not be 
consitutionally valid without the approval of the Majlis. 
This is exactly what happened in 1920-22, when the Majlis 
was. in abeyance and the Government of the day used this 
argument to great effect as an excuse for delaying decisions. 
The result was that the Dritish Legation devoutly wished 
that the Majlis was in existence so as to remove this 
excuse for delaying decisions on urgent questions. 
The other side of the analysis would have been if the 
Government had held fresh elections within the interval 
laid down by the constitution. Qavä. m was capable of rigging 
the elections and could have sent his own nominees to the 
? lajlis. The-Shah would undoubtedly have compromised with it. 
Also having the Majlis on his side, Qaväm would have been in 
a stronger position to bargain with the Allies. Moreover, 
the closing down of the democratic assembly of an ally at 
the instigation of the "Democracies" would be a gift to 
Axis, propagandists, while the embittered ex-Deputies would 
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do their utmost to agitate and intrigue against the 
Allies. Therefore, in the analysis, either way the 
Alles stood, would lose. 
However, talk of dissolution once more remained in 
the, air without effective steps being taken to that end. 
Although Qaväm seemed to be anxious to dissolve the 
Majlis, he was not willing to do so. Perhaps he wished 
to use the Najlis as a screen between the Government and the 
Allies. Thus the desire of the British Legation to see 
the "obstructive" assembly dissolved never came to fruition. 
The remedy supply was given to the Government in July, 
but did not last long enough to avert serious shortages of 
wheat. Immediately after Qavam's succession in August, 
theýAmerican Legation reported: "Unless the wheat 
situation is taken seriously in hand famine with all its 
accompanying difficulties may soon become a reality"58 
In fact the signs of a famine had been visible for some 
time in other parts of the country if not actually in 
Tihran, but nobody paid any attention. On August 19,1942, 
the British Legation in a note to Qavam stated that the 
Allies had fulfilled their obligation by providing Iran 
with 80,000 tons of wheat, and that Iran should take 
energetic steps to collect wheat and apply hoarding laws. 
59 
58. Dreyfus to SOS, August 5,1942. US. F. R., vol. IV 1942, 
p. 152. - 
59. Dreyfus to SOS, August 26,1942. US. F. R., vol. IV, 1942, 
'p. 153. 
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In other words, the Legation implied that no wheat would 
he imported into the country, at least, for the greater 
part of 1943. Furthermore, the Public Relations Bureau 
of the Legation made a statement on the wheat situation 
which was published in the Tihran Press. The statement 
attributed the misunderstanding of British policy on the 
wheat! situation to Axis propaganda and continued that the 
British Government had imported more than 70,000 tons of 
wheat into Iran since September 1941, and that the Soviet 
Government had sent 23,000 tons to Iran. It concluded that 
over a quarter of Iran's yearly wheat consumption had been 
imported into the country by meticulous efforts of the 
Allies (Iran's yearly wheat consumption was 300,000 tons). 
This statement did not improve the situation, it only caused 
61 
tumult in the Majlis. 
While the problem of wheat supply had remained 
unsettled, the Government was drafting in October a bill 
to issue two billion additional rials in currency ( one billion 
for internal needs and one billion for war needs). Butthe 
Government knew that the Majlis would not pass the bill, if 
nothing were offered in exchange. The crux of the situation 
is wheat. Meanwhile, Sheridan, the food adviser made a 
statement to the press in order to soften general discontent 
60. "Kaihan", 7 Shahrivar, 1321 (Au. 29,19Z2). 
61. At 87th session of the Majlis on September 20, Deputy Tihranchi attacked the Statement and said, "only for 
the Poles' consumption, we have to supply a great 
, amount of 
bread, butter, cheese, and other goods. 
The reason for the food shortage is not to say that 
we are corrupt. " See Muzäkirat-i Majlis, daura-yi 
sizdahum, 1321. 
199 
with the Allies' treatment of Iran. In his statement 
he assured the people of supplies of wheat and of a 
sympathetic and helping hand from both Britain and 
America. The British Legation took a strong position 
with regard to the statement and felt that Sheridan 
had no right to bind them to supply wheat to It-an. The 
situation was aggravated by the refusal of Casey's offer 
by the Iranian Government. On a short visit to Tihran 
he had offered to exchange 5000 tons of wheat (half for 
the Government and half for the British troops) with 
25000 rifles. The Iranian Government refused his offer 
on the grounds that the British had not paid for 100,000 
rifles andý1000 machine guns bought in previous months. 
Casey, because of this refusal and most likely encouraged 
by Bullard who was opposed to the supply of wheat, told the 
Government that the British did not intend to supply Iran 
with any more wheat and said: "I know more about the 
shipping situation than Mr. Sheridan. 
62 
These antagonizing statements could only drive the 
Iranians further into the Axis camp, and make-the Government 
and Majlis feel that it was unnecessary to make sacrifices 
for the Allies when they refused to supply wheat or other 
goods and when they took their potatoes, vegetables and 
62. Dreyfus to SOS, Oct. 17,1942. US. F. R., vol. IV, 1942 
p. 156. 
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cattle out of Iran without permission. 
63 
Obviously, 
the Government could not present the currency bill to the 
Najlis unless some assurances were given of essential goods, 
particularly of wheat. The American Minister feared that 
Qavam might resign if he did not receive any co-operation 
on-the matter. Consequently, the currency bill would be 
postponed in which event the Allies' war efforts would 
face, difficulties. Dreyfus thought that the obstinate 
attitude of the British towards the wheat supply was to 
force Qaväm to resign. Ile wrote; 
"I have impression that British Legation 
is playing again game of divide and 
rule and may be endeavouring force out 
Qavam and obtain more suitable Quisling. 
It is rumoured they favor Tadayyan for 
Prime Minister. At any rate British 
policy here seems to me to lack 
comprehension and vision". 64. 
Caught up by the gravity of the wheat supply, Dreyfus 
recommended that his Government should give Iran guarantees 
to undertake to supply the deficit of wheat, though this 
would have countered the British policy. The State 
Department, while instructing Dreyfus not to give guarantees 
until the matter was fully studied, informed the Foreign 
Office of its concern over the problem, and added: "A 
starving and rebellious population would, we feel, be an 
63. ' The Government and Majlis's claim about the Allies' 
', behaviour was not unfounded. For instance, Bullard 
reported: ".... The British military authorities 
were anxious to buy 10,000 tons (potatoes). The Persian 
Government, however, procrastinated about giving the 
necessary permits. Most of the quantity was bought by 
the military authorities and exported from Persia without 
permits. "Bullard to Eden, March 26,1943. E 2450/239/34, 
FO 371/35117. 
64, ',, Dreyfus to SOS9 Oct. 17,1942.0p. cit. p. 157" 
It is true that the British fav ur d Tada u but there is hardly any evidence to show 
that they risied to see 
Qaväm ou of office before the Majlis dissolved. 
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extremely serious obstacle". 
65 
Meanwhile, in Tihrzn, 
the Allies' representatives persuaded Qaväm to present 
the, currency bill to the Majlis, provided the United 
States and British Governments agreed to supply any 
cereal deficiency which might occur up to the end of the 
war, or"at least until the 1943 harvest. A joint Anglo- 
American declaration was then proposed along the same 
lines, to be announced publicly so that it would give 
morg heart to Qaväm to defend the bill in the' Majlis. 
Then, proposal and counterproposal drafts of such a 
dec. aration which later appeared as a food agreement 
began circulating between Tihran, London and Washington. 
The Russians, who had refused to join the declaration, 
submitted to the Iranian Government a request to buy 
5000'tons of wheat, 15000 tons of barley and 30,000 tons 
of rice. The direct result of this request was a further 
weakening of the political situation of the Allies in Iran. 
While it sorely needed its own wheat for internal use, the 
Sovýet, Union was pressing the Government to sell its wheat. 
The Iranian Government had no option but to comply with 
such a request, as 35000 tons of surplus wheat from 
p. zarbayijan was virtually in the hands of the Russians who 
were making any excuse to withold it. The Iranian Government 
hoped the British and Americans would raise an objection 
to the Russian purchases of Iranian wheat. But the Russians 
had'made similar requests to the US and British Governments, 
who'agreed to allow Iranian wheat to go to Russia, making up 
65. The SOS to Winant(UK), Oct. 19,1942. US. F. R., vol. IV, 1942 
P-159. 
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any Iranian deficit with Anglo-American wheat. Therefore, 
Dullard telegraphed his Government, requesting 20,000 tons 
of wheat to be sent to Iran as soon as possible to meet the 
situation caused by the Russian purchases. 
Meanwhile, the approved drafts, of the food declaration 
reach Tihrän from Washington and London to their respective 
Legations, and instructions were given to proceed with 
negotiations with the Iranian authorities on the basis of 
these drafts, in which the US and British Governments should 
"take all possible steps to ensure the supply of bread for 
the people of Persia until the gathering of the harvest in 
1943"" 
66 
In the Majlis, debates were göing on over the 
currency bill, in whose favour önly two Deputies spoke. 
It seemed that the Government have little hope of 
success. The main points from the opposition speeches, 
other than the bread shortage which all stressed, were: 
that the Anglo-Iranian Financial Agreement had not yet 
been passed by the Majlis while the Government was executing 
it; that the pound exchange rate was too high and the rate 
should be freed and the pound allowed to find its own level, 
which would be much lower than the present rate; that prices 
rose with every increase in note issue, the people were 
already suffering severely from the high cost of living 




which, ' previous increase in the note issue for the Allies 
had caused and could not stand further increase; that the 
Allies were bleeding the country and giiring nothing in 
return; that the war might go on for years and constant 
Allied demands for the increase in the note issue would 
reduce the value of qiran (rail) to nothing; and that the 
Allies were using Iran's means of communications for their 
own purpose to the exclusion of the country's urgent needs; 
and that the Allies were stopping food supplies reaching 
Tihran from Azarbayijan. 
67 
However, the Majli-s ratified 
only five hundred million rials to be issued, and it seemed 
that for the remainder of two billion rials proposed in the 
bill, the fight between the Government and Majlis would 
continue. 
The Deputies' resentment to ratify issuance of further 
rials was not unjustified. The Iranian economy was in 
perpetual crisis. The main cause of the crisis was the 
heavy Allied liar expenditure which amounted to four 
hundred million rials monthly, The Iranian note issue 
increased from 1550 million rials in August 19+1 to three 
billions in October 1942, and it continued rising. 
68 
67. Aiuzakirat-i Majlis daura-yi sirdahum, session No. 97, 
28 riihr, 1321. (Sept. 20,1942) 
Among the Deputies who made fierce attacks on the 
Government were: AmIr Taimyr, rAli Dashtl, and Dr. Javän. 
The last one resigned owing to his lack of confidence in 
the Government. 
68. Extracted from the Dank Milli Report published in 
Kaihan, 13 Aban, 1321 (Nov. 4,1942) 
2OL 
Rials in circulation (in million) 
Year Rial 
'Azar 1318(nov. - Dec. 1939) 1,115 
" 1319( 1940) 1,250 
1320( " 1941) 1,850 
it 1321( it 1942) 3,576 
of 1322( It 1943) 6,320 
It 1323( 1944) 7,580 
Source: Bank Milli Report (see fottnote No. 69) 
During the'same time the price index rose from the base of 
100 in 1937 to 193 in August 1941 and 331 in September 
1942, while, for Britain and Germany, the figures, from 
the inception of the war until March 1943, were 25-30, and 
105-L06 respectively. The cost of living index for the same 
period was. 100,209 and 418.70This was perhaps the main cause 
of need for an ever larger note issue and also an effect of 
increased circulation. There were, of course, domestic 
reasons as well why the Government had to issue more notes: 
firstly, notes did not complete the normal cycle and return 
to banks for reissue, due to the lack of confidence in the 
69. Ii. Pi. rniya, "Tasbit-i rival" , Iran_, 15 Isfand, 1323, 
(March 
6,1945). 
70, All figures extracted from the Bank Milli Report published 
in Dad, No. 93.17 Isfand, 1321 (March 8,1943). Also, see, 
Dreyfus to SOS, Nov. 18,1942. US. F. R., vol. IV, 1942. 
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rial which had caused people to buy goods and land rather 
than to place their money in banks, and secondly, because 
of the hoarding of notes by the lower classes and peasants 
who kept their notes in safes or under ground, in which 
case the amount was, however, not very considerable. 
However, after the Majlis vote for 500 million rials, 
Qaväm, immediately, placed 100 millions at the Allies' 
disposal. This amount would last for, perhaps, ten days, 
at which time a currency crisis would have come to the fore 
again. Qaväm asked, therefore, for the food declaration to 
be announced without delay, in order to reduce political 
tension caused by the food riots and also to strengthen the 
hand of the Government in obtaining Majlis' approval of the 
pendingcurrency bill. But Bullard rejected Qaväm's request, 
saying that the declaration did not meet the situation fully, 
for while the British and Americans would be bound to supply 
wheat until the 1943 harvest, the Iranians could resort to 
"blackmail" when the two billion rials were to be exhausted 
within a few months. 
71 
Therefore, Bullard proposed to the 
Foreign Office the abandonment of negotiations on the basis 
of the approved draft, and that they should proceed along 
these lines: (i) the British and American Governments would 
undertake to insure Iran's wheat supply until, the end of the 
i 
71.. Dreyfus to SOS, Oct. 30,1942. US. F. R., vol. IV, 194?, 
P"174 
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war 4nd to import 25,000 tons of wheat as soon as possible, 
(2) ttie Iranian Government must remove the legal limit 
tonný ge issue of currency and take out of the, hands of the 
AIajlirs the right to restrict the note issue, and set up a 
currency board composed of Iranian, Russian, American, and 
British members. 
72 
One might be inclined to think that these additional 
demands were, deliberately, designed not to be acceptable 
to the Iranians. Indeed, no government would accept that its 
currency control should be in the hands of aliens. The 
American Minister reported: 
"It is quite possible that the British 
are deliberately delaying solution of, 
food and currency problem by making 
additional demands and suggestions... 
I should not be surprised if they intend 
to occupy Tehran on pretext that Iranians 
have not lived up to agreement to furnish 
rials". 73. 
In fact, Dreyfus's alarming report was not without base, 
as the British had designed a military plan to take over 
74 
Iran do banks. At the same time the Foreign Office 
requested the State. Department to instruct Dreyfus to support 
the British Minister in his discussions with the Iranian 
authorities about those proposals. But the State Department's 
policy was different frone the British one. The American view 
can bye-gauged from the following lines: 
72. Ibid. 
73- Dreyfus to SOS9 Nov. 4,19)+2. US. F. R., vol. IV, 1942.1.176. 
714. C-in-C (Persia/Iraq) to War Office, Most secret, Nov. 13, 
1942. E 6703/69/34, FO 371/31407. 
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"we are opposed to repeated changes in 
the bases of negotiations in a period 
of crisis such as the present. We 
believe any action which would bring 
about fall of cabinet is to be avoided' 
if possible, since we fail to see how 
repeated cabinet changes may be 
expected to bring about greater order 
or enhance public confidence in 
Government. We are even more strongly 
opposed to forced suppression of 
Majlis and constitutional procedures- 
or military occupation of Tehran... 
6. In your discretion, you may 
formally urge upon Prime Minister 
advisability of seeking full powers 
from Majlis..... 
However, neither these or any other 
measures need be considered as 
essential conditions precedent to 
issuance of wheat announcement". 75 
On November 17, Qaväm placed a bill before the Majlis, 
conferring on him until August 19+3 full powers in regard 
to specified questions of special urgency, e. g., currency, 
food supply, and price control. He made the mistake of 
asking for these powers for himself personally instead of 
for the Cabinet. The Majlis, who requested that the session 
should be secret, showed considerable hostility and Qaväm did 
not press the bill. But the Cabinet were divided over this 
bill by then. Käzimi, the Minister-of Finance, who feigned 
illness to avoid the responsibility was dismissed. 
76 
75. The Secretary of State (Hull) to Dreyfus, Nov. 10,1942. 
US. F. R., vol. IV, 1942. p. 186. 
76. In his statement published in ICaihan , 28 Aban, 1321 (Nov. 19,1942), Käzimi claimed that he had resigned and 
had not been dismissed. He said: "... though I believe 
that there must be found resonable solutions for the 
Allies demands, I do not agree with the request from 
the Majlis for full powers (by Qavam), and I recognized 
it as pernicious to the genuine conscience and faith, 
I therefore resigned". 
_ The FO comment on Käzimi's dismissal reads: "Kazimi 
is certainly no loss and may well have been working 
against us behind the scenes". The FO, Nov. 20,1942. 
E 6822/1+/34, FO 371/31386. 
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Urged on by the Allies' representatives in Tihrän, 
Qaväm presented another bill to the Majlis on November 
19, providing for transfer-b the Hai' at-i nizärat-i 
andükhta-yiiskinä. s (Note Reserve Control Committee: ) 
of the right to control the note issue. This bill had 
been prepared as an alternative to solve the currency 
problem if the full powers bill of November 17 was not 
passed by the Majlis. The full powers bill was, however, 
not passed and referred to a Majlis committee without 
urgency, and the alternative bill had been agreed by Bullard 
and Qaväm on November 18, to be put before the Majlis. 
Bullard wrote: "I have told him that to satisfy our 
currency needs the bill must be passed into law by l. p. m. 
November 19" . 
77 
The Majlis passed the currency bill in the evening 
of November 19. The feelings of the Majlis towards Qaväm 
were hostile. it is clear from the tone of the debate that 
the Majlis were seeking to place on Qavam all responsibility 
for the existing evils and to set themselves up as friends 
and advocates of the Allies. This rather surprising change 
of attitude was no doubt inspired by the united-front shown 
by the Russian, American, and British representatives, and 
fear of dissolution. The effect of the Allies' victories 
in North Africa might also have played an important role. 
77, Bullard to F0, Nov. 18,1942. Ibid. 
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The currency bill, passed by the Majlis, was composed 
of five Articles: 
Article 1. From the date of the ratification of this law 
authority for the issue of notes is vested in the Haie at-i 
nizarat-i andukhta-yi iskinäs. 
Article 2. The Director General of the Finance, Dr. Milispaugh 
will become a member of the Hai*0 at-i nizärat-i andükhta-yi 
iskinäsafter his arrival. 
Article 3. The terms for the issue of notes, authority for 
which is vested by this law in the Hai at-i nizärat-i 
andükhta-yi iskinäs, will be fixed by a decree of the Hai at-i 
vazi, ran(Council of Ministers) acting on proposals put 
forward by the Hai 16 at-i nizärat-i andükhta-yi iskinä. s. 
Article 4. Notes which are issued by virtue of this law. 
niyst possess the following backing: (a) As to 60% Gold at 
tt}e. official rate ruling in the international market at the 
present date and/or pounds and dollars convertible into gold. 
(b)'As to 40(it Pounds and dollars guaranteed against 
depreciation in terms of gold at today's rate. 
Article 5. The backing for the notes to the value of three 
thousand five hundred million rials, authority for the issue 
of which has been given up till this date, will be on a basis 
of 60% gold and silver, valued at the international market 
rate'and jewels which were handed over to the Bank Milli ixt 
78 
accordance with the law of 25 Aban 1316 ." 
78. ,,; 
H', Pirnia", " Talbit-i, riyal", op. cit. Also see. Dreyfus 
to SOS, Nov. 20,19E2. US. F. R., vol. IV, 1942. p. 202-3 
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By ratifying this bill, the Majlis lost one of its 
important rights. But, what would have happened, had the 
Majlis failed to do so? The answer was in Bullard's 
telegram: 
"In view of the urgency of the currency 
situation I found it necessary yesterday 
to authorise the British military 
authorities to put into operation 
preliminary part of military plan already 
worked out for seizure of note forms 
in the National Bank. These preliminaries 
involved no overt military action on our 
part. 
2. In the light of provisions of new 
currency law I have toddy cancelled all 
arrangements for forcible action". 79 
After receiving satisfaction on the currency question, 
both the British and Americans agreed to proceed with the 
wheat declaration. On Decmber It, the Food Agreement was 
signed in Tihrän by Sacid, Bullard and Dreyfus. By this 
agreement the British and US Governments undertook to 
ensure, "within the full limit of their powers", that 
supplies of cereals would be brought to Iran to make up 
any avoidable deficiency to the harvest of 1943, provided 
that the Iranian Government carried out all the measures 
recommended by the American food adviser, Sheridan, including 
measures to prevent hoarding and the introduction of rationing, 
as well as the recommendations of the Road Transport 
79. Bullard to FO, Most secret, No. 1465, Nov. 20,1942. 
E 6860/69/34, FO 371/31407. 
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Committee. It was at the same time provided that the 
Iranian Government were responsible for the internal 
distribution of cereals and for ensuring that a deficiency 
in one area would be met by a surplus from another. The 
British and US Governments undertook, so far as possible, 
to ensure that the means of transport at the Iranian 
Government's disposal were sufficient, if put to the 
best possible use, for the proper distribution of these 
cereals. 
80 
Simultaneously, the British and American 
Ministers presented to Sarid two notes which stated that 
both Governments were jointly arranging to bring into 
Iran 25,000 tons of wheat as the compensation for the 
Russian purchase, and that if the Soviet Government wished 
to participate in the agreement, a revised text would be 
signed to replace this one. The Soviet Government, however, 
declined to participate in it, in view of its own food 
difficulties. Bullard also presented another note, 
declaring that the food agreement in no way would diminish 
the British obligations under the Tripartite Treaty of 
January 29t l9420' 
On the eve of the signing of the food agreement, 
the food situation in Tihrärn had reached a critical stage. 
Sheridan had only one day. supply of wheat in the silo and 
80. For the full text of this agreement, see US Department 
of State Executive Agreement series No. 292, or 56 Sta. (pt. 2) 1835. 
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was ready if necessary to open soup kitchens. The wheat 
from Äzarbayijän had not come as hoped, partly because of 
the Russian lack of co-operation and partly because of the 
inability of the Government to gather wheat. The British 
army could furnish only 1500 tons of flour from their 
stoc1s, and the Middle East Supply Centre (MESC)81 had 
reported that it had no reserve stocks which could be 
made available. In the meantime, Dreyfus was, hopelessly 
drifting to find a solution for the wheat crisis, whereas 
the British authorities did not seem to be taking a 
sufficiently serious view of this crisis. 
The deterioration of the wheat supply and the 
subsequent bread shortage culminated in bread riots of 
8th and 9th December. In the morning of December 8, the 
student demonstration was joined by several thousand 
persons, including women and children, outside the Majlis 
at tJaidan-i Baharistän, crying, "You may kill us but we 
must have bread! " The crowd grew in the afternoon and 
the demonstration developed into rioting. The people were 
agitated against Qavä. m and they looted his house, and also 
food and clothing shops in the main streets. In the evening, 
demonstrations occurred outside the Palace. `Abbäs'Mas`üdI, 
the Ittila'oat's licencee, had gone to Maidän-i Bahäristän 
81. For the MSC's functions see Survey of International 
Affairs, 1939-191E6, o . cit, pp. 169-193 
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(Baharistan Square) to deliver the Shah's message to the 
people, was attacked and injured. The police and military 
did not seriously intervene and fired only in-the air. 
82 
The crisis was aggravated by the arrest on the same 
day by the British Army and the internment at Sultänäbäd 
of General Zahidi, the General Governor of Isfahan. The 
news was badly received by both the Shah and Qaväm. 
83 
On the morning of December 9, rioting recommenced. 
The police and army did not take effective measures again 
to control it. But, when in the afternoon the situation 
became desperate, the police and army received orders to 
take, action. When an armed party of British troops tried 
to rescue their broken truck surrounded by mobs they were 
fired on by the Iranian police and three British soldiers 
were killed. The Iranian Government, later, agreed to pay 
five hundred pounds' compensation to the family of each 
84 
of them. However, a curfew was imposed in Tihrän at eight 
o'clock in the evening, and General Ahmadi was put in 
charge to restore order. A battalion of British troops 
arrived in Tihran from Qum on the evening of December 9, 
to protect British property and military installations. 
The Soviet Union, though aware of the British intention, 
refrained from bringing troops to the capital, which made a 
82. I-Iasan Nazlh, who was a law student and an observer at 
the time of the bread riots of December 8, wrote a 
detailed account of the event, "Dar Ti. hrän chi khabar 
büd? "published in the Faryäd, No. 5,25 Azar, 1321, 
83., See chapter6. 
811. Bullard to Eden, Confidential, March 26,1943- 
E 3450/239/34, FO 371/35117 
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good impression on the Iranians. The American Minister, 
worried by the British action, wrote: 
"British again blundered in bringing 
troops to Tehran, their position 
vis-a-vis the Iranians having 
deteriorated if possible. Russians 
on the other hand again gained in 
reputation by not bringing in troops. 
While Russians cannot be said to be 
liked by Iranians there is no doubt 
that their restraint and good conduct 
are turning many Iranians increasingly 
in their favor". 85. 
Meanwhile, the Shäh had asked Qaväm to resign, but 
he refused. He had the support of the Allies which helped 
hint to refuse the Shah's order. Instead, he lost his 
popularity among people who began to turn against him and 
to regard him as the Allies' tool. He suppressed all the 
capital press, and a Government newspaper, Akhbär-i Rüz, 
was published in their stead. Ittila' t was perhaps the 
onlyipaper which suffered the longest period of the 
suppression, forty-three days. This was probably as 
retaliatory measure against the paper which had published 
an article by its owner'Abbas Masrüdi, who had criticised 
the Qavam Government for its inability to solve the bread 
problem, three days prior to bread riots., Qaväm also 
86 
jailed a number of people who were alleged to be responsible 
for these riots. 
85. Dreyfus to_SOS, Dec. 19,1942. US. F. R., vo1. IV, 19L2. pp. 221-2 
E36. Abbas Mas'udi, " Nan! va nati 'a-i i dämät- i dulat", 
14 Azar, 1321 (Dec. 5,19 2. 
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The causes of the Tihran riots seemed confusing at 
first. There was a tendency to believe that they were 
spontaneous. But, the British Legation was spreading 
rumours that it was part of a German plot and the Russians 
seemed to have held the same view. The Iranians, on the 
contrary tended to believe that the riots had been inspired 
by the British or Russians. There were apparently some 
indications to justify the Iranian belief, particularly 
about British involvement. Why did the British choose 
such a delicate moment to arrest Zähidl? Why did the British 
deliberately fail to. bring 3500 tons of barley and 1500 tons 
of wheat to Tihrä. n, earmarked for Iran, and hold them in 
Basra at such a critical time? Why did the British not bring 
five thousand tons of cereals to Tihran, being held in Ahvaz 
not in Basra as they had claimed? And finally, why did the 
United Kingdom Commercial Corporation(UKCC) procrastinate 
for two weeks in bringing five thousand tons of rice to 
Tihr; ln from MLazandä. rän? These were, perhaps, the questions 
which the Iranians, at least those who knew what was 
happening behind the scenes, could emphasise and lead them 
to believe that the British were responsible for the riots. 
However, there is hardly any evidence available to show 
British involvement in the event. It is, however, safe to 
say that the British took advantage of the situation to 
bring back their troops to Tihrä. n. 
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A few days after the rioting, both the British and 
American Ministers reported the causes of the riots to 
have been political intrigues on behalf of the Shah 
against Qavam. The focd shortage as a sentimental issue 
was used by the Shah and his associates to discredit the 
Government and to get rid of Qavam. The Shah had ample 
reasons to fear Qaväm. Because Qaväm had presented the 
full, powers bill to the Majlis, talk of the Majlis 
dissolution was in the air, and he also had the support of 
the Allies. Therefore, Qavam might easily have reduced 
the power of the Crown, had he been free from the check 
i 
provided by the Majlis. 
However, these intriguers were the military clique headed 
by the Shah consisting of General Yazden Panah, Chief of 
Staff; Rädsar, Chief of Police, and a number of young 
officers of the court group; and the civilian group, 
including the Paikär Party, a youth organization; Mas'udi, 
Rabnarn , 
Azäd, and Safari, newspaper editors; Akbar Masrüd 
(Scrim-al-Daula); deputies, Dayä. t, Nikpür, and Yamin 
Isfandiyäri; Suhaili, Tadayyun; Hasan and Karim Altbar of 
Their ultimate objective was supposed to be Gilan, 
87 
to get rid of Qaväm and to set up a military Government 
under direct influence of the Shah, including his group 
of young officers. It seemed that this group of officers 
87. Dreyfus to SOS9 Dec. 13,1942. US. F. R., vol. IV, 19L+2. p. 219 
Two articles in the Damavand, 13 Murdad, 1322(Aug. 4, i943), 
and in the Dad, 11 Aban, 1323 (Nov. 2,1944), somewhat 
: reveal the involvement of the Shah and Mastudi in the 
riots. These two papers were generally against the 
monarch. 
217 
prevented the police from taking effective measures during 
the riots. Colonel Ibrahim Arfa, who was shortly after 
the riots promoted to the rant of General, had addressed 
% the crowd, assuring them that the army had orders not to 
molest them. Timmerman, the American Adviser to the 
Iranian Police, reported: 
.... this demonstration could have been 
broken and beaten within a period of 
half an hour if proper Police methods 
had been applied". 88 
Even if the bread riots were deliberate and the 
people used as tools for political ends to evict Qaväm, 
they certainly did not succeed. Qaväm's position became 
stronger as a result of the riots. He could then press 
the Majlis to pass the Press Law of December 24, which 
his predecessor had failed to do. In fact, the new law 
was an amendment to the Press Law of 1908, according to which 
9 
all periodicals had to obtain a licence to operate. 
8 
The year 19+2 ended while Qavam was still in office 
and was contemplating reforming his cabinet. IranIs 
foreign policy which had been supposed to shift towards 
more co-operation with the Allies with the signature of the 
Tripartite Treaty at the beginning of the year, appeared 
to be far from what the signatories had hoped for., The 
88, Dreyfus to SOS, Ibid. 
89. See L. P. E1we 11-Sutton, 11 The Iranian Press",, p. 66. 
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currency and food crises were solved. As for the bread, 
the result was continued chaos and, though Tihran was 
kept supplied with bread by feverish efforts at the last 
minute, Sheridan never succeeded in securing more than 
three or four days' reserve in the silo. 
As for relations with the British, their influence 
in Iran grew as the year proceeded, but it can not be 
said ghat their popularity grew with it. During most of 
the year, the Russian policy in Iran remained an enigma. 
It also seemed to be more or less of a hand-to-mouth 
nature, owing, no doubt, to the acute problems which the 
German drive in South Russia set them. The Iranians, who 
were fundamentally terrified of the Russians and feared 
the worst after the occupation, were, on the whole, 
surprised that they had not had to suffer from them. By 
the end of the year, the Russians seemed to be discontented 
with the arrival of American advisers in Iran and worried 
at the ever-increasing influence of the Americans and 
British in Iran, both in the Central Government and in the 
provinces. They might have thought that the British and 
Americans were playing a 'deep waiting game', and were 
going to profit by the Russian war embarrassment and 
absence from the scene, and were steadily getting Iran 
into their pocket. At the end of the year, when the 
Russians began pursuing a more active policy as the fortunes 
of war changed, they spoke to Iranian Ministers against the 
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principle of having American advisers. 
Throughout the year the question of the arresting 
of pro-Axis Iranians and Germans by the Allies was a 
disquieting matter between Iran and the Allies. This 
will be discussed in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
The Last Policy of Reinsurance 
The Axis Plot and pro-Axis Organisations in Iran 
I 
".... Persians who continued, after the 
tripartite treaty, to work for the 
Germans. This is understandable, since 
the treaty had been signed under duress; 
but it was our business to stop them 
if we could". 1 
The momentous shift in Iran's policy, which was to be 
achieved by the treaty that would, in turn, bring about 
genuine collaboration between Iran and the Allies, seemed 
to be slow, if not still motionless, during 1942, Despite 
the closure of the Axis Legations and the signing of the 
treaty with Britain and the Soviet Union, the Iranians 
never became hostile to the Axis, nor did they wholeheartedly 
turnout to be pro-Allies. As Millspaugh asserted, the 
Iranian "historic distrust and fear of the British or the 
Russians or both precluded any clear recognition of a 
2 
common cause or genuine spirit of collaboration". 
1. Sir R. Bullard, "Persia in the Two World Wars", p. 14. 
2. A. C. Millspaugh, Americans in Persia, Chap. IX, p. 155. 
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After the signing of the Tripartite Treaty in January, 
1942,1a number of Iranians, including Government and 
military officials, continued to work for the Axis, The 
Iranian Government were aware of their activities and 
organisations, but they took no measures to stop them. 
They'even closely collaborated with them on many occasions. 
We call this "the Iranian Government's last policy 
of reinsurance with the Axis", in particular with Germany, 
whose successes, in the early part of 1942, in South Russia 
and Libya, had inevitably affected the Government and 
encouraged a tendency to sit on the fence. 
In December 1941 the British Legation in Tihrän 
informed the Foreign Office that, in view of the signature 
of the Tripartite Treaty, it was of the utmost importance 
to round up Iranian fifth columnists and pro-Germans owing 
to thQir potential danger to British interests. The Foreign 
Office replied that they preferred to endeavour to secure 
collaboration with the Iranians rather than to proceed to 
wholesale arrests immediately after the signature of the 
treaty'. 
3 
The Furu, hi Government was quite prepared to take 
action against a few Iranians, whose number should be kept 
as low as possible, as a deterrent to others, provided that 
there was definite evidence against them subsequent to the 
Bullard to ]; den, confidential, No. 321. Sept. 28,1942. 
E 6157/122/34, FO 371/31419. 
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signature of the treaty and that any such action was taken 
with the consent of the Iranian Government. Large-scale 
arrest could not be approved by the Government unless the 
extensLon of war to Iran was imminent and action was urgently 
required on military grounds. These considerations did not, 
of course, apply to German nationals. 
At the end of February 1942, a list of seven prominent 
and active pro-Axis advocates, against whom sufficient 
evidence was available, was prepared by the British Legation. 
The names were Vaziri, Däru-gar, Darrudi, Atäbäi, Zulfagäri, 
Ghafari, and Daryush. The Soviet Embassy gave its support 
to the British, and the list was submitted to the Iranian 
Government, with the request that these suspects should be 
detained under Iranian Police supervision in Eastern Iran. 
After some delay the Iranian Government agreed and gave the 
necessary assurances to the British Legation that action 
would be taken. The Government had decided that those 
persons should be exiled to Kirmän and some other remote 
areas. 
4 
It soon appeared, however, that three of the 
suspects were still at large. In view of this, the British 
Legation demanded the immediate arrest of the suspects and 
their delivery to the British military authorities for 
internment. The Legation also considered that Atäbai, 
being the Shäh's brother-in-law, should still be detained 
4. From the Iranian Legation (Washington) to Department of 
State, undated. US. F. R., vol. IV, 1942. PP"337-8. 
t 
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in Eastern Iran under police supervision. After considerable 
hesitation on legal and prestige grounds by the Iranians, 
five of the suspects were, at the end of April, sent to 
Kirmänshäh to be kept under Anglo-Iranian Guard. But, a 
few days later, they were arrested and sent to Ahvaz by the 
British authorities without the Iranian Government's consent. 
The sixth suspect, Muhammad Hisäm Vaziri, disappeared 
mysteriously under the eyes of the police and he could never 
be traced until the end of the war. 
5 
As a result of further 
discussions between the Iranian and British authorities, 
some Germans and a few more Iranian suspects, including 
Nasir Munshi and 'Abbas Mazda, were detained for examination 
by. the Iranian police, while one German was arrested by the 
British security authorities and sent to Baghdad under 
British military escort. 
Early in June 1942 it became apparent that the Axis 
propaganda drive had gained momentum again in Iran, and 
there were reports of Axis agents passing through Turkey 
into Iran via Kurdistän. The British military authorities 
reported a series of accidents, some serious, some light, 
which, were taking place at the ports and on the Trans-Iranian 
railway, some of which could only be attributed to sabotage. 
5. Nürulläh Lärüdi, Asiran. Tihrän 1332(1952)p. 181. 
The author was one of the internees at Shiraz. He furnishes 
an account of his and other internees' arrest, their 
activities at internment camps, and criticizes the behaviour 
of Iranian and British officers at the camps. Understandably, 
he is biased and uses invective language in his book. 
Itisam Vaziri left Iran. for Europe on February 27,1944, 
by a forged passport under the name of Ghuläm Rizä 
`Abbäslyan. See E3126, May 23,1944. FO 371/4O/72. 
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On June 20, the British Legation made three requests 
to Suhaili: (a) that visas to enter and leave Iran should 
only be granted after reference to-the British Legation, 
this is in practice would mean that the Iranian Government 
should abandon its rights to issue visas; (b) that the 
proclamation making Axis propaganda illegal should be made 
more specific by laying down the precise penalties which 
infraction of it would entail; and (c) that eighteen 
persons suspected on good grounds of Axis activities should 
be handed to the British for interrogation - in fact detention6 
Surprisingly, Suhail granted the first request without 
demur; and arrangements were made to control the issue of 
transit visas via Iraq. Nevertheless, the Iranian borders 
could not possibly be closed to all unwanted travellers, 
and it was certain that Axis agents would penetrate into 
Iran with relatively little hindrance from Turkey through 
the disturbed areas of Kurdistan. The second request 
regarding the proclamation on Axis activities and 
propaganda, was also granted, though there were loopholes 
in the articles of the penal and military codes referred to 
as applying to infractions of the proclamation, by which a 
clever person could elude punishment. 
6. Bullard to Eden, confidential, No. 248, July 28,1942 
E 4619/3655/34 FO 371/31443. 
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. 
The third request, for the arrest of eighteen suspects 
and their delivery to the British authorities, was met by 
l 
Suhaill with a request that interrogation should not take 
place in Ahväz. The idea of being sent to Ahväz, as the 
British had demanded, in summer is, to many Iranians, 
peculiarly horrible. Therefore, it was decided that the 
suspects should be sent to Kirmänshah for preliminary 
interrogation. On July 19, three Germans were delivered 
to the British authorities. As a result of further pressure 
by the Legation, Suhaill agieed on July 22 that by July 
25 he would hand over eleven of the eighteen, but no action 
was taken, and Suhaill fell from power soon afterwards. 
In fact, Suhaill had been most unwilling to hand-over any 
more Iranians to the British. His selection of the eleven 
was itself a very clever tactic and designed to obviate 
trouble for himself and to create it for the British; the 
eleven were either persons of no importance, or else men 
connected with the army whose arrest would tend to arouse 
yet more anti-British feeling in that on the whole distinctly 
pro-Axis force. 
'During the period from the time of occupation in August 
1941 to the fall of Suhaili at the end of July-1942, there 
had been cases where Iranians, living in areas occupied by 
British or Russian military forces, had been removed from 
their homes and sent to "unoccupied" territory on the charge 
of being hostile to the Allies. Thus,, about twenty persons 
were deported from Abadan to Tihrän at the request of the 
AIOC, and several were sent away from Hamadan by the British 
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Political Adviser or at his request.? These deportations 
caused much correspondence and discussion between the 
Iranian Government and the British Legation. Another case 
of dispute was the vagueness as to the place of detention 
of suspects handed over by the Iranian Government to the 
British authorities; some were removed from Kirmänshäh 
to Ahväz, which in summer is regarded rather as the French 
regard French Guiana. For instance, the Iranian Government 
made a strong protest when a very old official named 
Nabbizada, who had been arrested by'. the British military 
authorities in the south and removed to Ahvaz where he 
died a few days later, probably from the heat. When therefore, 
Suhai, li was succeeded by Qaväm, the British Legation decided 
to establish an agreed procedure with the Iranian Government 
to obviate the question of the place of internment for 
suspects. 
In the early days of the Qaväm Government, the British 
Legation submitted a new list which bore forty-five names, 
with a request for their arrest and delivery to their 
military authorities. This list had been drawn up, 
consisting entirely of names of persons implicated in the 
evidence given by Germans or Iranians already in British 
custody. Qaväm proceeded to arrest the persons concerned, 
but he obstinately refused to hand over Iranian suspects. 
7. Bullard to Eden, No. 321. op. cit. 
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There were, of course, two reasons for this; first, it 
would have been undignified for the Government to hand 
over their own subjects to aliens in their own country, 
secondly, Qaväm was himself involved in pro-Axis activities, 
and he; probably feared that thoseIranians detained might 
disclose his connections under British interrogation. This 
they did. And we will explain this later. Meanwhile, the 
question was handled by the police with deliberate laxity. 
One of the principal suspects, Frau Bernstein, a German 
known to be the link between the Axis agents in Fars and 
those'in Tihrän, was, after her arrest, allowed to return 
to her-house where she committed suicide. Similar negligence 
by the,; police caused serious concerns for the British 
authorities to press for the guarding and detention of 
suspects somewhere in the British zone not in Tihrän. 
But Qaväm resolutely refused to hand over any Iranians and 
stood out for their detention in Tihrän. 
While he had readily consented to arrest the forty- 
five suspects, he was asking the British Legation to furnish 
ample written evidence against them within twenty-four hours 
in accordance with the Iranian law. In their turn, the 
British were pressing the Government that arrested persons 
should be turned over to them without complying with 
Iranian law. As a result one more crisis was combined With 
those existing ones, viz, food and currency, in August 1942. 
The American Minister, Dreyfus, held the view that British 
disregard of Iranian susceptibilities was causing the Iranians 
to become increasingly bitter against them. He reported: 
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" British Minister takes view "I can't 
work with a Government like this" an 
-attitude which may cause another 
political crisis.... "8 
On August 9,1942, Bullard handed over a severe note 
to Qaväm, complaining about the lack, of co-operation. 
In-the meantime, the Iranian Government presented a request 
for American intervention in the dispute between the 
Government and the British Legation, and it also appealed 
to the, Foreign Office through its Minister in London to 
find a solution to this deadbck. Meanwhile, the Iranian 
press and public had been deeply stirred by these arrests 
and British pressure. The press took the view that the 
Allies had no right to require the Government to make illegal 
and unconstitutional arrests, that this action was 
undemocratic and not based on the treaty, that the wholesale 
arrests were as bad as treatment meted out to people by 
Ri a Shah's regime and they were no longer secure in their 
homes. The press attack was directed mainly against the 
British, and the newspapers such as Nabard, Khurshid-i Iran, 
Igdäm, and Kaihän were prominent for the attacks. Bullard, 
presumably disturbed by the press attitude reported: 
$. Dreyfus to SOS, August 9,1942. US. F. R,, vol. IV, 1942. 
P"336. 
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"... Situation will, however, remain 
unsatisfactory until Iqdam and Keyhan 
have been taught a lesson and I am 
asking for their suppression for a 
considerable perivd...... Prime 
Minister will probably object as he 
is reported to be somewhat beholden to 
KhaI'ili ' of Iqdam for past political 
services". 9 
Later, in early September Qaväm closed down the Nabard 
and Khurshid-i Iran for a short period and the Igdäm was 
also suppressed. 
However, when the State Department was about to make 
a very mild demarchd, based on the Iranian request, to the 
Foreign Office 
10, Qaväm and Bullard reached to an agreement 
over the question of suspects. Therefore, the State 
Department saw no purpose in making the demarche in London, 
but an official of the Department added, "I do not think, 
however, that we should let the matter drop entirely". 
11 
The agreement was secured owing to Qaväm's endeavours 
to obtain the consent of the Majlis at a secret session, by 
assuming full and personal responsibility. 
The agreement was, however, unsatisfactoty from the 
Iranians' point of view, and in actual fact, the British 
authorities had the real control over the detention and 
interrogation of suspects. It provided for the detention of 
9. Bullard to FO, August 21,1942 E. 5143 FO 371/31385. 
10. Draft telegram'to the Ambassador in the U. K. (Winant), 
August 25,1942. US. F. R., vol. IV. p. 34o, 
il. The Adviser on Political Relations (Murray) to the SOS, 
Sept. l, 1942, Ibid. p. 341. 
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all Iranian suspects at Sultänäbäd, near Arak, where there 
were British troops, and for,: the association of Iranian 
officials with the British authorities in the supervision 
and interrogation of such suspects. 
12 
Much of the confusion and delay over the question of 
suspects and their place of detention, probably arose from 
the different policies carried out by the parties concerned 
in the matter. The British had insisted on the delivery of 
suspects to them, while the Iranian Government was prepared 
to hand over only foreign nationals. The United States 
Minister was inclined at first to consider the original 
Iranian proposal adequate, viz, that suspects should be 
detained at Tihrän and tried by Iranian law. He was 
eventually persuaded by Bullard to, go as far as to assure 
the Iranian Government that the fifth column was a danger 
which ought to be eliminated, but by then the question of 
principle had, in fact, been settled. The Soviet Embassy 
had evidently received instructions not to do anything 
which might be interpreted as interference in the internal 
affairs of Iran, so they did not join the British Legation 
in putting pressure on the Iranian Government in support of 
British suspect policy. This did, however, not prevent the 
Embassy from trying to secure British help on various 
occasions. It was at Soviet instigation that the British 
12. For the text of the Agreement see Appendix III p. 559. 
231 
Legation requested the Swiss Legation to repatriate two 
Swiss subjects resident in Mashhad and alleged by the 
Russians to be anti-Ally. Similarly, in Tabriz, when the 
Russians wished to secure the arrest of a number of 
persons alleged to be indulging in anti-Ally propaganda, 
they tried to obtain the support of the British Consul- 
General, who wisely confined his support to giving the 
local authorities a list of those persons. 
One of the difficulties, which was encountered later 
on, was that the agreement, concerning the detention and 
interrogation of Iranian suspects at Sultänabäd, between 
the British Legation and the Iranian Government, was 
inapplicable in areas where there were Russian troops, 
because the Soviet Embassy were not a party to it. The 
British Legation could not accept the odium of participating 
in Russian requests for arrest and detention of people 
against whom they had nothing at all. It did, however, 
appear that the Russians did not detain as many Iranians 
as the British did. They had detained six Armenians of 
Iranian nationality, among whom was the editor of the 
newspaper Alik, in Armenian; nick-named Mus1yu Zhuzif 
(Monsieur or Mr. Joseph); the organ of the Dashnäk Party, 
at their detention camp in Rasht. The camp, previously a 
hospital, was closed in 1944 and the detainees were 
transferred to Tihrän. 
l3 
13" Lärudi, op. cit., 1.180. 
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In early November 1942, the British succeeded in 
seizing documents from the house of a German agent, Franz 
Mayr, who was said to have close relations with the Court, 
particularly with Prince Ali Rizä, and with influential 
Iranian statesmen. Berthold Schultze-Holthus, another 
German agent who, like Mayr, went in hiding at the time 
of the deportation in September 1941, gives an account of 
the capture of Mayr's documents in his book as follows: 
"The representative of the German SD 
in Isfahan, a certain Herr Mayr, 
recently fell out with his closest 
colleague, an Armenian named Musa, 
as a result of which the latter 
went to the British Consul Gort and 
betrayed the hiding-place of certain 
secret German documents. They were 
apparently in a safe built into the 
walls of a ruined house and a dossier 
was found with the names of various 
officers who have been active in the 
Persian Resistance Movement. The 
German agent has disappeared since 
the incident ... ". 14+ 
When the news of the British discovery of Mayr's 
documents, which revealed a German plot to seize power 
in Iran reached Dreyfus, he reported: "It is not beyond 
the realms of possibility that British have exaggerated or 
manufactured this plot as an excuse for military occupation 
of Tihrän. 
11i5 But in actual fact, according to the documents, 
a plan had been designed for execution on July 25 which was 
14. D. Schultze-Holthus, Fruhrot in Iran. Esslingen: Bechtle, 
1952. English translation, Daybreak in Iran, London 
1954. p. 186. He travelled in Iran as Doctor Bruno 
Schultze and adopted Saba as his Iranian name. 
The name Musa in the quotation refers to Musa Gäspariyan. 
15. Dreyfus to SOS, Nov. 6,1942. US. F.. R., -vol. IV, 1942. p. 179. 
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the date fixed by the Germans for the capturecf Stalingrad 
and also coincided with the British retreat in Egypt. 
Arrangements for seizing the aerodrome, blocking roads 
and adequately dealing with Allies forces with German 
assistance and setting up a military government had been 
all-worked out in detail. Many prominent Iranians, mostly 
army and tribal leaders, including the Chief of General 
Staff, Yazdan Panäh, General Küpäl, Shahbakhti and Zahidi, 
and Näsir Khan Qashgaai were implicated. 
16 
Bullard, and subsequently, the Foreign Office were 
quick to ask the War Cabinet for instructions to be given 
to deal with the discovered conspiracy and, probably, to 
arrest all those concerned. But the Chiefs of Staffs? 
recommendations, in regard with the plot, were these: 
"l) Military action should be taken against 
those concerned in plot against us. 
2) General Wilson recommends no action be 
taken at the moment against prominent 
Persians involved in plot, unless our 
hand is forced by failure to reach 
agreement over the currency situation. 
3) General Wilson suggests not to ask the 
Shah to issue a Firman or to occupy 
Tehran. 
4) General Wilson suggests that the best 
method to safeguard the supply route to 
Russia is by subsidising Nasir Khan and 
the Qashqais and the Chiefs of Staff are 
in favour of this method. The alternative 
is to take action against QASHGAI. 
This is open to following objections: 
16. Bullard to FO, Nov. 11,1942. E 6623/122/34, 
FO 371/31420. 
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a) We should, with land forces, largely 
beat thin air, because the tribesmen 
would evapourate as they always do; 
b) In any case, we should use troops 
and/or air forces needed for more 
important tasks; 
c) Action against Qashgai would antagonise 
the liakhtiaris and the Lur tribes, whose 
country lies generally across our road 
and rail communications north from Ahwaz. 
This would in time result in increased 
internal security commitments to protect 
those communications; 
d) we should drive the plotters underground 
without checkmating them; 
e) We should-not to be sic) striking at 
the root of the trouble, which is the 
Persian ruling class". 17 
The Foreign Office did not seem to be convinced by 
these recommendations. They only commented: " Wait to see 
the currency situation". 
18 
In late November 1942, after the currency problem had 
been solved, the time was ripe to proceed with the arrest 
of the first bunch of persons who were incriminated by the 
documents discovered at Isfahan. It was thought that their 
arrest would scare the other conspiritators, but, as Bullard 
advised, a prima facie case could be made against them for 
other reasons and the plot neediriot be mentioned to the 
Iranian Government. Therefore, proposals were submitted 
to the Foreign Office by Bullard in agreement with General 
17. From Office of War Cabinet to DZr. Pink(FO), undated, 
E 6840/14/34, FO 371/31386. 
18. Ibid. 
The State Department recommended to the Foreign Office 
to proceed with this case "with utmost caution and 
regard for Iranian sensibilities in any action they may 
take with respect to alleged conspirators. The Department 
continued: " We consider it especially desirable that 
no public action of any kind be taken against Iranian 
Nationals until tension caused by wheat and currency 
problems has relaxed". SOS to the Ambassador (UK), 
Nov-7,1942. US. R. F. vol. IV, 1942. p. 189. 
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Wilson for the arrest of General Zahidi, Colonel Furühar, 
Deputy Naubakht, and General Ku-pal on general grounds of 
pdrsistent and dangerous hostility to the Allied cause. 
In view of their importance, it was clear that it would 
be futile to request the Qavam Government to effect their 
arrest, and it was, therefore, suggested that the British 
military authorities should take the necessary measures 
themselves. It was finally agreed by the British Legation, 
British military authorities, and the Foreign Office that 
they would concentrate first on General Zähidi, as being the 
most dangerous of the four persons concerned, and defer 
action against the others, in order to see first the effect 
produced by the arrest of Zähidi. In fact, the case against 
Furühar and Naubakht was not very strong to arrest them in 
December. 
However, all necessary measures were accordingly taken 
by the British military, and Zahidi was arrested without the 
use of force in his house in Isfahan and immediately taken 
to Sultanäbad from where he was sent to Palestine. 
19 As the 
arrest coincided with the bread riots in Tihrän, it passed 
almost unnoticed, Both the Shäh and Qaväm mentioned the matter 
19, An account of Zähidi's arrest is given in Khandaniha 
20 Dai, 1331 (January. 10,1953). Also Fitzroy MacLean, 
the British Intelligence Officer who arrested Zahidi, 
gives a similar account of the arrest in his book, 
Eastern Approaches, London, Cape, 1949. pp. 265r-74. 
General Zahidi at the time of his arrest was the Commander 
of the Isfahän Division. His constant intrigues against 
the Governor-General of Isfahan, Fahim-al-daula, and his 
obstructive interference in purely civil matters was 
harmful to the administration of the area. Though he 
handled the Bakhtiaris successfully, he stirred up 
trouble in Isfahän. One of his intrigues showed his 
clever technique well. About August 20,1942, at one 
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Footnote continued...... 
of the nine spinning and weaving mills of Isfahan, a strike 
had been declared by the workers because of the low wages 
paid. The strike spread to nearly all of the factories and 
the employers appealed to Zahidi for help ( the Governor- 
General to whom an appeal should have been directed was 
absent in Tihran). Zahidi seized his chance and sent soldiers 
to guard the mills and later received a deputation of 
workers under a military guard, for discussion of their 
grievances. He also saw the employers. It was then said that 
a settlement had been reached and that certain increases in 
pay would be given as well as reductions in the hours of 
work nominallY'eight hours plus two for compulsory overtime 
for men, women and children alike. Certain other concessions 
were also promised and it was agreed that work should begin 
again. No positi'tae step was taken to fulfil the promises 
while work confinued. The British Consul at Isfahan reported 
that he understood that Zähidl had been bribed by the 
employers to do his best to double-cross the workers and cut 
down the promised concessions. Meanwhile, the Governor- 
General returned from Tihrän and declared that he would 
safeguard the interests of workers if they would give him a 
couple of weeks in which to work. This offer was accepted. 
Soon after it came to light that the unrest among the 
workers which had been blamed on the Tüda Party in Isfahan, 
was the work of Zähidl. himself, who hoped, by stirring up 
trouble which he could then put down, to manoeuvre himself 
into a position in which he could say that Isfahan was really- 
a dangerous place and required a military Governor rather 
than a civil one. 
Later, in October, there was a campaign against Zahidi in 
the Tihrän newspaper, Khurshid-i Iran. The first article gave 
a fairly accurate account of his misdeeds in Isfahan, and then 
it was answered in the Bäkhtar by a letter signed by twenty- 
one of Zähidi's advocates in Isfahan, denying the accusations. 
A second article appeared in the former paper, making more 
accusations, in particular that he had ordered the Economic 
Department of Isfahan owned by the wife of General Jahänbäni, 
the grand daughter of Zil-al-Sultan. This accusation was 
partly true:, as she owed wheat to the Government. But, being 
closely acquainted with this lady and her family, I have 
always been given the impression that there has been age-old 
hostility between the Jahanbanis and Zahidis. This Zahidi's 
order in favour of this lady seems to be difficult to believe. 
Even prior to the capture of Mayr's documents in which Zähidi 
was implicated, the British Consul at Isfahan was persistently 
asking for his removal because of his obstructive attitude. 
See, Isfahan Diary, from August to November 1942, piece Nos. 




Col. Furuhar was Zahidi's nominee, serving at Farldan 
(near Isfahan). When, on August 3,1942, Mr. R. C. Harris, 
British Vice Consul at Isfahän, Dr. Griffith and his son 
were murdered while on tour in the Duriid area, Furtihar 
showed considerable ineffectiveness in recovering the 
bodies and directing the enquiries. There was some reason 
to believe that the murder was not entirely free from the 
influence of German agents. 
The Russians had found General Küpäl so hostile to their 
interests that they had him removed from Azarbayijän. 
The Soviet Ambassador had proposed that he should be 
arrested by the Russians but had received no reply from 
Russia. The British, on the other hand, did not wish to 
make all the arrests and regarded it as most important 
that some of the arrests, including Küpäl's should be 
effected by the Russians. Küpal's name was listed because 
of the Russians mistrusted him and because owing to his 
close connection with the Turkish Embassy his arrest, was 
thought, would frighten whoever was allowing the Turkish 
bag to be used illegitimately. See, Bullard to FO, 
Nov. 28,1942. E 7020/14/34, Fo 371/31387. 
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to the British Legation and seemed rather aggrieved that 
they had not been warned of British intentions in advance. 
The Shah also sentOAlä to the US Legation to register his 
protest against what he termed this unjustified action. 
fAla mentioned that the Shah had said; "If the British 
can do this to my country they can do anything". 
20 The 
British Legation informed in reply, both the Shah and 
Qaväm, that "any previous notification would have been 
very awkward for the Persian Government and it was accordingly 
thought better that the British military authorities should 
take full responsibility". 
21 
Shortly after Zähidi's deportation, more people were 
arrested and detained in connection with the German plot. 
22 
But these arrests dismantled only the first phase of the plot, 
and the second phase had not yet been dealt with. According 
to Schultze-Holthus, he and Mayr had divided their task 
between themselves. 
23 
The former was to incite the Qashgä"i 
tribes, while the latter had to recruit Axis sympathizers 
and organise them for the plot. 
20. Dreyfus to SOS, Dec, 8, 'l942. US. F. R., Vol. IV, 1942 p. 208 
21. Dullard-to Eden, Confidential, Annual Report 1942, No. 121, 
March 26,1943. E 2450/239/34, FO 371/35117- 
22. For the names of detainees see, Appendix III, p. 560. 
23. Schultze-Holthus, op. cit. p. 150. 
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II 
The pro-Axis Organisations 
To provide a better understanding of Iran's foreign 
policy during this period, and to find out why the Iranian 
Government were implicitly trying to reinsure their ties 
with the Axis camp, a detailed study of the scope of the 
pro-Axis organisations or groups in Iran and the parts 
played by their various members, many of whom were in 
important posts, is essential. 
These groups had been mainly organised by Franz Mayr 
and a number of Iranians of outstanding importance, but it 
must be pointed out, however, that none of these groups 
was an independent organisation. In fact, they interlocked 
in the most intricate way and there was much overlapping 
of functions. Many individuals appeared to belong to more 
than one group. There were several reasons for this. Various 
organisations had been set up from time to time, the most 
important of which was the grand fusion of all anti- 
Allied cells and other organisations under one direction of 
a Central Executive Body known as the Milliyun. Then again, 
what at first may appear to have been an organised group 
was in fact a method used by Franz Mayr to record a certain 
chain of contacts. An example of this was the FN group which 
will be seen below. 
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Milliyün-i Iran 
Franz Mayr described the objectives of this organisation 
in his own draft as follows: 
"The Melliun movement is the unification 
of all forces and associations of Iran 
which aim at freeing their homeland and 
who, in their fight against Bolshevik 
Russia and the Anglo-Saxon world, see 
in National Socialist Germany their 
natural allies". 24 
The structure of the Milliyitn allowed for an Executive 
Committee which was to control and plan the future 
constitution of Iran. There were also a Political Bureau, 
a Military Bureau, a Party Secretary and a Chairman of 
Board of Leadership. The Milliyun controlled the whole 
pro-Axis structure as far as the Iranian side was concerned, 
besides directing the activities of espionage, propaganda, 
military preparations and all other forms of subversive 
activity. It had planned for the day when the country could 
be taken over. On August 2,1942, Vaziri wrote to Mayr: 
"Please tell Berlin the following: - Transmit by radio in 
French, Persian and German that in Iran Meiliun-Iran has 
united all powers that are national". iIn his turn, Mayr 
prepared a note for a courier to take to the German Embassy 
in Ankara for onward transmission to Berlin, on October 15, 
1942. It began thus: . 
24. Extracts from papers seized from Mayr's house. 
FO, August 25,1943. E 5036/38/34, FO 371/35074. 
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1. 'The Military, Gendarmerie and Tribal 
organisations are welded together in 
the Mellium Iran Movement. Everything 
is thoroughly organised in the provinces. 
Throughout the whole country they 
are ready to strike. Your energetic 
assistance with the Air force and arms 
is awaited. Landing grounds for aircraft 
and parachute troops and sites for 
dropping of arms are ready in every province. "25 
According to the documents the idea of unification 
took place about May 1942 and the Milliyun was formed by 
the end of July of that year. It is always clear, however, 
that although there was an Executive Committee, behind this 
lay again the guiding power of Mayr, Schulze-Holthus, 
M. H. Vaziri, and finally Berlin. 
The most important activities and jobs in the Milliyün-i 
Iran were shared by some outstanding personalities amongst 
whom were: 
26 
1. Äyatullah Abul Qäsim Käshäni' 
2. `Ali Haig at, Ministry of Justice. 
3. 'Mustash7ar-al-Daula (Sadiq Sadiq) 
4. 'Ali Akbar Musavizada; High Court Judge 
5. Habibullah Naubnkht, Majlis Deputy for F'asä 
0 (Province of Fars 
6 Husain Naivandi 
7. General Murtiza Khan Yazdän Panah 
8. General Agivli 
9. General Kupäl 
10. Ihtisham-al-Daula (Qaraguzlu) 
11. Sayyid Nagibzäda Mashä. yikh 
12. Nasrullah Subühi, interned and later released 
13. Ahmad Namdär,, interned, who was acting as 
representative of Zahidi in Tihrän. 
25, Ibid. P. 119. 
26. All the names of persons appear in this section 
were checked and consulted with the file FO 371/35074, 
1943, Lärüdi' book, op. cit., and a number of persons 
somewhat involved in these organisations with whom 
I had interviews. Moreover, all the details and informa- 
tion on the pro-Axis organisations mentioned here are 
based on the same P0's file. 
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The Gulmuhammadi Group. 
This name was used by the Group itself, but was 
allotted to it by British intelligence officers in Iran 
when evidence of the activities of its members was first 
obtained by them in July 1942, It did, however, comprise 
numerous contacts and channels of communication, together 
with an espionage network and other subversive activities 
controlled by the Gulmuhammadi bf'others and by N4ubal; ht. 
At the same time, of course, several of its members were 
in direct contact with Mayr or his lieutenants. 
The main artery of this organisation was Tihran - 
Hamadän-Kirmanshah with tributaries running into these 
three places. A great deal of its strength was drawn from 
the Iranian Army, but there were many civilians in it too. 
Tribal contacts were numerous, though for a time the southern 
tribes had been dealt with by Naubakht separately. The 
tribal contacts were somewhat modified when General 
Shähbakhti was transferred to Fars, taking with him 
several officers who were members of the Iiizb-i Nazi, the 
Nazi Party, as the Gulmuhammadi Group called itself in 
Kirmanshah, at any rate. 
"This 
resulted in an increase of 
those who, like Naubakht, were ready to intrigue with the 
Qa hgä'i and other southern tribes. 
This group had three main functions. The first was to 
collect information on the disposition of British and 
Russian troops and later of American troops and to collect 
all material possible on Allied Military installations. 
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The second was to prepare for armed action in the event 
of the German troops reaching the Caucasus or in the event 
of an air-borne invasion by Germany. The third was the 
conduct of anti-Allied propaganda. 
Written messages of this group were first intercepted 
at-the beginning of August 1942 by the British military 
authorities and enough of its correspondence was seen later 
on. It showed that its activities had not slackened with 
the changing fortunes of the war. 
The threats imposed on the Allies by this group were: 
1. It operated on an important line of communication. 
2. It was in touch with the tribes on whom the Germans 
were relying for their main endeavour in Iran. 
3. It was a source of arms for the tribes. 
4. It was the first "friendly" organisation that any 
parachutists would encounter who were landed in 
Kurdistan or that German agents infiltrating through 
Kurdistan would meet. The parachute connection 
was no mere bogey, as members of the Group such as 
Lt. Saharkhiz and Cap. Matini in Tihran were linked 
with the arrivals of parachutists. 
27 
The chief members of this group were: 
1. Ii. Naubakht, HQ. representative and Head of Society. 
2. Aqa Qa imagämi, Naubakht's deputy in the Society, 
Tihran. 
/ 
27. The first arrival of six German parachutists occurred on 
April 30,1943. These landed near Daryacha Qum (Namak) and 
they were conveyed to Tihrän with money and arms for Mayr. 
On June 17, three more Germans and Iraqi were landed north 
of Mosul by mistake while they should have been dropped 
near the Iraqi-Iranian frontiers to incite the Kurds. 
Hafengel, a German agent, had organised three hundred 
riflemen in Kurdistan. On July 15, three more Germans and 
an Iranian were dropped near the Qashgä'i tribal area, 
continued..... 
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e 3. Ali Gulmuhammadi Nubakht's representative and 
Managing Director of the Society in Tihran 
4. Capt. Ghulam Husain Gulmuhammadi, Director for 
receiving Iranian-and Foreign information for 
the Society, Tihran. 
5. Capt. Ahsiad Matini, Head of the records and 
in charge of lists of members. 
6. Third-Lt. Sabarkhiz, co-Head of propaganda, 
Tihran. 
_ 'ý. Ali Akbar Kumaill, News Director and sender 
and receiver by code of telegraph messages, 
tTihran. 8. Monsieur Gabriel, Collator of Information, 
Tihran 
9. Äqä MuntaVimi, Co-Head of propaganda and 
_ 
Keeper_of codes, Tihran. 
10. Aqa Furuhar, Naubakht's representative as 
Head of the Society in Tabriz, Zanjän, Qazvin, 
and Isfahan (a roving commission). 
11. Sayyid Abul Qäsim Mir, Naubakht's representative 
as Head of the Society at Rasht. 
12. Sayyid Jarfar Faiz Bakhsh, Head of the Society 
at Babul, Dabulsar and throughout Mäzandärän. 
13. Aqa Qä° immagami, Head of the Society at Simnä. n, 
Dammhdnt and Shahrud. 
14. Nasir Khan Qashga'i, Head of the Society, Shiraz. 
15. Ihtishäm-al-Daula (Qaraguzlu), head of the Society at Hamadäm, Maläyir, and Qazvin. 
16. Maj. Muntazimi, Head of the Society at Khurramabad, 
Arak, Burijird, Ahväz, Salihabad, and Andimishk. 
17. Capt. Dilavar, Head of the Society in. Kirmanshah, 
Nihävand, Taraskan, and Shahabad. 
18. Col. Qa'immagämi, Head of the Society in Qasr-i 
_Shirin, 
Khusravi, Pusht-i Kuh, ham and district. 
19. Aqä Ardalan, Head of the Society in Kurdistan. 
Footnote from previous page continued...... 
and joined Schulze-Holthus, and established connection with 
Mayr in Tihrän. See, Ismäeil Rä' in, " M; Rmur-i Makhf14 
Hitler dar Iran", Tihran -iMusavvar, Nos. 1279 and 1281, 
2 and 1 Farvardin 1347 March 22 and April 5,1968). 
Also see, Survey of International Affairs, op. cit. p. 157, ft. l. 
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The Society claimed a large membership, but its exact 
and effective size was never known. The following were 
also members: 
20. `Ali AsEhar, Tihrän Police. 
21, Buzurg, 
22. Capt. Muhammad Safar SalaritArmy Officer, Tihran. 
23. Col. Hasän Khan Parsa, Tihran Police. 
24. Lt. Col. 'Adili, Army Officer, Kirmanshäh, 
25. Maj. Hushmandt It " 
26. Capt. Alvandpur, " It 11 
27. it Kam; . a. b , ºº ºº ºº 28. " Pidram, 
29. " Zirihpush, 
30. " Mukhtari, " ºý 'º 
31. Lt. Abdul Hamid Muhäjir, " " 
32. " Nikumanish, of º' " 
33. " Muna Cim, 
_ 
º' 'º 'º 
34. " Muhajir Azar, 
35. " Yigana, º' un 
36. " Hujäri, 
37. " Daulatshähi, 
38. " Murtazavi, 
39- 'º Mu Cävani, "" ºt ºº 
40. Capt. Zarshämi, Army Officer, Tihrän, but visited 
Kirmänshäh as courier. 
41. Col. Muhammad Davvalu, Army Officer, Kirmanshah. 
42. Maj. Jalahi, 
43. It Firaidun Saulati, Transferred from Kirmänsha-h 
to Tihran. 
44. Capt. `Ali Azar-, acted as courier, based in Tihran, 
45. Jalil Navidi, Tihrän. 
46. Äqä Muzahari_, business partner of the Gulmuhammadi 
brotfiers in Tihrän. 
47. Äqä Tag-1 Faiz_Bakhsh, brother of No. 12, worked in 
Gulmuhammadi'sfirm. 
48. Maj. Durmishän, Army Officer. 
49. " Panah an, went south with Shahbakhti. 
50. Sgt. Qa'imi, Air Force. 
51. Abdul Qadirzada, Kirmänshäh. 
52. Dr. Karim Khan Sanjabi, Eon of Sardar Nasir. 
53" Salman Haqiqat, Kirmanshah. 
54. Maj. Saif, Tihran and Mäzandaran. 
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55, Capt. Dävari 
__ 56. Maj. 
_uhammad_ 
All Ilhami , went south with 
Shahbakhti. 
57. Abdul IIasan Rushan, Hamadan. 
58. Danish Naubakht son of No. l. 
59. Lt. Col. A slam. 
General Shahbakhti was certainly aware: of this group, 
if not actually a registered member. 
Hizb-i Kabüd (The Blue Party) 
This was a sooiety which had been formed by Naubakht 
together with those deputies who voted against the 
Tripartite Treaty. Its tone was solely anti-Ally and it 
took its name from the fact that the membership cards 
were of the same colour as the ballot cards used for voting 
against the ratification of the treaty. 
28 
This society eventually developed most strongly in 
Tihrän and in Shiräz where it was connected with Naubakht's 
operations among the QashgaIi. As far as Tihr. was 
concerned, the 'swearing in' of members took place in 
Ndubakht's house. The aim of the society was to incite 
people to violet action not only against the Allies but 
also against the Iranian constituted authorities. A pamphlet 
which was used by the society in Shiräz in February of 1943, 
clearly showed this aim: 
28. Ismä"il Ra41n, o p. cit. " Amal'i ät-i_, Hizb-i Kabüd", 
Tihran-i Musavvar, 6 Urdibhi ht, 1347 (April 26, 
1968). Also see, FO 371/35071+, p. 121 
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"In the Name of Real life and Independence of Iran. 
In spite of the fact that we, the sons of 
Iran, have more confidence in our sentiments 
than that of the other nations, and the 
people of the world know our fiery thoughts 
better than use therefore, we know that we 
shall never be deceived by the tricks of the 
fascinating masses, and we also know that 
to-day they take away our food-stuffs and 
wealth by force and want to impose their 
ridiculous posters, showing us the importation 
of wheat for us from India. We can not believe 
that the guests of last Shahrivar, or in other 
words, the people in the last war who 
disappointed us in honour, glory and so on, 
would be considered our intimate friends, 
and would also take the least steps for us. 
Today our responsible authorities are 
not able to take any steps towards our ease, 
and also are unable to work and to show their 
patriotism, we shall never expect anything 
from them, because the same secret guest would 
rule our dear country by the force of gun and 
Machine-gun, and with a cheeky face would order 
what is adapted to their policy. 
Hurry up! Oh, the brave and the youth in 
order to eradicate the foreigners from the 
country". 
"Make every effort! Oh, Iranians who love 
your country, and obey the order of God, and 
start a religious war. There is no remedy 
except a revolution. 
Hizb-i Kabud" 29 
The members of this society in Tihran were; 
1. H. Naubakht, Majlis Deputy. 
2. Dr. Javänt ex-Majlis Deputy. 
3. Amir Taimur, Majlis Deputy. 
4. Muhammad Husain Saripzäda, Tihran. 
5. 'Ataullah Ruhi, Majlis Deputy. 
29. This English translation is quoted from FO 371/35074, 
Most Secret, p. 121. 
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6. Lt. Col. Jim, Tihrän 
7. Äqa Hijazi, it 
The following were members In Shiraz: 
8. fAA Salami h 
9. Mihdi Parham 
10. Ja'far Abtat; i- 
11. Bahädur Qahramani 
12. Käzim Pizishki 
__ 13. Sha'bän Qasr Khalili 
14. Ynsif Käzimi 
15. Husain MäIrrifat 
16. I3asan_ Maxrifat 
17. riansur Sarraf 
18. `Ibad Khft1idi 
19, Nusrat Khälidi 
20. Baliä' -al-Din Zakhlra 
21. Manüchihr Dana 
22. Ja"far Azari 
23. Rasul Javahiri 
24. Ahrnad `A13 Baiza-%i 
25. Jämshid Sisakriti 
26. Haidar Himmatiyan 
27. aamshi_d Tavvalali 
28. Mihdi Hamids 
29. 'Ali Siaarat 
30. '(Abdul Khaliq Hadad 
31. Ghulam 'Abbas PIuhibi 
32. Muhammad Farahm. nd" 
33" Mahmud Khälidi 
General Ahmadi was at one time a member of the Hizb-i 
Kabüd. It is not-known whether he had joined in order to 
find out what was going on or because of his political 
leanings. 
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Siyähpushan (The Black-Clads) 
This group was commonly referred to as the SP group 
and had been made up of people who were ultranationalistic 
in politics and whose chief adherents looked to the 
Japanese Legation for guidance and assistance afteb the 
events of August 1941, and until the time of the departure 
of the Japanese mission in April 1942. It was founded 
about January/February 1942 at a time when the pro-Axis 
persons were beginning to recover from the shock of the 
occupation. Many members of this group had been in touch 
individually with the Germans before the occupation, but 
the Japanese Legation became for a time the natural 
inspiration for anti-Allied activities for the obvious 
reason that the Japanese had the only Axis Legation left 
in Tihran for some eight months. 
Franz Mayrts Diary and the captured documents showed 
that all these contacts were passed on to Mayr and his 
friends on the departure of the Japanese. The reasons 
were simple. The Germans had their own agents of German 
nationality at large and active in Iran, and it was obvious 
that any Japanese left behind for espionage or subversive 
activities would be far too conspicuous, even more so as 
there were not then any Chinese in Iran for whom they might 
hope to be mistaken. 
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The size of this group is not exactly known. But the 
SP symbols ran up to SP 40 in Mayr's papers. There were 
for instance SPl, SPl4, and SP15 appearing, so that it 
is possible to say that there was in fact a member for 
each available number up to 40 at least, 
The British authorities identified certain of the 
members of this group who had been referred to under this 
cover. The activities of the Siyahpüshän were mainly 
concentrated in Tihran, Shiraz, and Isfahan. The role 
played by this group, which contained only a few military 
men among its ranks, was largely political. 
Its chief members were: 
1. Ayatullah_Sayyid Abul-Qäsim Käshäni, Tihran 
2. General Zahidi, Isfahan 
3. Shaikh Abdul Majid Shirazi_, Tihran 
4. Capt. 'Alavi, outlaw with Bakhtiyari 
5. Abul Qäsim Khan Bakhtiyari, outlaw. 
6. Hushang Manüchihri 
7. Javad tAllabl di . 
8. Yahya Vira, Tihran Municipality (Shahrdari) 
9. Tayyar, Tihran 
10. Iaji Ismaýil Niya, Tihrän 
11. Sayyid Naqibzada Mushayikh, Tihran 
12. Mahmud Khusravi 
13. Ashraf Adrienne, mistress of Kawasaki of the 
Japanese Legation. 
14. Shahidzada, once a judge in Kirmanshah 
15. Sayyid Bihbahani, Majlis Deputy 
16. H. Naubakht, it it 
17" ßr. Javan , ex- 
18. Amir Taimur. 
19. Sadr-al-Ashraf, 
-" 20. Rühullah M1rzä Jahanbani 
21. Ibrahim Khalili ý'Amiri 
22. Col. Jahanbiglu, Isfahan 
23. Maj. of it 
24. Lt. Col. Dr. Abtahi, Tihran and Isfahan 
25. General A9ivli; 'tihran 
26. " Talbaksh,, Tihrän 
27. Sardar Bahadur Bakhtiyäri, Shiraz. 
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This group also had many tribal connections which 
are implicit in the names given above, but to make it 
clearer these included the Dakhtiyari, Qashgä'i, Tangistani, 
Guran, and Taimuri. 
Jam Vivat-i Milli, Hamayat-i Darmandig n-i Iran 
. 
_The National Society of Protection of the Disinherited of 
Iran) 
The founder of this Society was Dr. MahmUd Mushävir. 
It posed as a charitable organisation and was founded at 
about the same time as, though apparently independently of, 
the Siyahpushan. From the ve'y beginning it was in fact 
a cloak for political activities of an extreme nationalist 
tendency and was supported by many sworn enemy of the Allies. 
It showed in fact how the same currents ran through the 
history of the pro-Axis groups in Iran. In its early stages 
this society held meetings which Mayr and Friedrich Kumel 
attended. This Society never registered with the Ministry 
of the Interior as an official party, but its existence 
was known to them. It finally disintegrated and its members 
joined the other organisations after several of its members 
had been arrested in the Spring of 1942 as a result of the 
capture of the German agent, Kumel, and the arrest of 
'Abbas Mazda. It had a membership which numbered between 
100 and 150, chief of whom were: 
IL 
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1. Dr. M. Mushävir, lawyer, interned. 
2. 'Abbas Mazda " 
3 Na. sir Munshi, 
4. Lt: Col. Dr. A_`lam, Tihran 
5. Muhsin Maliki, interned for a period then released 
6. Nasrullah Subhi, 
7. Äqä Hijazi', later member of the Hub i Kabüd 
8. Husain Naivandi, in hiding, later interned. 
9.11uhammad Husain Hisam Vaziri, in hiding 
10. Äqä Ma'adin, 
_of 
the Ministry of Justice 
11. 'Abbas Marjuban, secretary of No. l. 
12. Aqa Jalayir 
_ 13. Habibullah Khiltash, of the Ministry of Trade 
&_Inductry, 
_interned. 14. Mahmud Khusravi, representative of Mercedes Benz 
0 in Iran, interned in Palestine. 
This society had been organised into cells, each 
foundation member being responsible for a group under him 
of ten members. One of these cells was linked to a Berlin 
based society or party known as IIib-ilrän-i Äzäd whose 
chief organiser was General Shaibä. ni in Berlin. 
Hiäb-i Iran-i AzadfThe Free Iran Party) 
Little was known of this party in Iran beyond its 
Berlin connection. Dr. Mushavir and Marjubän were involved 
in the Iranian end of it. In July 1942, just prior to 
their arrest, Mushavir and his secretary, Marjubän, were 
turning out leaflets from Mushavir's house with the name 
of Iran-i Azad. Mayr was certainly aware of this party 
as his documents showed. 
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Anjuman-i Tabligh-t-i Irän (The Propaganda Society of Iran) 
The interest taken by Mayr and Vaziri in this matter 
showed that the religious element had not been overlooked, 
which was seen as a medium for propaganda. Vaziri wrote 
to Mayr on April 22t 1942: 
"Moreover we have increased the cell 
spirit in so far as we have founded 
a completely official society for 
the Islamic religion. This society 
is called Anjurnan-i-Tablighat-Iran. 
The followers are all spirituals of 
Iran". 30 
The Society had been registered officially for the 
ostensible purpose implied in its title. It was, however, 
used as a cover for stirring up the religious elements 
against the Allies. It held its meetings at Subuhi's 
bookshop who was a prominent member and the son of the 
Majlis Deputy, MirzaAbdulläh Va'iz. On October 1,1942, 
Vaziri wrote again to Mayr about Vä6iz: 
"Also Vi/216(i. e. Subuhi)'s father makes 
a good speech. Yesterday evening he worked 
up about 3000 people to emphasize this 
action according to our instruction. 1. 
"This action" refers to the arrest of the Iranians who 
had been sent to Sult&nabäd at the end of September 1942. 
On September 17,1942, Vaziri had again written to Ma.. r- 
about Vä 
'iz's activity: 
31.. Ibid, p. 123 
32. Ibid. 
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"Up to date Mirza Abdullah Fa'ez (sic. ), 
the father of our arrested friend Vi/216, 
speaks daily in the parliament mosque 
from 3 P. M. He talks quite mad on the 
lines we wish. He enquires of me daily 
as to what theme he should elaborate. 
He has an audience of 5,000 and talks 
about the Koran and the Marxist idea. 
Excellent:: The day before yesterday 
I sent Haji(Ismail Nia) to him and 
instructed him to say no political 
stand should be adopted". 32 
Hizb-i Iran-i Bidar (The Awakened Iran Party) 
This party was founded in Tabriz and, in 1943, it 
was apparently running candidates for the Majlis Elections. 
Its leader was Dr. Shä. fi Amin, "the best school friend 
of Vaziri", who also had a brother in Tabriz, Lt. Col. 
Amin. Its composition was not of any importance but 
Mayr's documents showed that the party was co-operative 
with Vaziri and his friends through the intermediary of 
Jalil Navidi and Colonel Zinda Dil. It was taken, too, 
under the cloak of the Milliyün. 
The FN Group. 
This group existed only on paper as far as Mayr was 
concerned and was used by himself and others who know the 
code for the General Zahidi -Ahmad Namdär chain of contacts. 
This connection was regarded by Mayr as of the highest 
importance because of its political ties through Zahidi 
and also through the same channel to the Bakhtiyari and 
Qa hqa i. It was in fact a way of counter-balancing Naubkht's 
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intrigues. Moreover, Mayr had strengthened his power 
by controlling several channels and his playing off one 
group against the other. The result was the impression 
that many thought Zähidi controlled Mayr instead of the 
reverse. 
Railway Section. 
A special and an important section of Mayr's 
organisation known under the code name of A/216 had been 
established to deal with espionage and sabotage on the 
Trans-Iranian railway. The leader of this section, known 
as Al/216 or "Engineer A", reported directly to Vazirl, 
or in his absence, to Husain Naivandl. "Engineer All 
supplied Vaziri with statistics of goods for Russia carried 
on the railway, general information relating to the war 
materials for Russia, antd a description of landmattks to 
assist German bombers in locating stores of material lying 
in Bandar Shah port. All the information was transmitted 
to Mayr who sent them to Ankara. Technical information 
on the railway was supplied by Kumel, who had received 
sabotage training before his arrival in Iran. 
Unlike the other pro-Axis organisations, the Railway 
Section operated under very tight security covers, and it 
proved extremely difficult to be penetrated by Allies 
agents. Later, it was revealed by members of, the other 
groups in custody that information about the activities 
of the Railway Section had been withheld from all except 
agents directly concerned, so that the risk of betrayal 
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would be small. It was believed that the organisation 
had been on the cell basis, with the object that each 
agent should know only his immediate collaborators. 
The leaders of this organisation were believed to be: 
1. Engineer Habibullah Fathii Rails and Bridges Dept. 
2. Engineer fatfar Sharif fmami, Locomotives, 
extremely pro-German. 
3. Engineer Abul Qäsim ýädiq Bihzadi, Technical Stores 
4. Col. 'Abdulläh Ashraf!, Railway, Police, direct 
agent of Vaziri. 
The organisation had designed sabotage plans on the 
railway at the "right moment". 
33 
The Armed Forces and Police 
As it had already shown, the Iranian armed forces 
were riddled with men of anti-Allied sentiments who had 
implicated themselves in activities of assistance to the 
Axis. Mayr's documents are full of allusions to the officers 
and units on which the Germans could rely. Apart from those 
who have already appeared in the foregoing pages some 
important military men involved in pro-Axis activities 
such as these Generals: 
ICaikävusi, and Firuz, 
2aräbi, Täjbakhsh, Pürzarid, 
The police also played an important role and contained 
many officers who were actively helping pro-Axis elements. 
'Ali Hai*lat had been entrusted with the job of compiling the 
lists of arrests which it was intended to effect through the 
police if the movement in favour of the Germans succeeded. 
34 
33. Ibid, p. 124 (both sides) 
34. Ibid. p. 125. 
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Tribal Contacts. 
Mayr's documents revealed the fact that all the pro- 
Axis organisations had reckoned that they could rely on 
a large percentage of the tribes for support. The 
activities of German parachutists showed that this belief 
was not unfounded. Mayr's papers also showed to what extent 
they had built up their contacts with tribes whose names 
were these: 
1. Afshar 
2. Shähsavan of Azarbayijan 
3. Qashga'i 
_ 4. Buir_Ahmadi Fars-Khuzistan 
5. Afsharoof Hamadan 
6. Shahsavan of Sava 
7, Findrisk of Khurasan 
8. Usanlu 
9. Täimürtäsh 
10. Sanjabi, Kirmanshah 
11. Papi 
_ 12. Bakhtiyari. 
13. Güränt Kirmanshah 
14. Kalkhani 
13. Uraman 
_ 16. Häjalilu, Makü area 
17. Qara Quyunlu 
18. Dashti Bushihr 
19. Tangistani, Bushiir 




In addition to these there was a widespread network 
of contacts among the "Jangali" of Mazandiran. But among 
35 
all these tribes the QashgPi appeared to be'the menace 
to the security of the Allies. 
35. Ibid. 
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The ashgä1 i and the German Plot. 
There are three main tribal divisions in Fars 
the Qashgabi, Khamsa (Arab)and Buir Ahmadi . There are 
in addition the coastal tribes of the Dashti and Tangistäni, 
to the southeast of Bushi}u... The most important of all is 
the Qashga'i on whom the Germans had great influence, and 
it was upon this tribe that Wassmuss used his influence, 
successfully, from the German point of view, in the First 
World War. 
36 
Nasir Khan, the QashgäIi leader, had given asylum 
to Schulze- Holthus and other Germans who were in possession 
of a radio transmitting and receiving set in Firuzabäd, 
the capital ' of the Qashgä*4i, fifty five miles south of 
Shiraz. Nasir had no cause to love the Allies, in 
particular the British. He had fought and defeated his 
father, and was scared to death, bolting from his very 
shadow. He never stayed in one place long, never under a roof, 
always in the open. Missmall daughter had died, entirely 
owing to the vagrant life Nasir was leading. 
. 
Early in March 1942, it became clear that trouble 
was brewing In Qashga'i country. Reports spoke of contacts 
between Nasir Khan and the Buir Ahmadi tribal leaders, to 
the north of the main Shiraz - Bushihr route, and with tha 
36. For Wassmuss's activities in Iran see Christopher Sykes, 
Wassmuss, the Persian Lawrence, London, 1936. Also see 
Nicolson, Curzon: The Last Phase, a study in Post-War 
Diplomacy, 1934, pp. 129-130. 
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Dashtis. It was also suggested that the Buir Ahmadis 
had been in touch with the Bakhtiyaris to their north. 
It was thus possible to imagine a tribal rising 
stretching northwards from the Persian Gulf (Dashtistän), 
crossing the main Shiraz-Bushihr road in the Qashgali 
country, and curving round through the Buir Ahmadis and 
Bakhtiyäris to the north,. east. This would make part of 
the circumference of a circle whose centre was Abadan. 
There were also reports that instructions had been sent 
out by Nasir to tribesmen along the main road to be ready 
on receipt of orders to cut the telephone wires and 
sabotage the road with explosives stolen from the 
contractors in the neighbourhood of Pir-i Zan, half way 
from Shiraz to Kazirun, where the road could be effectively 
out. 
A combination of the Buir Ahmadi., Qashgä. 4 i, and Dashtl, 
given capable leadership which might be supplied by Schulze- 
Holthus could have threatened the port of Bushihr and the 
oilfields' area of Gachsäran, which had already been 
threatened by the Buir Ahmadi. The Khamsa tribe might have 
taken advantage of an unsettled situation to loot, and even 
to cut the Shiraz- Isfahan road. But it was most unlikely, 
however, that the Khamsa would join in with any movement 
originated by their hereditary enemies, the Qashgall. 
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This would-be situation in the tribal area was a 
source of anxiety for the Iranian Government and, naturally, 
for the Allies. Therefore, the Government invited Näsir to 
come to Shiraz to discuss the question of his land claims. 
He refused. Meanwhile, the Iranian troops in Fars were too 
demoralised to be able to take action against Näsir Khan, 
and there was also a notable degree of reluctance on the 
part of the Governor-General and General, Officer Commanding 
(G. O. C. ) in Shiraz, Major-General (Sartip) Prince F1rüz 
to take any step against Näsir Khan, though he was 
apparently co-operating 'satisfactorily' with the British. 
37 
Firuz's background in the Imperial Russian Army, which 
tended to influence him against the Soviets, and the effects 
of a stay in Germany in the early part of the war were 
factors which could hardly be expected to influence him in 
the Allies' favour. Besides, he probably did not wish to 
'brusquer l'affaire' by fighting Näsir or anything like 
that as, it would have generally had a bad Offect on the 
tribes. 
Negotiations with Nasir Khan, however, began and 
continued throughout the summer without making any headway. 
The situation at Firs had closely been affected by the 
military situation, and although it was a matter of 
conjecture, it seemed probable that the intention of those 
37. British Consulate, Shiräz, to Bullard, June 10,1942. 
secret. FO 371/31418 , 
0 
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elements in Fars who opposed any action against Nasir Khan 
41 
was that, in the event of a German victory in the Caucasus, 
they would have handed over the Government of Firs to him 
as the preserver of local law and order on behalf of the 
Germans. 
As noted previously, Näsir Khan was generally known 
to be in contact with the Germans and to be harbouring 
German agents. Thus, those elements in Tihrän and in the 
south of Iran who did not favour the Allied cause, used 
their influence to ensure that no action should be taken 
against Näsir, notwithstanding the representations made 
. 
by Bullard to the Government. The situation was more 
disquieting since the road from Büshihrto Shiraz passed 
near the Qashgäli territory and any serious disorder in 
the area would have affected the delivery of supplies to 
Russia by this route. 
At the end of September 1942, Firuz and the British 
Consul at Shiraz went to Tihrän, where conferences were 
held with the Iranian authorities and the British Legation 
to decide what should be done. Firuz, earlier in July, 
had expressed his desire to occupy Firüzäbäd-and thus have 
control of all that area - Qir, Karmin, and Farräshband 
where Näsir Khan had prepared landing grounds for the 
German aeroplanes, but he had been afraid to, do so with 
the Qashga`i - Buir Ahmadi infested elements of which his 
troops consisted. Yet the Central Government had refused 
his request for fresh troops to replace some of his local 
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men, and to send some trucks. 
38 
However, the general conclusion that was reached by 
the Government at the conference, in September, was that, 
pending a clarification of the position, measures should 
be taken to thwart Näsir in increasing his authority. 
The British Legation suggested that "this could best be 
done by making suitable arrangements with the leaders of 
the sub-tribes and by re-establishing the authority of the 
Government in the Firüzäbäd area", 
39an 
operation that 
appeared to be within the capacity of the Iranian forces. 
While Firüz was still in Tihrän, troops were 
positioned on the migration route of the Aashgä! i tribesmen 
on their way to their winter quarters to disarm them. But 
the troops were inadequate and a detachment was ignominiously 
disarmed instead. Nothing effective was done by the Central 
Government either to occupy Firüzäbäd or to diminish Näsir's 
authority. However, the German defeats in Africa and the 
Soviet Union, and the evidence that the British authorities 
took a serious view of the situation in Fars made Näsir 
Khan put some water in his wine, and somewhat desultory 
negotiations for his submission began towards the end of 
1942. But this was again Näsir's manoeuvre to buy time to 
consolidate his position. 
38, Record of conversation between Firüz and T. V. Brennan, 
Consul at Shiraz, on July 25,1942. Bullard to FO, 
July 26,19+2. FO 371/31418. 
39" Bullard to Eden, Report on Political Events of 1942, 
confidential, March 26,1943. E 2450/239/34, FO 371 
/35117 
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In the i3arlier months of 1943, it became apparent 
that Nasir had consolidated his position and acquired more 
adherents among landlords and peasants, who, since the 
Government were unable or reluctant to protect them, had, 
under the threat of pillage, no alternative to conciliating 
him. Numerous approaches by the Government not only 
failed to persuade Nasir, stiffened certainly by Shulze- 
Holthus and other Germans who were with him and by pro- 
German elements in Tihrän, to accept terms consistent with 
the recognition of the Central Government, but rather 
increased his prestige. His successful, if polite, defiance 
encouraged other dissident tribal chiefs to show a bold 
front, and this resulted in a rapid weakening of Government 
authority over a vast area extending to the oilfields, and 
to an increase in lawlessness and insecurity which could 
hardly fail in time to affect the Allies' interests, 
particularly the British. In Bakhtiyari a young khan, Abul 
Qäsim4o, had set himself up in defiance of Government with 
pretentions to be a ruler of Bakhtiyä. ri, and had collected 
a band of armed followers which would allow him to exact money 
and grain from Bakhtiyari villages. In April 1943, at his 
instigation attacks were made on Iranian garrisons in the 
40. The incipient dissidence on the part of Abul Qasim Khan 
early in 1942 had been satisfactorily settled in May 
1942, when he submitted to the Government. Subsequently, 
General Zahidi, the G. O. C. 
_ 
of the Isfahan area, nominated 
him and another ]3a]chtiyäri chief to be official 
representative of the Iranian Army in Chahar-Mahal 
This agreement proved most unsatisfactory as the 
Khans held up food supplies for Isfahan in order to sell 
them on the black market, and began to rob the population 
in the old way, After the arrest of Zahidi in December 1942, 
Abul Qasim Khan ceased to enjoy the blessing of, the local 
authorities. 
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Janiki country sufficiently close to the oilfields at 
Masjid Sulaiman and Haftgil to cause a temporary anxiety 
for thier safety. 
At the end of 1942, General Headquarters, Paiforce, 
were concerned about the safety of the BüshihrShiraz 
route, which it was, at that time, intended to use to 
a greater extent for the transport of supplies to Russia. 
Although there had been no serious interference with the 
Allies military traffic, a series of minor robberies and 
hold-ups had hampered the work being done by British 
engineers on. the improvement and maintenance of the road, 
and had created some embarrassment among labourers and 
transport drivers. 
41 
It was obvious that there would be 
no real security on the road until the Iranian Government 
had established some respect for their authority in Fars, 
and that this could not be achieved as long as Näsir Khän's 
power remained unchecked. The Iranian forces in Fars were 
demoralised after a long period of inaction and were immobile 
through lack of transport. It was agreed by the British 
Legation and General Headquarters, Paiforce, that the 
Iranian Government should be urged to take effective 
measures to ensure the security of the road and to re- 
establish their authority over the Qashga i tribe. 
41. Bullard to Eden, Confidential, June 29,1943, E 3868 
/239/3+, FO 371/35117. 
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'Furthermore, General Headquarters, Paiforce, undertook 
to supply the minimum amount of mechanical facilities 
for the operations, to provide basic rations, blankets 
and greatcoats for the Gendarmerie protecting the road, 
in the hope that this would help to a more efficient 
performance of their duties, and to send to Shiraz a 
small staff of British officers for liason with the 
Iranian troops, and the supervision of the use and 
maintenance of this transport and the issue of the rations. 
2 
Meanwhile, the Iranian Government decided to appoint 
General Shähbakhti, a tough uneducated soldier of the old 
school with a reputation to maintain for courage, energy 
and astuteness in dealing with the tribes with full civil 
and military powers in Färrs. Although he was involved 
in the German plot, the British Legation had decided not to 
oppose his appointment, thinking it was safer to have him 
kept busy in a responsible job than to leave him free to 
intrigue against the Allies. 
43 
The mere announcement of Shahbakhti's appointment 
had on the tribal situation an immediate effect which, 
however, wore off as weeks passed in inaction. There might 
at first have been some justification for this inaction in 
the delay in arrival of the transport faciltiies promised 
by Paiforce, without which, it was probably true, the 
42. Ibid. 
43. Bullard to Minibranch for P. A. I. C., No. 108, Dec. 16, 
1942. E 735/14/34 F0,371/31387 
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General was unable to act, but the delay gave time to the 
v pro-German party, whose tool was Näsir Khan, headed by 
Naubakht to work up a considerable agitation in the Majlis 
and press in favour of Näsir Khan and against this "barädar 
kushi" (fraticidal warfare). That the British had pressed 
the Government to undertake these operations, that the 
British were providing assistance and officers to see that 
these operations were carried out was well known, and the 
agitation inevitably assumed a strongly anti-British bias. 
Only traitors, it was said, would lend themselves to 
British designs against the patriotic Näsir Khan, whose 
father had so successfully foiled all British attempts to 
take possession of Fars. This agitation had its immediate 
effect on the never very firm decision of the Government, 
which quickly communicated itself to General Shähbakhti 
and the forces in Färs; and it was not until the end of 
May- General Shähbakhti went to Shiraz in February 1943- 
that he allowed himself to be persuaded that the Govenment 
really meant him to act. After an initial set-back the 
first stage of operations, of which the object was the 
occupation of Firuzäbäd and other important places in the 
area dominated by Näsir Khan, was successfully completed 
by the 12th June. Nasir Khan with two Germans went into 
hiding in the hills. Organised opposition rapidly 
disintergrated and the Government's lost prestige among the 
tribes was restored. But this sucess was short-lived. 
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The Iranian forces failed to press their military 
advantage, new intrigues were set in train, encouraged, 
no doubt, by German agents; and the Buir Ahmadi tribe, 
under the absconding chief, '(Abdulläh Zar hämpur; was 
persuaded to lend support to the Qashgall. On July 3, 
the tribes, assisted, it was commonly believed, by 
treachery among the troops, scored a signal success against 
a garrison at Simirum, a village on the northern limit 
of the Qashga'I summer quarters. The whole force of some 
900 men, after a poor show of resistance, was captured by 
the tribes wittall its arms. When asked about this event, 
Shähbakhti said: "It is. not an important incident, such 
things happen repeatedly in the world". 
44 
This disaster altered the situation. The tribes were 
greatly encouraged. The Iranian forces, correspondingly, 
depressed, became obviously incapable of restoring the 
situation. By this time, it had already been decided that 
B5shihrshould beclosed as an entry port for supplies to 
Russia. Therefore, the unsettled situation of the area 
would not threaten the security of the Allies' transport. 
But there was still ample cause for anxiety. The Buir 
Ahmadl, whose territory touches the southern oilfields, 
were now in open revolt, which would have caused much 
concern for the British; some sections of-the Bakhtiyäri, 
44. Did, No. 144,23 Tir, 1322 (July 14,1943). General 
Shahbalchti was alleged to have caused deliberately 
the Simirum disaster. An account of trials of those 
allegedly responsible for the Simirum defeat is given 
in Dad, No. 262,2 Aiihr 1323(Sept. 24,1944) 
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under Abul Qäsim Khan were known to be harbouring German 
agents and to be in close contact with the Buir Ahmadl 
and Qashga'i leaders; the tribes, suffering under real 
and imagined grievances of the last twenty years, were 
in a mood that predisposed them to listen to incitement 
against the Central Government and the British who 
supported it. It was presumably the desire of the German 
agents to create the maximum amount of disorder in the 
hope of creating opportunities for sabotage, embroiling 
British troops with the tribes and dislocating to the 
maximum extent the Country's economy and administration. 
Meanwhile, the Shah and the Government proposed to 
send Qavam- al-Mulk to Fars as Governor General with 
extensive powers, hoping that by his influence he would 
be able to rally against Näsir Khan the Khamsa tribes, 
who formerly owed allegience to his family, and even some 
of the Qashga)i tribes. Dullard supported this proposal, 
but the Government, having decided that their salvation 
lay in Qavam-al-Mulle, then made every difficulty about 
granting him powers demanded by him. Moreover, the 
Government made no attempt to neutralize the'powerful 
intrigues against his appointment that were at once 
instigated by Näsir Khan's friends and other pro-Axis 
elements. 
On July 26,1943, Naubakht tabled an int'erpellation, 
in the Majlis, of the Government, and of the Minister 
for War, General Ahmadi, in particular. in regard to their 
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campaign against the Qashgä'i tribe. He asked the Government 
to explain on what legal justification two thousand troops 
had been sent against the Qashga'i, Buir Ahmadi, and 
]3akhtiyari, and 'whdt"maslahat -i'ali baräy-i kishvar 00 
(supreme expediency for the country) had prompted this 
internal war contrary to national unity". 
45Meanwhile, 
the Foreign Office gave authority to Bullard to make use 
of information about the German plot at his discretion. 
This authority arrived at a most opportune moment, as 
Naubakht had just tabled his interpallation. Therefore, 
Bullard accordingly furnished the Prime Minister, Suhaill, 
and the Minister for War with suitable evidence regarding 
Naubakht. 's pro-Axis and other "treasonable" activities, 
both in connection with the plot and since that date, so 
as to enable them "to produce a crushing reply" to the 
interpellation which was fixed to take place for August 24. 
At the same time, Bullard, in a letter of August 59 requested 
Suhaili to withdraw Naublcht's parliamentary immunity to 
enable him to be arrested and sent to Sultanäbäd for 
detention and interrogation in accordance with the Anglo- 
Iranian agreement of 1942.46 Naubakht, undoubtedly scenting 
danger and realising how weak his hand had become, particularly 
45. Iran, 5 Murdad, 1322 (July 27,1943). Also see Ramazani, 
op. cit., p. 56. 
46. Bullard to Eden, confidential, No. 393, Sept-15,1943. 
E 5658/239/34, Fo 371/35117 
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in view of the arrest of certain Germans in Tihrän, failed 
to present himself at the Majlis on the day appointed for 
the Government's answer to the interpellation - August 24. 
The Government did not feel themselves strong enough to 
ask the Majlis to remove his immunity. Naubakht and his 
son fled to Shiraz district. 
However, it was not until August 10, that Qaväm-al- 
Mulk left for Shiraz. Meanwhile, Näsir Khan and his brother, 
Khusrau had already notified the Governor of Bakhtiyäri, 
Murtizä Qull Khan, a fellow-tribesman, of their desire to 
open negotiations with the Central Government. This was 
undoubtedly in, part due to the appointment of Qavä. m-al- 
Mulk, but to a greater extent to the fall of Mussolini and 
the Russian victories, news of which had by this time 
filtered through the tribes. On August 11, a meeting was 
arranged, at Kular(near Abada), between NasirjKhusrau, 
the Governor of Bakhtiyäri, and the newly appointed G. O. C. 
of the forces in the South, General (Särlashgar) Jahänbäni, 
at which Colonel Robert, a British liason officer, who had 
established some personal prestige with the Qashgä)i leaders, 
was present. 
47 
The outcome of this meeting was that 
Khusrau agreed to go to Tihrän to express repentance for past 
47- Ibid. 
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misdeeds, and to ask for certain terms for himself and 
his brother. 
48 
These terms were; Khusrau should be made 
governor of the Qashgali, he undertook to return all 
arms captured from troops and to restrain the tribes from 
robbing; Näsir Khan should be allowed to be elected a 
Najlis Deputy for Firuzäbad, and when protected by that 
immunity he would leave Qashgäli territory) the 
Government should immediately return to Näsir those of 
his lands held by the Government. 
" 
When the news of this settlement reached Bullard, 
he informed Suhaill that he would not be satisfied unless 
they included an undertaking that the Qashga33 would hand 
over any Germans in their territory and would allow 
British officials free movement among the tribes. Khusrau 
Khan signed an undertaking to this effect before leaving 
Tihran. 
49 
In spite of the conciliatory replies given by the 
Government to Khusrau and their perhaps too evident desire 
to settle the trouble in Firs by peaceful means, Näsir 
Khan continued for a while to profess dissatisfaction 
with the assurances given. He claimed that his distrust 
of Qavam-al-Mulk that was hindering a settlement. In fact, 
according to the diary of a captured German agent, Qaväm- 
48. Iran, 23, Murdad, 1322 (August 14,1943) 
49. Bullard to Eden, No. 393, 
_op. cit. 
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al-Mulk's appointment to Shiraz had been regarded by the 
Germans with great alarm. 
50 
Finally, Nasir Khan improved his relations with both 
the Government and the British authorities to whom he handed 
over all Germans who were in his area in exchange for two 
of his sons who had been in Germany and, on their way to 
Iran, "fell into British hands". Thereby the German menace 
in the Qashga. l area was eradicated. In later years, Bullard 
said; " This was never a serious menace, but it was a cause 




51. Bullard, "Persia in the Two World Wars", op. cit., p. 14. 
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N 
Qavam-al-Saltana. and' the German Plot 
Qavam's involvement in pro-Axis activities until at 
least August of 1943 appeared to have shocked the British 
who discovered such involvement through interrogations 
and written evidence obtained from those interned at 
Sultänäbad or other internment camps. Although the 
British did not seem to have revealed their discovery to 
the Iranian Government, and because no action was taken 
against him by the Allies, Qavam might have been under the 
impression that his activities were not revealed. 
This revelation enables us now to see how the "last 
policy of reinsurance with the Axis" was initiated within 
the years prior to the Anglo-Russian occupation of Iran in 
August 1941, and also to see how it was implemented after 
the occupation, while Iran was nominally one of the parties 
to the treaty. Finally it would throw light on undeclared 
foreign policy of Iran during this period. Undoubtedly, 
the Suhaili and Qavä. m Governments were instrumental in 
carrying out this undeclared policy. , 
In the early part of 1942 Qaväm was reported to have been 
in contact with the Japanese Legation. He had made some kind 
of offer to the Japanese Minister at about the time of the 
fall of the Furüfhi Cabinet and the formation of the first 
Suhaili Cabinet. 
The exact terms of this offer are not known but the 
sense of it was that Qaväm should once more take an active 
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part in politics and form a cabinet with himself as 
Prime Minister. His policy would be to obstruct the Allies 
as far as he might dare without actually antagonising them 
and to prepare the ground quietly for the day when the 
Japanese forces should arrive to drive out the British 
and Russians. The Japanese Minister had apparently replied, 
somewhat far sightedly, that he did not think that 
Japanese troops would arrive so soon, as to forestall 
Qavam falling from power again as a result of such a 
policy. 
52 
Had such a story been told at that time, it would 
have been difficult to believe. But it can now be seen why 
Qavam energetically intrigued against Suhaill to eliminate 
him from premiership as he was about to give in to the 
British presure concerning the delivery of pro-Axis suspects 
to them. 
Qavam's first contacts with the Germans were made in the 
time of Riza Shah, before the German attack on the Soviet 
Union. A committee composed of Qavam, General Murtizä Khan 
Yazdän Panäh, General Qadimi, Hakim-al-Mulk, Mutashär-al- 
Daula, and Husain Ali Qaraguzlü (Fath-al-Saltana) was formed. 
This secret committee was in touch with other prominent 
Iranians and its secret intention was to contrive the 
52; F0, Most Secret, March 24,1944. E 1861, FO 371/40180. 
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overthrow of Rizä Shah with German aid. Secret meetings 
were held in Tihrän and an emissary with good German 
contacts, Qaraguzlü , was sent to Berlin to approach the 
German Government for assistance. A plan was adopted and 
agreed to by all parties, but it was spoilt by the 
jealousy and intervention of Ettel, the German Minister 
in Tihran, who prided himself on his influence and 
friendship with Rizg Shäh. The result was a struggle 
between the German Foreign Ministry and High Command until 
it was too late to do anything before the Anglo-Russian 
occupation of Iran. 
53 
The Government which it was hoped would be established 
in Tihran was thus: Qavam, Prime Minister; Yazdan Panah, 
War; Qadimi, Chief General Staff; Mustashar-al-Daula, 
Foreign Affairs; Qaraguzliä, the Interior, and Hakim-al- 
Mulk did not want a post. 
The occupation of August 1941, for a while, upset 
everything, but the swift advance of the Germans towards 
53" Ibid. 
Bahram Shährukh, who was once a Persian broadcaster 
for Berlin Radio and then returned to Iran and became 
the Director of Propaganda; and who. was alleged by some 
newspapers to have been a British spy, wrote a series 
of articles in 1948 in which he gave an elaborated 
account of this secret committee and its operations, 
but there was never any mention of Qavam's name in 
the articles in which Qaväm was only referred to as 
"yiki az bä fikrtarin siyasatmadärän"(one of the most 
thoughtful statesmen). See D. Shahrukh, "Khäkistar-i 
Garm" (The warm Ash), Mard-i Imrüz, Nos. 132,13 
139, From 12 Dai to 18 Bahman 1326 (Nan. 2 - Feb-7,1948) 
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the Caucasus revived their interest in the plan for a 
coup d'etat which would be favourable to themselves. 
The previous coup plan, which was drawn up in 1940, 
according to Qaraguzlu, was for some officers to penetrate 
to the palace and arrest Riz& Shäh, 
54 But this time Ahmad 
Akbari, who was later interned at Sultänäbäd, was sent 
from Berlin by the Germans with a special micro-photo 
message to contact Qavä. m once more. The committee was to 
be told through this channel that in the summer of 1942 
German troops would reach the Iranian frontiers, that the 
German Government desired the closer co-operation of the 
Iranian Army, which in the circumstances would have to 
be reformed, and that the committee should take power at 
the appropriate moment. Financial help would be given if 
necessary. 
55 
The broad lines of this policy are familiar 
and can be compared to the line which Mayr was taking 
during the summer of 1943 before his capture. 
However, Akbari arrived in Tihrän in April 1942. He 
was suspected by the British of collaboration with the 
Germans, and was arrested by the Iranian Police at the 
Legation's request. But he was set free soon without being 
properly interrogated. He did not deliver the message 
personally to Qaväm as he was afraid to draw attention to 
54. Ibid. No. 136" 
55- I. No. 139" Also see E 1861, op. cit. 
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himself, and Qaväm was at that time in Lähijan. He therefore 
contacted Hasan Qaraguzlu, the son of Fath-al-Saltana, who 
carried a letter to Lähijan, and it was through this same 
channel, after he had been released by the police that he 
actually met Qaväm. 
When interrogated, Akbari gave an account of his 
pro-Axis activities and his meetings with Qavam. Extracts 
of a statement written and signed by Akbarl read thus: 
"My conversation with the Qavam lasted 
at most ten minutes and concerned the 
contents of the letter. He explained that 
he could not give me an immediate reply 
and must think about it. When I asked him 
whether he could provide me with a W/T 
set, he replied to the negative. At the 
second meeting he said it was still 
impossible to undertake anything, When I 
sentGharagozlou to him for the third 
time he. replied that if German troops 
reached the Persian frontier he would 
be in a position to do something.... 
In the meantime I heard that all those 
who had been in Germany were to be 
arrested. I then went for the third 
and last time to the Qavam and asked 
him to see, if possible, that I was not 
arrested. He said that he could try to 
keep all those who had been arrested 
in Persia. I asked when I was to be 
arrested and he replied it would be on 
the next day or the following; day". 56 
56o E 1861, op. cit., p. 78 
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This last meeting was when Qavä. m was Prime Minister. 
It can be seen how the policy of reinsurance was at work 
while the head of the Government had been committed by 
the treaty to collaborate with the Allies. It might well 
be asked why he saw fit to warn a man whom he knew to be 
a'German agent against impending arrest at the request 
of the British Legation, thus enabling him to go into 
hiding. Akbarl was not captured for a whole year as a 
result of this timely warning during which time he was 
able to work closely with Mayr, After Mayr's capture, Akbarl 
was still managing the radio transmitter in the Bakhtiyärl 
country with two Germans. 
In support of Akbari's evidence there is also the 
signed statement of Masan Qaraguzlü : 
"Some two years ago a person came 
to the office and introduced himself as 
Akbari... After a few days had passed 
the man came again and disclosed that 
he had a letter which he had to give to 
the Qavam-es-Sultaneh and that, since 
he had newly arrived and in view of his 
travels did not know anyone, would I 
do this for him(i. e. hand over the 
letter). I went away and delivered the 
letter in Lahijan. When Akbari handed 
this to me, it was understood that I 
ask when the Qavam was coming to Tehran. 
I put the question and he said that, 
for the time being, he was very busy 
with some work but that he would come 
in ten or fifteen day's time. On my 
return I gave an exact account of what 
had taken place to Akbari. 
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You have asked what kind of work 
they were engaged upon. I have heard 
and seen that they were continually 
preparing to bring about some trouble 
and were working for a day that would be 
one of the worst of which the imagination 
could conceive. This policy they 
continued". 57 
Meanwhile, things were going rather well for the 
Germans. The German drive for the Caucases in August 1942 
was in full swing. Qaväm was Prime Minister and Mustashar- 
al-Daula and Hakim-al-hulk had been brought into the 
Cabinet as Ministers without portfolio. The only puzzle 
was the omission of General Yazdan Panäh. Qaväm gave his 
fellow conspirators as a reason for this that Yazdan Panah 
would thus be freer to plan the necessary reforms of the 
Army if he were left out for a time. 
Qavam's plans were closely linked with his brother 
Vusuq-al-Daula who was in Switzerland at the time and it 
was through him that Qaaräm kept in touch with Berlin 
after Akbari had gone into hiding. He endeavoured to send 
Vusuq as Ambassador to Turkey where he could act as a 
convenient intermediary. Vusüq was in fact nominated for 
the post but his poor health never improved sufficiently 






This allocation of trusted people in diplomatic 
posts was a favourite point of the policy of pro-Axis 
elements. Mayr and Naubakht were both interested in 
getting another Qaraguzlu to Turkey in a diplomatic post. 
This was Ihtisham-al-Daula, later interned at Sultänäbäd' 
and a confessed collaborator of Mayr. Both Qaväm and Mayr 
were interested in getting General Iiitpal to Turkey as 
Military Attache. 
The development of events proved, however, too much 
for Qavam's plans. The battle in Russia went against the 
Germans, they were defeated in Africa, and finally he 
himself ceased to be Prime Minister. Mayr never actually 
contacted Qavam personally, but there were signs that they 
had common friends and their respective aspirations 
dovetailed neatly, Hüshang Manuchihri, oneof the sons of 
Shaikh'Abdul Majid Shiraz: -L, was in an appropriate positon 
to know what the pro-Axis persons were attempting. He once 
stated that in 1942 Qaväm had much contact with Näsir Khan 
and that he used 
Äyatullah Käshani and Sayyid Nagibzädä 
Mashayikh as his intermediaries. 
Qaväm when in office did nothing to prevent Naubakht 
from visiting Nasir Khan at a time when it was said that 
Naubalcht was not only hostile to the Allies but supporting 
tribes with whom there were known to be Germans living. 
Musa Gaspäriyän, the Armenian who used to live with Mayr 
until they quarrelled in Isfahan in November 1942, thus 
leading to the capture of Mayr's documents and Gäspariyan 
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himself, gave some interesting evidence under interrogation. 
He asserted that Mayr was in touch with Qaväm through the 
intermediary of Naubakhtend Käzimi who later resigned from 
the Ministry of Finance. Qaväm, when Prime Minister, 
sent a message to Mayr asking him to suggest to the German 
Government that TihrKn should not be bombed from the air. 
Mayr had apparently replied that this could be arranged 
on these conditions: (a) Iran must undertake not to fight 
Germany under any circumstances; (b) the Qaväm Government 
must give clear instructions to the Iranian Police that 
no German or their agents in Iran should be interfered 
with; (c) All British and Allied nationals must leave 
Tihrän prior to its being declared an open town. 
59 
Gäspäriyän also recounted how Mayr told him of how 
Qavam instructed Kazimi to keep in touch with Mayr through 
Naubakht. Mayr again mentioned the suggestion of Tihrän 
becoming an open town, and also spoke of Naubakht's plans 
for installing Näsir Khan on the throne instead of the Sh3h. 
60 
Finally, when Mayr was captured there were found in his 
possession notes in his own handwriting for a report on the 
political situation in Iran which it was his intention to 
transmit to Berlin. He had written among other things: 
59. Ibid. It must be mentioned that the question of 
making Tihran an open town was actually raised in 
1942 by the Government. 
60. Ibid. 
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"Two combinations have been formed 
in Isfahän; one against the tribes 
which comprises the Court, Parliament 
and well-known servants of the British 
... on the other side is the Freedom 
Front of the Melliun controlled by me. 
It has the nation behind it and 
affinities with a great part of the 
forces ranged against the Court under 
Qavam-es-Sultaneh with their great 
press influence". 61 
With the eradication of the pro-Axis organisations 
and elements from Iran's political scene, and the change 
of fortunes against Germany in the war, Iran had to adopt 
a somewhat new foreign policy, this time, to ensure her 
place in the Allied camp. Thus, on September 9,1943, she 
declared war on Germany by a Farman(royal decree) of the 
Shah, and on the same day the Majlis approved the decree 
by a vote of 73 to ß+. 
6z 
This new rapprochement with the 
Allies was not brought about as suddenly as it might 
appear. Its initiation went back so far as late December 
1942 when Iran expressed her desire to adhere to the United 
Nations Declaration of January 1,1942. 
However, after recalling Iran's policy of neutrality, 
Suhaili, for the first time, publicly admitted German 
activities in Iran, and at the same time denounced them 
as being against the interests of the country. Then 
'Ali 
Dashti attacked Riza Shah's policy of neutrality, and 
61. Ibid. 
62. Iran, 18 Shahrivar 1322(Sept. 10,19Z3). 
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suggested what foreign policy Iran should adopt. He said: 
"One of the unfinished works of the 
past was_this policy of neutrality 
.... bidun-i rüdar bayisti bayad 
Iýtiraf kard (Frankly, it must be 
confessed) that we are a nation 
who have two big neighbours. 
Until the time when these two 
neighbours were not allied, the 
adoption of neutrality had been 
in our interests. But when these 
two became allied, neutrality 
would then be nonsense". 63 




Foreign Interference in the Fourteenth Mailis Elections 
I 
As noted in Chapter Five, by the end of 1942, and 
particularly after the bread riots of December, the Shäh's 
relations with Qaväm had deteriorated from bad to worse. 
The Shäh was determined to direct and control the army, 
and interpret literally the constitutional principle that 
he was the'Commander-in Chief of his forces. The Prime 
Minister, on the other hand, was endeavouring to assert 
and establish the principle of ministerial responsibility 
for all Ministries, especially the Ministry of War, and 
he had not long previously asked for full powers from the 
Majlis in order to assume personal responsibility to deal 
with the current affairs of the country. That request, 
however, provoked strong opposition from both the Majlis 
and the Court and it was not followed up. It was obvious 
that such political manoeuvring for power would only 
cause greater inefficiency and slowness in the administrative 
machine. And it did indeed. Throughout this time the 
Allies' representatives supported Qaväm, and Bullard 
endeavoured to effect a reconcilliation between the Shah 
1 
and Qaväm. 
Bullard to Eden, Confidential. No. 80. Feb. 25,19k3. 
E 1775/38/3+, FO 371/35070 
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It was in the middle of January 19+3 that a 
reconciliation seemed to have taken place. Qaväm 
introduced new members of his Cabinet to the Majlis on 
February 21: Javad`Ämiri at the Ministry of Justice 
(instead of the Interior); Farajulläh Bahrami at the Ministry of 
the Interior; TNuhsin Rä is at the Ministry of Posts and 
Telegraphs; 'Ali Mu'tamidi at the Ministry of Roads and 
communications; and Nasrulläh Intim at the Ministry of Health. 
Qaväm also announced that Allähayär Sälih, the economic 
adviser to the Iranian Legation in Washington, would 
become Minister of Finance on his return from the United 
States. His appointment was believed to be due to the 
suggestion of Dr. Millspaugh. At the same time the Prime 
Minister tabled a Bill for the establishment of a new 
Ministry of Labour and National Economy. This Ministry 
was to co-ordinate all the welfare of the working and 
peasant classes, to find work for the unemployed, and to 
initiate measures to prevent a rise in the cost of living. 
It was probable that its formation had been suggested, 
if not urged, by' the Shah, who had become aware of the 
miserable plight of the lower classes and had been 
preaching reform from above as the only alternative to 
revolution from below. The Shäh and many others feared 
that the influence of Soviet ideals, which were commanding 
increasing respect and attention, might, however little 
communism might appeal, incite the lower classes to abandon 
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their long-suffering patience. 
2 
Conditions arising from the 
war had greatly widened the gap between the rich and the 
poor. On the one hand, fortunes were being amassed by 
contractors, landowners, and hoarders, on the other, 
scarcity and ever-rising prices increased the discontent 
of the many. 
The Minister designated for this new Ministry, 
Dr. Musharaf Nafisi, was the Minister of Finance in 
Furüpzhi's Cabinet, and it was known that he was well 
thought of by the Shah, who had probably nominated him 
for the post. The Majlis did not receive this announcement 
with enthusiasm and Qaväm was well advised not to put the 
new Cabinet to the vote. The Deputies showed surprising 
opposition to Dr. NafIsI and the new Ministry which had not 
come into existence. Of the new Ministers three, Ra is, 
Mu 'tamidi and Intizäm, were regarded as the Shäh's nominees, 
and were in consequence looked at with suspicion by many 
members of the Majlis. 
3 
The new Cabinet was received generally without enthusiasm 
or criticism, while the Majlis Deputies shawe1 their usual 
obstructiveness-some suspicion of the new ministers, others 
disappointed that none of the Deputies had been appointed 
to ministerial rank. 
4 
Meanwhile, a sudden vicissitude of 
Qavam's fortune was marked by a Majlis vote of confidence 
2. Military Attache's Intelligence Summary (Herafter cited 
as MAIS), Secret, No. 4. Jan. 21-26,1943. E 864/110/34, 
FO 371/35129. 
3. Ibid. 
4. Bullard to Eden, No. 80, op. cit. 
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on February 7. This somewhat surprising result was 
secured partly by Qaväm's acceptance of the Bill for the 
head of the Bank Milli to be chosen by the Majlis, 
5 
and 
partly by political manipulation and promises of favours 
to the Deputies. Qaväm was always tended to regard success 
in political manoeuvre as more important than good 
administration; on the other hand, since he was opposed 
by the Shah and had little support from the people and 
press, it was natural that he should try to win over the 
Majlis. In doing so, Qaväm introduced a Bill designed 
to abrogate the law of the 22nd Tir, 1306, that no Deputy 
could be appointed a Minister without resigning and waiting 
for three months, but that attempts to buy over the Majlis 
merely succeeded in raising acute jealousy between rival 
Deputies who longed for a ministerial post, and the Bill 
was soon referred to a commission and shelved. 
On February 4, the Majlis endeavoured by a snatch-vote 
to make the appointment of Governor of the Bank Milli 
dependent on the vote of the Majlis, the effect of which 
would be to remove from the post Abul Hasan Ibtihaj, 
although very nationalistic, was behLved to be well 
disposed to the British Legation, the action of the 
Majlis was to some extent an attack on the British, 
as well as on Qaväm . See Bullard to Fo, Feb. 6,1943" 
E 763/38/34, FO 371/35o68 
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The immediate outcome of the vote of confidence was 
the resignation of Bahrämi (Dabir A 
zam), the rebellious 
Minister of the Interior, who had caused a fresh crisis 
between the Shah and Qaväm, and refused to resign when 
called upon to do so by the Prime Minister. 
6 
On February 10, Qaväm made a long speech in the Najlis, 
which amounted to an emphatic assertion of the Prime 
Minister's duty of administering the affairs of the 
country without interference by the Shäh. He stated in 
the course of his speech that the laws passed during Rizä 
Shah's regime had not been in accordance with the spirit 
6. On February 2, Bahrämi had taken two of the new American 
advisers to an audience with the Shah. On coming out of 
the room, he found Qaväm waiting for him in a furious 
temper. The Prime Minister reproved him sharply for 
going direct to the Shah without informing his chief, 
and told the Minister that he should resign.:. Bahrämr 
replied very impertinently, saying he would not resign: 
it was for Qavam to resign. Qavam then went to the Shah 
and offered to resign if Bahrami did not, but the 
Shah 
refused to accept the resignation of either. The net 
result was further coolness between the Court and the 
Prime Minister. Then Qavam called upon his Ministers 
to resign and ten of them did so. For some days there 
was much intrigue among the Deputies of the Majlis by 
both Qaväm and Court circles, but in spite of the 
hostility generally felt by the Deputies towards Qaväm 
who had closed the Majlis after the bread riots of 
December (it reconvened December 20), they eventually 
opted for Qavam and gave him the vote of confidence. 
To mediate between the Shah and Qaväm over this dispute, 
both Bullard and Smirnov separately saw the Shah. Then 
Bullard reported: 
"The Shah declared that he disliked dictatorship in 
principle and had no desire to interfere, but I am 
afraid that 
giving detailed orders which he now follows 
in the army might easily extend to other departments". 
See Bullard to FO, Feb. 6,1943. E 763/38/3Z, FO 371/35068. 
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of democracy and that the next Legislature might do well to 
revise even the constitution. His speech had little effect 
on the Deputies while the Shah had been alarmed by the 
reference to a revision of the Constitution. Then Qaväm 
went on with his attempts to complete his Cabinet, which 
currently consisted of only three Ministers. He hoped to 
persuade Suhaili, Hikmat, and Badir to join the Government. 
Bullard, who had met Qaväm on the same day, reported: 
"I have urged that Minister of Agriculture 
and Minister of Commerce (viz: Ahmad `Adl 
and 'Abdul Husain Hazhir) should be 
retained. By constantly consulting 
representative of His Majesty's Legation 
for some months they have acquired 
experience whose loss would be serious 
and they are both well disposed. "7 
They refused Qavä. m's proposal on February 12, and the 
weary Prime Minister attributed their refusal to Court 
Intrigues. 
8 
But it seems more likely that they thought 
a Qavä. m Cabinet could not survive long and withdrew for 
that reason. In the meantime, the Russian Ambassador was 
so anxious to keep Qaväm in power, that he sent a message 
to Tadayyun to the effect that the Soviet Government no 
longer had any objection to his joining the Government. 9 
On February 13, the Majlis Deputies sent one of their 
colleagues named Iftibär to inform Qaväm that he no longer 
7. Bullard to FO, Feb. 10, 1943. E 844/38/34, *FO 371/35068 
8, Bullard to FO, Feb. 13, 1943. E 888/38/34, Ibid. 
9. Bullard to Eden, No. 80. ocit. 
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had any majority in the Majlis, and he resigned and retired 
to his estates at Lähijän. Presumably not knowing about 
Qavä. rn's relations with the Axis. Bullard could, still in 
early 1943, write about him as this: ".... he was the first 
Prime, Minister to come out definitely on the side of the 
Allies". 
10 
Abrahamian argues that Britain and the United States 
opted for the Shah because the rivalry between Qaväm and the 
Shah would divert the Allies' "meagre military resources 
from the vital responsibility of transporting war materials 
to the thankless task of preserving law and order". 
11 
He continues to imply that the army was behind the Shah and 
both the British and Americans were aware of this, and the 
War Department in Washington had, therefore, instructed the 
American military advisers in Tihrän to lend US support to 
the Shah against Qavam. 
12 
This argument could partly be 
acceptable in that in the end Qaväm found himself with 
practically no active supporter except the Soviet Ambassador, 
but his downfall was not only because of the withdrawal of 
British and American support as Abrahamian implies. He 
overlooks the role of the Majlis and Court intrigues, about 
which the British Military Attache wrote: 
j LO. Ibid. 
ll. E. Abraharnian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, p. 183. 
12. Ibid. Also see Vail Motter, The Persian Corridor and 
Aid to Russia, pp. 162,436,471 
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"His legitimate intention to establish 
Cabinet control over the army brought 
him into conflict with the Shah and 
the Chief of the General Staff q and 
they and other interested persons, 
made play with the irresponsible 
obstructiveness of a venal Majlis to 
undermine his position"-13 
Besides, the Army was not altogether behind the Shah. 
For instance, the dispute between Razm'Ara, who represented 
younger officers and was the Chief of the General Staff at 
the time, and General Ahmadl, the Minister for War, highlighted 
the division within the army. While the latter represented 
the views of the Cabinet and insisted that the authority 
of his Ministry should be established over the Chief of the 
General Staff, the former executed the Shah's orders without 
consulting the Minister. Moreover, the Shah considered the 
co-operation between these two authorities as a threat to 
himself. In fact, as Bullard pointed out: 
"It is unfortunate that the Shah has only 
one conception of the way to run an army 
viz, to appoint intriguers to all posts 
so that they may counter-balance each 
other" . lt 
It must also be pointed out that the British or Americans 
did not support the Shah for the mere fact that he was 
ambitious to create a larger army, and probably to run the 
13" FO S, secret, No. 7, Feb. 10-16,1943. E 1533/110/34, 
14. Bullard to FO, Oct. 26,1943. E 6515/38/34, FO 371/35075" 
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country by himself through the Army. They did their best not 
to give him encouragement on this score. For instance, when 
in 1942, the Shah talked to Bullard about the creation of 
a bigger army and a sense of patriotism among his people, 
Bullard somewhat unfairly commented: 
"We may sympathise with the Shah in his 
hopeless search for signs of nobility 
of character in the Persians but his 
big-army policy is inconvenient 
attitude since it tends to prevent 
or delay the non-belligerent co- 
operation that is useful to us". l5 
There again, when Qaväm resigned the Shah suggested 
that Särid should be appointed to the post. He was an honest 
man with a good record of co-operation with the Allies, but 
Bullard did not approve this suggestion: 
"The objection to Shed from our point 
of view is his weakness. If he were 
Prime Minister, the country would 
probably be run in fact by the Shah 
and the Chief of the General Staff". 16 
Qaväm's successor was to be his predecessor, Suhaill 
who had been forced to resign some seven months before, after 
a short tenure of office during which he established an 
impressive record of ineptitude and corruption. He was 
selected by the Majlis by a considerable majority over 
other candidates: 
17 
15" Bullard to FO, Most secret, Sept. 29,1942. E 5785/G, 
FO 371/31385. 
16. Bullard to FO, No. 168, Feb. 14,1943. E 891/38/34, 
FO 371/35069. 
17" Kaihan, 25 Bahman, 1321(Feb. 14,1943). The Shah had informed 
the Majlis that he would have preferred SZCid as Prime 
Minister, and asked them to think it over, but this had 
no effect. On February 15, Suhaili formed his Cabinet and 
introduced it to the Majlis two days later as this: 
Continued.... 
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PM and Minister of the Interior 








Commerce and Industry 
Roads and Communications 
War 
Education(Resigned in August) 
Posts and Telegraphs (PT)_ 
Finance(Omitted later, Dayat 
took over 
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Suhaili 72 votes 
Sä 'id 18 
Tadayyun 8 
Qaväm 2 
Ahi 1 " 
_ Bahrami 1 
Dr. Musaddiq 1 " 
Blank vote 6 
The reason for the Deputies'choice was obvious. While 
in office Suhaili tried to buy them off by jobs and promises, 
and in any case he was amenable to influence whereas S91id 
was without ambition and sensible enough not to submit to 
blackmail. The Allies' representatives, though not impressed 
by the choice, did not object to his appointment. Dullard 
was convinced that Suhaill would co-operate with the Allies 
not from conviction but because they were going to win the 
war. It was the Soviet support of Suhaill which caused 
suspicions in some quarters that it was the policy of the 
Russians to produce disintegration and that for this purpose 
they found Suhaill an admirable Prime Minister. If that 
was their policy they had good cause for satisfaction. On 
the other hand, there was no need to look for anything so 
Machiavellian; the fact was that the autocratic methods of 
the previous years had discouraged the entry of capable and 
honest young men in administrative and political life, and it 
desperately needed a good few years before new men were 
trained to fill the vacuum which had been created. 
The programme of Suhai1 's Government on domestic 
problems was to deal with the supply of food, stabilisation 
of prices, improvement of the welfare of peasants; workers 
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and the Government employees. In fact the problems of food, 
prices and welfare of the lower classes were what the Allies, 
particularly the British, were believed to have caused by 
their occupation of the country. The anti-British feeling, 
as distinct from pro-Axis or anti-Ally, was much in evidence 
in 1943- For instance, in addition to famine conditions, 
a shortage of kerosene oil for some days had affected a large 
number of the poor of Tihrän and had aroused much bitterness 
against the AIOC and against the British, who were believed 
to control the means of transport. That the Iranians had 
to go short of their own oil was a useful and effective 
theme for propaganda. 
18 
The resulting increased unpopularity 
of the British among the lower classes was a matter of some 
concern to the Iranian Government and the Court, who were 
seeing in closer collaboration with the British the only 
defence against the spread of Russian influence. 
19 
They, too, 
probably blamed the British for failing to remedy, if not 
for having brought about, the hardships, which were driving 
the people towards revolution. Probably, for this reason, 
Suhaill inserted eye-catching phrases such as "welfare of 
peasants and workers" in his Government's programme. Did 
Suhaili fulfill this programme? Certainly not, but the impact 
18. Iran, "Ni ähi bi MatbüIrät", 18 Farvardin, 1322(April 
18,1943). 
19. MAIS, secret, No. 9, Feb 24-March 2,1943. E 1395/110/34 
FO 371/35129. 
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of' those problems was reflected in his foreign policy. What he 
did in fact on domestic affairs was to strengthen his relations 
with the religious establishment. After Hilanat's resignation . 
from the Ministry of Justice, the post was filled by the 
elderly Sayyid Muhsin Sadr (Sadr-al-Ashräf), an ex-mülla and 
shari'a judge, who looked much better in the turban, which 
he had worn for most of his life, than in a Pahlavi hat. 
20 
The Shäh and Suhaill were reported to have developed 
negotiations with mujtahids of Kerbela and Naja, f, and one of them 
Haji Aqa Husain Qurni made a pilgrimage from Najaf, where he 
had been living throughout Rizä. Shah's reign, to Mashhad 
in June 1943. After his return to Tihrä. n, Qum! made some 
demands, which were in fact the demands of the religious 
class in Iran as these: freedom for women to wear the veil, 
segregation of the sexes in schools, the restoration of the 
waqf funds to their original administrators, and political 
pressure on Ibn Saud with a view to securing his consent to 
the repair of certain tombs in Medina. The Suhaill 
Government replied to Qum! in a cabinet decree in which 
they stated that the police would no longer molest women in 
the matter of veil, and that mixed schools for boys and girls 
would be abolished, and gave him some satisfaction on other 
points as well. Later on, divinity classes were also 
introduced into the state school curriculum. 
21 
20. See Personalities, Appendix One, P. 526. 
21. Bullard to Eden, Confidential, Sept. 15,19L3 
E 5658/239/34, FO 371/35117 
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The main pretext for this movement for a return to religion 
seemed to be that it was necessary to counteract communist 
propaganda and the godless influence, which was threatening 
the country from the north. If this was the object of the 
Government and the Shäh, it failed to achieve that aim. 
Perhaps, Bullard saw the imprudence of this policy at the 
time when he wrote: 
"It remains to be seen whether the 
disadvantages of a reactionary return 
to political jobbery by venal mullahs 
will not outweigh the advantages of 
an anti-Bolshevik drive with the slogan 
'Back to Islam' ". 22 
In pursuit of the original pattern of Iran's foreign 
policy, Suhaill offered to go to the United States to negotiate 
a commercial treaty, and offered to negotiate for granting 
an oil concession to American companies. This 'new' dimension 
in Iran's policy was not seperate from both internal and 
external strife. The object was to find a 'third power' that 
would counter-balance, on one hand, the influence of 
communism which Britain was perhaps no longer able to do, and 
on the other, to counter-poise the pressure put on Iran by 
both Britain and the Soviet Union. 
While in office Suhaili was confronted with two 
controversial problems; 
(a) the return of Sayyid Z3ya-al-Din 
Tabätabaai, and (b) the elections of the Fourteenth Najlis, 
both of which were not completely free from foreign influence 
and interference. 
22. Bullard to Eden, confidential, No. 271. June 29,1943, 
E 3868/239/3k, Fo 371/35117 
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II 
1. The Return of Sayyid Ziyä 
In his early career, Sayyid Ziyawas the bomb-maker on 
the committee known as the Jahangir Committee. Then he 
entered into politics and his editorship of the newspaper 
Ra rd gave him an insight into local political affairs. He 
became a member of one of Vusuq-al-Daula's cabinets, and 
at that time tried to help the passage through the Majlis 
of the abortive Anglo-Persian treaty of 1919. When he rose 
to power, however, things had significantly changed: the 
British troops were evacuating the country, and the menace 
of the Bolsheviks was great. He conceived then that Iran's 
hope of survival lay in collaboration with the British. But 
he was forced to work with the northern neighbour, and the 
strictures passed on his'actions by Lord Curzon were unfair. 
Curzon could not forgive him fOr negotiating the treaty of 
1921 with Russia, nor with accepting the first Bolshevik envoy, 
Rothstein. But all these measures were taken, having Iran's 
interests in view. Nor could Curzon ever forget that the 
Sayyid had not carried out the 1919 treaty, though Norman 
and other local advisers saw that it was impossible to carry 
on with it. When Sayyid Ziyý embarked on taking steps to combat 
oppression and corruption, the Foreign Office seemed more 
concerned with interceding for the release of Prince Firüz 
(Nusrat-al-Daula) who was reputed corrupt than with helping 
299 
him with a constructive policy. 
23 After the advent of Rizä 
I{han, the Sayyid was forced to leave the country, and after 
spending some years in Europe, he settled down in Palestine. 
It was in the early days of August 1941, before the 
occupation of Iran, that the British Government seemed to 
have taken initiatives to establish contacts with the 
Sayyid. The Foreign Office reported: 
"Havard saw Sayid Zia on 9th August 
at his farm near Gaza. He gathered 
during a lengthy conversation that 
Sayid if called upon to return 
to Persia as Prime Minister to 
work for his'country would reluctantly 
give up his farm and go provided that 
he was assured of success. Sayid Zia 
is convinced that success could only 
, 
be achieved if the Shah would agree 
at once to employ British or American 
advisers especially in Finance and 
Security Departments with the necessary 
powers for himself and wholehearted 
backing of the Shah". 24 
The chaotic situation and collapse of the administration 
which resulted from the occupation, and the ever increasing 
demands of the occupying forces were to induce in Iranian 
statesmen a reluctance to accept or remain in office. Sensing 
this Bullard asked the Foreign Office in early September 1941 
to find out whether the Sayyid would be likely to be of use 
if he was urged to return. But Bullard also emphasized: 
"'It would in the meantime be necessary not to hold out any 
hopes to him". 
25 
239 Brit. Legation to FO, (Notes on Sayyid Zia Tabata'i), secret, 
Oct. 6,1942. E 6197/G, FO 371131400. Also see Personalities, 
Appendix One. An account of Ziya'sactivities before the 
_ Coup was unfavourably given by All Dashti, "Aga-yi Sa id Zia- 
al-Din Mudiri Ral0d", the Shafaq-i Surkh, Nos 137 & 138 1302 1924) 
24. High Comrnissioner, Palestine(Sir H, MacMichael)to SOS for the 
Colonies (to FO), Most secret, Sept. 8,1941. E 5508, FO 371/27213. 
25. Bullard to FO, secret, Sept. 4,1941. E 5350, FO 371/27213. 
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When some degree of stability however-prevailed with the 
premiership of Furughi, and due to the fact that there was 
no demand for Sayyid Ziyä in those days, Bullard,, repeatedly, 
warned the Foreign Office of the undesirability of returning 
the Sayyid to Iran. This did not mean that either the British 
Legation in Tihrän or the Foreign Office put aside the 
question for ever, they left it dormant for some months. 
In July 1942, when the Suhaill Government was on the verge 
of collapse, the Legation once again reconsidered the Sayyid 
as a possible successor to Suhaill, but this time it was 
the Foreign Office which did not receive the suggestion 
with great enthusiasm: 
".... of the possible successors mentioned 
by NLr. Holman, Zia-ed-Din Tabatabai is, 
I imagined, ruled out because both the 
Shah and the Soviet Ambassador are 
opposed to his return to power (E 2887). 
There is also no reason to suppose that 
he wishes to return to Persia.... 
For the present there seems no need 
for us to decide who would be the most 
suitable successor to Soheily". 26 
The Shah's opposition to the return of the Sayyid stemmed 
from the fear that he might try to take his revenge on the 
Shah, whose father had forced him to exile. The Russians 
opposed the Sayyid because they regarded him as a British 
tool. 
26. Minute by Pink (F0) on Holman, July 9,1942. 
E 4095/14/34, FO 371/31385. 
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In early Autumn of 1942 the Germans seemed to be 
approaching the Caucasus, German agents were still active 
in Iran, and Qavam appeared to be difficult to handle. 
Therefore, the Foreign Office agreed to Bullard's suggestion 
of sending Mr. Trott, the Oriental Secretary of the Legation, 
to-Palestine to ascertain the Sayyid's views on his return 
to Iran. Mr. Trott met the Sayyid in Gaza on September 24, 
1942. Bullard wrote to the Foreign Office: 
"I think that you will agree with me that 
this interview has served a most useful 
purpose, in that it has helped to clear 
our minds as to the desirability of making 
use of SEYYID ZIA TABATABAI. 
if the occasion arises. As far as I can 
see, he may prove a satisfactory candidate 
as Prime Minister, we cannot proceed any 
further in the matter of his return unless 
or until Qavam-es-Saltaneh is unable to 
continue to our satisfaction". 27 
During the interview the Sayyid had stated that he could 
not go back to Iran as less than Prime Minister, as he was 
sure that he would not be able to work under another chief. 
He was aware of the Russian hostility towards him, but it 
did not worry him. As for the Shah, he had never met him but 
he would work with him if necessary. The Sayyid seemed very 
concerned about the German approach to the Caucasus. Ile 
thought that some good could be done by guerillas, and it 
might be possible for him to arrange a system of guerillas 
by means of a directing committee working outside the country. 




"I then told him of my own experience 
with the levies which we raised in the 
Khalkhal district in the last war: 
how they had all run away directly the 
Turks began to attack theme SEYYID ZIA' 
laughed and said that I was right about 
levies: but he would propose to work 
through villagers, and with the help 
of the Armenians, with whom he had 
worked a great deal in the past. Persons" 
like Dr. Aghayan were of little use: 
the Dashnak-Sakantz party were the only 
ones who would help, and he thought he 
could do a great deal through 'X "'. 28 
Trott concluded as this: 
".... that SEYYID ZIA was still a patriotic 
Persian, anxious to serve his country: 
and also firmly attached to the idea that 
his country must work with the British 
in every possible way". 29 
In actual fact the Sayyid was never regarded as patriotic 
by his fellow Iranians. His advocacy of the abortive treaty 
of 1919 has discredited him in the eyes of the Iranians. If 
there appeared to be some degree of support for his return, 
it was only due to desperation and a belief that any change 
must be for better. 
28. Trott's"interview with Sayyid Zia. Ibid, ' p. 183. 
Sayyid Ziya's relations with the Dashnaks goes back to 
the years before the Coup of 1921. They had organized 
a secret committee called the 'Kurvita-yi Ahan', in 
Tihran, which later played a role in the Coup. The 'X' 
has not been identified in the document but it is 
presumably referring to'Prince Muzaffar'Firüz 
29. Ibid. p. 181+ 
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In January 1943, the Igdäm published an article, giving 
30 
the account of Prince Muzaffar Firuz's interview with the . 
Sayyid in Palestine. The interview was a blatant piece of 
electioneering, and it fell flat. Public opinion regarded 
it as an obvious attempt to win over the Russians, the Majlis, 
and-the Shah. 
31 
The public held the British responsible for 
the interview, whereas in actual fact, the Iranian Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs had requested the British Legation for a 
diplomatic visa for F3rüz for Palestine. The Court tried to 
persuade the Legation to cancel his visa, but the Legation 
hinted to the Shah's emissary that his interference was 
illegitimate. Then the Court put pressure on the Ministry 
to ask the Legation to cancel the visa but by that time Firüz 
had left the country. 
32 
The article did not, however, evoke much popular 
enthusiasm, but a campaign in favour of Sayyid Ziyä's return 
began to gain momentum from the middle of February, no doubt, 
aided by a group of prominent persons such as Muzaffar Firjz, 
30. Nuzaffar Firuz is the son of Prince Nusrat-al-Daula, 
who was killed by Riza Shah's police, the nephew of 
Dr. Musaddiq, and the editor of the Iqdam. Later on, 
he ceased his relations with the Sayyid, and joined 
to the latter's opponents, and became the Parliamentary 
Secretary in Qavam's cabinet, 1945-6. He hascurrently 
organized a movement based in Paris for the restoration 
of the Qäjars. 
31. Iqdam, 8 Bahman 1321 (Jan. 28,19+3)" In the interview 
the Sayyid made a strong effort to conciliate the Russians: 
"... the language, ideology, and character of Lenin and 
leaders of the Russian Revolution were not Iranian, but 
what they gave and did for Iran had not been done by no 
Iranian king or leader; no Iranian Minister, no Majlis 
Deputy, and no writer"., 
32. Bullard to Eden, Feb. l, 1943. E 969, FO 371/35069. 
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Pür Rizä (FIrüz's family lawyer), Nigabat, "Ala, Ibtihäj, 
and some Majlis Deputies. At the same time opposition to 
his return was growing among people like General Ahmadl, 
a number of Majlis Deputies, the American Legation, and the 
Russian Embassy. The Americans opposed the Sayyid because 
of his attacks on them in his paper, the Ra'd, in the past. 
They too regarded him as a British tool. 
33 
Besides, the 
American policy, in contrast with the British, was to lend 
support to educated 'honest young men, so they claimed. The 
Russians, not flattered by the article, strongly objected 
the Sayyid because of his alleged reactionary tendencies, 
his reputation as a British tool, and his connection with 
the Coup. Their sentiment and opposition were reflected in the 
Tüda Party organ, the Rahbar, which came out strongly against 
the Sayyid. Other papers also attacked the Sayyid. The 
Mihr-i Irän, which had previously published series of articles 
entitled, "Mugadamat-i Küditä-yi 1299", by Husain Makki, 
34 
the historian and veteran of the oil nationalization era, the 
whole purpose of which was to imply that Sayyid Ziya had been 
too obsequious to the British, now renewed its attacks. 
Meanwhile, the position taken by the British Legation was that 
it was for the Iranians to bring him back if they wanted. 
35 
33" SOS(Hull) to the Minister in Iran (Dreyfqs), Feb. 11,19Z3 
US. R. R., vol. IV, 1943-P-330- 
34. Mihr-i Iran, 17-20 bahr, 1321 (Oct. 9-12 , 1942). 
35" Bullard to FO, No. 168, Feb. 14,1943. E 891/38/34, 
FO 371/35069 
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In practice, the Legation seemed to be rather flexible with 
regard to their position. In March, some Majlis Deputies 
and "certain elements" were given transit visas to Palestine, 
probably with the view of encouraging them to get in touch 
with the Sayyid. But Bullard discounted such an intention: 
"It would of course be highly undesirable 
for this Legation to be involved in any 
way in this affair and thus lay itself 
open to the possibility of accusation 
of intrigue by the Prime Minister. 
At the same time it is most important 
not to alienate the sympathies of Zia 
if there is likelihood of his return 
to office. I am therefore adopting 
non-commital attitude but at the 
same time keeping a close watch on 
developments". 36 
The campaign in favour of the return of Sayyid Zita was 
accompanied by a manifesto circulated in Tihrän on June 14+. 
This manifesto had been arranged by an elderly Deputy, Sayyid 
Käzim Yazd!, of the Hizb-i Vatan (the Fatherland Party), 
which comprised some of the advocates of the Sayyid. The 
manifesto claimed that at the invitation of the Vatan Party 
a conference of parties had been held at a place outside the 
town on June 9,1943, and representatives of the following 
parties attended: Vatan, Taragikhahän va Kishävarz an 
(Progressives and Cultivators), Dingänän(Peasants), Vahdat 
. 
(Union) Ranjbaran (Toilers), Igtisäd-i Azad (Free Economy), 
36. Bullard to F0, No. 380, April 13,1913. E 1949/38/34, 
FO 371/35070" 
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Ittihädia-yi Pishavarän-i Iran (Union of Artisans of Iran), 
Jam'iyat-i Ra"d (Thunder Society), representatives of the 
Armenians, the Zoroastrians, and the Student's Council. 
Apart from the Vatan Party, the other groups were either 
unknown or of very little importance. The manifesto, 
however, stated that these groups had decided to telegraph 
to Ziya that he ought to assume the direction of the affairs 
of Iran, and to publish a programme. Because they believed 
that the only person possessing the necessary qualifications 
was the Sayyid. 
37 
In August, Sayyid Ziya informed his friends in Iran that 
he was shortly returning to Iran. Having received the nexus 
of his return, the American Minister reported: 
"British Minister confirms this fact but 
denies any British comlicity therein. 
To prove this point, he states that he 
has refused to assist Taba tabai to 
obtain seat in plane from Palestine". 
Dreyfus then concluded: 
- "Notwithstanding this denial I have 
every reason to believe British have 
at least encouraged him,... Since both 
Shah and Russian Ambassador have told 
me they are very much opposed to 
Tabatabai, our wisest course for 
the moment may be to permit them to 
offer any resistance they desire 
and ourselves await developments". 38 
37" For English translation of the manifesto see Bullard 
to FO, June 18,1943. E 3793/38/34, FO 371/35873. 
38. Dreyfus to SOS, Aug. 8,1943. US. F. R., vol. IV, 1943, p. 374. 
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From the middle of August, the campaign against the 
Sayyid was increasingly intensified. The Tüda press directed 
their bitter attacks against him. The Shah went so far as 
to meet one of the leaders of the Tüda Party and his old 
foe, Qavam3?, against whom the Shäh had only recently made 
violent accusations to Dreyfus, declaring that QavRm was 
maintaining a "gang of cut-throats" and was "only awaiting 
the return of the Soviet Ambassador to execute some unfriendly, 
but desperate design". 
4o 
These meetings were reported to 
have been held to seek Russian support for the Shah as the 
Party and Qavam were both supposed to enjoy Russian blessing. 
Sayyid Zßä arrived in Tihrän on October 1,1943, after 
an absence of over twenty years. His reception, as Professor 
Elwell-Sutton pointed out., was mixed. "Some groups welcomed 
him with almost Messianic fervour; others, including the 
Tudeh Party, were equally violent in attacking him as fascist 
and a reactionary. ' 
41 
Meanwhile, Suhaili saw in the conflict 
between the two parties a hope of maintaining his position, 
and in order to embitter the struggle he ordered the release 
of three Soviet-supported papers which could be relied upon 
to attack the Sayyid. 
39, MAIS, secret, No. 36, Aug. 31-Sept. 6,1943. E 5577/110/34, 
FO 371/35130- 
40. Bullard to FO, No. 842, July 31,1943. E 4484/38/34, 
FO 371/35073- 
41. L. P. Elwell-Sutton, "Political Parties in Iran", p. 51. 
308 
The popular belief was, however, that the British were 
responsible for his return. At any rate, they were going to 
be blamed for it, regardless of whether his return was under 
British auspices or due to his own decision. Perhaps, at 
some point, it could be said that the Sayyid could have best 
served British interests by remaining in Palestine. 
Having returned, Sayyid Zryä appeared to have realized 
that the time was not opportune to bid for premiership, as 
its outcome would-have been a more open and intensified 
struggle for ascendancy by the Russians in Iran. He therefore 
opted for Parliament, whose elections were partly in progress. 
III 
II. The Fourteenth Ma, ilis Elections 
Shortly after his succession to premiership, Suhaill 
was faced with the question of the elections for the 
Fourteenth Majlis, which turned to be, to borrow Abrahamian's 
words, "the most prolonged, the most competitive, and the 
most meaningful of all elections in modern Iran". 
42 
Suhaili, had, 
on the durface, a reason to postpone the elections until after 
the war on the grounds that foreign troops were still occupying 
42. Abrahamian, op. cit. p. 186. 
I 
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most parts of the country, and that the elections could hardly 
be carried out without foreign interference in occupied zones. 
This was partly true, but it was also the fear of the Tüda 
Party, which had sobered Suhaili and a group of Majlis 
Deputies, and led them to such reasoning. 
From late 1942, the wealthier classes began to take an 
anxious interest in the Tüda Party behind whose increasing 
activities they professed to see Soviet agents. It was true 
that except for Isfahan which was chiefly a manufacturing 
town, it was in the Russian zone that the party was most active, 
but the published programme of the Tabriz and Qazvin branches, 
which had appeared in early 1943, were not communist but 
highly constitutional, and their specific demands for reform 
were mild in comparison with conditions of the poorer classes. 
There was nothing apparent to justify the accusation that the 
party was directly run by Russia, but the situation was such 
that it afforded a golden opportunity for the Soviet Union to 
exploit the party in the interests of their long term policy 
in Iran. Suhaili did not, however, proceed with the idea of 
postponing the elections, on the grounds that the Soviet 
Eqibassy might object to it. Bullard had, in fact, favoured 
the postponement; his stand had been undoubtedly dictated, 
like Suhaili, by the fear of increase in the Soviet influence 
in Iran, to the detriment of long term British interests. 
When informed of Suhaili's decision, Bullard asked the 
Foreign Office for instructions: 
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"The probability that elections will be 
held this year faces His Majesty's 
Legation with a delicate problem. It 
is natural to suppose that the Soviet 
authorities will use their influence 
in their zone to secure the election 
of candidates more or less subservient 
to their views, and the question 
arises how we can counter-balance 
this by influencing the elections 
ourselves in other parts of Persia without 
giving cause for complaint to our Soviet 
Allies or cause for misunderstanding 
to the Americans". 43. 
The American view was that "democratic processes should 
continue in spite of the fact that interests of privileged 
Iranian classes or of foreign powers" might suffer. 
44 
The Foreign Office maintained a similar view to that of the 
Americans that the elections should be held, but for different 
reasons. The Foreign Office had long been anxious to see the 
Thirteenth Majlis dissolved. Therefore, they would not 
appreciate any arrangement whereby the Deputies could retain 
their seats until the end of the war: 
"We have nothing to hope for from the 
present assembly who have consistently 
done their best to embarrass and blackmail 
us. If they knew that they would not be 
sent packing whatever they did, the 
deputies could surely be relied upon to 
use this opportunity to curry favour 
amongst our enemies by blocking every 
attempt by the Government to cooperate 
with us". 45. 
43. Bullard to Eden, Confidential, No. 139, March 6,1943. 
E 2453/239/34, FO 371/35117- 
44. Dreyfus to SOS, March 20,1943, US. F. R., vol. IV, 1943, 
p. 344. 
45, FO to Bullard, March 15,1943. E 1463/38/34, FO 371/35070. 
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The Foreign Office viewed the forthcoming elections 
not only as harmless but advantageous in that the elections 
could scarcely result in a 'worse' bunch of deputies than 
those of the Thirteenth Majlis. Besides, some deputies from 
the. Tuda Party would not have prejudiced British interests. 
"Indeed from long term point of view", asked the Foreign 
Office, "does not the danger of a violent swing over increase 
the longer the present gang of corrupt and selfish landlords 
remain in control? ". 
46 
And, indeed, some'Tüda deputies in 
the next Majlis might have made the majority, comprised of 
"corrupt and selfish landlords", become more dependent on 
the British'for their protection. 
By further instructions, Bullard was directed to use his 
influence to prevent the election of elements directly 
associated with the Axis. But this should be carefully 
implemented, if it became known, to be defensible. 
4 
So, 
Bullard sent a guidance to British consuls in Iran in June 
as thus: 
"Members of Tuda Party and other groups 
of the left, provided that they are not 
irresponsible, may in many cases be 
serving the best interest of their country 
and be far preferable to present reactionary 
and obstructive elements in the Majlis and 
it is not in our interest that such 
candidates should be prevented from standing 
at elections simply because they hold left 
views. On the contrary candidates of good 
46, Ibid. 
47. FO to Bullard, No, 267, March 22,1943. E. 1561/38/34, 
FO 371/35070" 
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character with liberal and progressive 
ideas who are likely to promote reforms 
should be encouraged without too close 
attention to electoral programmes which 
in this country are apt to be vague and 
unstable". 48 
As can be seen, British "interference" was, contrary 
to the popular belief, limited to giving encouragement to 
the "best elements" to come forward, and that the object was 
not to favour a pro-British as opposed to pro-Russian 
candidate. Finally Bullard assured the Foreign Office that 
the Legation would endeavour to help to secure a better 
Majlis than the present one, but he remarked: 
.... it would be a mistake to leave you 
with the impression that any of us here are 
optimistic about the usefulness of democratic 
institutions in this country. It seems 
extremely likely that oncethe foreign troops 
have gone, some form of dictatorship, however 
well disguised, will be set up, doubtless 
with the army as a basis". 49 
In short, democratic institutions ask too much of the 
Iranians. 
48. Bullard to British Consuls, Circular No. 7, June 6,1943, 
E 3486/38/34, FO 371/35071. 
49. Bullard to Baxter (FO), secret, June 7,1943. 
E 3492, FO 371/35071. 
313 
IV 
The Royal Rescript announcing the coming elections for 
the Fourteenth M4jlis was duly promulgated on June 23, and 
two months after that the elections were due to commence. 
In Tihrän and to a lesser degree in the provinces canvassing 
had already begun. Over eight hundred candidates were 
competing for 136 seats, and the Shah was reported to be 
creating an organization to ensure the return to Tihran 
of candidates of his choice,, 'and it was alleged that the 
Chief of Staff was spending the leave given to him from 
his military duties in furthering the Shäh's election plans. 
50 
He did not 'appear to have been completely successful in the 
end. Too many antagonistic political forces, the Majlis 
Deputies, the Prime Minister, mullas, all seemed to be 
interesting themselves in the struggle for the elections. 
The picture. of the electoral activity was a confused 
one, and appeared characteristic of an 
after a period of dictatorship. There 
or less insignificant so-called politi, 
any with the organisation, discipline, 
(except the Tnda Party) of a political 
sense. Moreover, some of these parties 
irresponsible reaction 
were a variety of more 
cal parties, but hardly 
and serious aims 
party in the Western 
appeared to be little 
50. MAIS, secret, No. 26, June 22-28,1943. E 3988/110/34, 
PO 371/35129. 
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more than loose associations for the sole purpose of 
supporting a particular candidate, and disappeared when the 
elections finished. There were a limited number of parties 
which seemed to be more than a collection of a few friends 
with some pompous label. The majority of these parties 
did not have clear-cut programmes, or even any programme 
at all; instead, personalities tended to count more than 
programmes. 
A small number of candidates argued for national 
regeneration of the dilapidated society which the majority 
were divided into two broad groups; those commonly known 
as reactionary and those with a tendency to the left. In 
other words, the campaign was between those who had and 
those who had not. Numerous candidates had blossomed freely, 
since the law required no deposit. The parties which seemed 
to be involved, were these: 
Hizb-i Tüda -yi Iran ( The Party of the Masses)51 
51. There is sufficient literature on the Tüda Party 
available in both Persian and English. The following 
works give accounts of the Party's origin, developments, 
structure, and activities: 
G. Lenczowski, The communist Movement in Iran", pp 29-4 
Sepehr Zabih's book under the same title. S. J. V. Courtois, 
"The Tudeh Party", pp 14-22. L. P. Elwell-Sutton' Political 
Parties in Iran", op. cit. A very sympathetic view on the 
party is given by Reza Shashahani, " The Background- of 
of the Iranian Affair", pp. 113-31. A liberal interretation 
of the Party's programme is given by Ahmad Qäsimi , 
Hizb-i Tuda-yi Iran chimiguyad va chi mikhahad? These two 
following articles on Iran's political parties during the 
period 1941-47 also discuss at some length about the 
Tuda Party, see Franciszek Machalski, "Political Parties 
in Iran in the years 1941-46". pp. 135-170, and Giovanni 
D'Erme, "I Partiti. Politici In Persia Dal 1941 Al 1944". 
pp. 213-235. 
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was reported to have, on the eve of the Elections, eight 
thousand members in Tihrän, of whom some twenty to twenty- 
five were active party workers, and a total nominal roll 
of 60-65000 was claimed for the whole country. In Tabri-z, 
Rizä)iya, Ardabil, Qazvln, Chälits, Shahi, Mashhad, and 
Isfahan, the party had a few thousanlsympathizers in each 
town, with four to seven active party organisers. Small 
cells (Huza) existed in Yazd and Shiraz. In Isfahan the 
party had organised a Worker's Union (Shurä. -yi Markazi-yi 
Ittihädia-yi Kärgarän-i Isfahan) under the leadership of 
Fidäkär who was later elected to the Majlis with the help 
of Sarim-al-Daula, the most influential man in Isfahan 
upon Bullard's recommendation. 
52 
The Isfahan Worker's 
Union had a rival in Tihrän and the north, called the Union 
of the Workers of Iran 
(Ittihädia-yi Kärgarän-i Iran), 
whose organ was the paper Giti. A noticeable feature, however, 
of the Party Organisation was that its leaders included 
intellectuals, among whom DoctorsBahrämi, a physician educated 
from Berlin University, and Yazdi, a professor and physician 
educated from the same university, previously active in 
the Jangali movement, were prominent. Several of its 
candidates had suffered imprisonment during Rizä Shah's reign 
for their convictions. The party had sponsored thirty-nine 
52. Bullard to Baxter, June 7,1943. op. cit. 
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candidates for the Majlis elections, but only eight found 
their way through. In Tabriz the Party leader was `Ali 
Amirkhlzi and the group had the support of Muhammad 'All 
Akhbari, the editor of the paper Kirdär va Guftär, which 
had been ceased to appear for the lack of funds. 
Hizb-i Millat (The Nation Party)was of liberal complexion. 
It was reported to have about two to three hundred members, 
mostly older men, under the leadership of Sayyid Muhammad 
Tabataba'i, who was elected from Tihrän with the second 
highest poll to Dr. Musaddiq. . 
Hizb-i Hamrahan (The Comrade Party) was comprised of a 
group of younger intelligentia under the leadership of Mustafa 
Fatih; an employee of the AIOC. Fatih was more of a theorist 
than a practical man. His British connection had given rise 
to a popular belief that he enjoyed British support. After 
leaving the co-editorship of the paper Mardum with the Tüda 
Party in a short-lived front called Anti-Fascists society, 
Fätih founded his own paper Imrüz va Fardä. The party had 
a small membership. Fätih attempted 
to organise a popular 
front composed of the Tuda Party his own party, and the Millat 
party. Although the Hamrähän and 
Millat parties were ready to 
co-operate fully, the only agreeement reached with 
the Tüda 
was that they would not oppose each other's candidates. The 
Soviet Embassy were opposed to the Hamrähän, though whether 
this was because Mustafa Fatih was regarded as pro-British, 
or because he was an arm-chair socialist, 
is not known. After 
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the conclusion of the elections, a number of party members 
led by Shahidzada left the Party and set up a new socialist 
party called Hizb-i Susiyälist-i Iran, with the Imrüz va 
Fardä as its organ. Fatih therefore started a new paper 
called Sham as the Hamrähän organ. The party gradually 
disintegrated. In later years Fatih wrote a Marxist 
interpretation of the history of Iranian oil-Panjäh sal 
Naft-i Iran ( Fifty years of Iranian Oil). 
Hizb-i Iran-i Javän (The Young Iran Party) was founded 
around 1? 30 and was originally an association of friends. 
It was headed by Dr. 
¶Ali Akbar Siyasi, the Minister of 
Education, and was supported mainly by graduates of the 
Faculty of Law of Tihrän University. Suhaill, the Prime 
Minister, had connections with this group, if he was not 
an actual member. Dr. Musharaf Nafisi 'as an official party 
candidate. This party had about 150 members, with ten 
candidates. 
Hizb-i Mihan Parastän (The Patriots Party) was alleged 
53 
to be subsidized by the Shah. Its leader was Muhammad AlI 
. 
Jalal1, the editor of the paper bearing the Party's name, 
but an engineer named Khalili was also mentioned as its 
leader. 
gAbbäs Mas üdi was the official candidate of this party. 
Its membership was insignificant. 
53" British Legation to FO, Aug-7,1943. FO 371/35074. 
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Iiizb-i 'Adälät (The Justice Party. )'s leading figure was 
the Deputy All Dashti, a nationalist with an inclination to 
the Right. In his earlier years, he edited the paper 
Shafaq-i Surkh, and in later years he wrote many excellent 
books, among which his "Dami bä. Khayyäm" (In search of Omar 
Kahayyam) has been translated into English. 
54 
The sole 
purpose of the Party was to serve Dashtl's own ambitions 
and those of his friends. The Party was said to number about 
four hundred, and among the adherents were Jamal Irnämi ( the 
son of the Tihrän Imam Jum'a), Abulgäsim Amin!, Ibrähim jaja 
Nüri, and Dr. Jamshid A 
clam. 
The leader of the Hizb-i Ittihadi-i Milli (National 
Union Party) was known to be Bayät, who was appointed as 
Minister of Finance in the place of Allahyär Salih. Among 
prominent members were the Deputies Dr. Malikzäda, Hashimi, and 
Mirat Isfandiyäri. Others included Farajulläh Bahrämi (Dabir 
A zam), Dr. Khal 'atbari, and Dr. Sajjädi. The party numbered 
about six hundred members, and had some influence in the 
Thirteenth ifajlis, but apparently little aim other than 
place-seeking for the new one. 
The Milliyün was a small group of some sixty officials, 
doctors, and businessmen, supporting the candidature of Dr. 
Nasrullah Vaziri. 
54, Translated by L. P. Elwe, 3. l-Sutton. The other books of Dashti 
on Iranian classic literature are TZalamruv-i Satdi, and 
Nagshi az Hafiz. 
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The Ra'd (Thunder) and Vatan (Fatherland), were both 
led by Muzaffar Firüz, and carried out propaganda for 
Sayyid Z3jä who was elected from Yazd. 
The Yärän (Friends) was a small group headed by iihallil, 
the editor of the Igdäm. Sayyid Zia was also supported by 
this group. 
The Ta6Rvun (co-operation) was also a small group of 
friends with a small membership, not exceeding four hundred. 
The leading figures of this group were the Deputy Niqübat, 
and Dr. 'Abduh of the Ministry of Justice, both of whom were 
elected from Khurramshahr and Tihrän respectively. 
The Paikär (Combat) was an anti- Ally party with a small 
membership. The leading figure of this party was Khusrau Igbnl, 
a lawyer, who in June 1943 joined the paper Iran-i 111. Ile 
fornmerley published another paper called Nabard. This party 
supported the candidature of Igbäl, who was never elected. 
A party with the same name was active in Mashhad which 
opposed the Tuda Party there. It is not known whether thoro 
was a connection between them. 
The Istigläl (Independence)'s membership was very small. 
It was led by`Abdulgadir . iäd, the editor of the paper of tho 
same name. 
The Physicians' Association was a group of doctors, wtio 
supported the candidature of Dr. 
Xshtiyäni, a son-in-law of 
Vusizq-al-Dau1a, who was not, however, elected. 
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The candidates of the Chamber of Commerce (Utäq-i 
BazarganI) and industrialist interests campaigned individually. 
Äli Vakili, the president of the chamber, Nikpür, Kahbud 
Isfandiyäri, Kharäzi, Bätmangilij, Shahäb Khusravani, and 
Muhammad Khusraushahi were active candidates of this category. 
A number of pro-German personalities were active in 
electoral campaign. The group centred around Dr. Matin Daftarl 
and Sayyid Abulgasim Käshant, 
55the 
latter of whom was elected 
to the Majlis but because of his arrest by the British ho 
could not take his seat. Matin Daftari did not represent any 
political party, but enjoyed the support of influential 
families such as his father-in-law, Dr. Musaddiq, and Dr. Kiya, 
some members of the Law Faculty and of the Ministry of Justico, 
and certain wealthy merchants. He did not, however, stand for 
the elections. 
The Shi h was anxious to see young progressive individuals 
in the Majlis. In line with this policy, a group called Iran-i 
Nau was formed and headed by Misbahzada, the Director of the 
Press and Propaganda Department and the owner of the Kaihün. 
Misbahzada was a friend of the Shah, and was active in 
40 0 
conjunction with Husain Fardust, an officer at the Court and 
a close friend of the Shäh. 
S6The 
candidates of this group 
were'Abbas Mas`udi 
(also of the Mihan Parastän), and Rahnamä. 
55. British Legation to FO, August 7,1943-op. cit. 
56. Ibid. p. 107. 
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The group numbered about three hundred and carried out 
propaganda chiefly among the younger generation, including 
University members. 
The Hizb-i Nihzat-i Milli (National Movement) had 
emerged in Isfahän with the backing of the industrialist 
opposed to the local Tuda union. The formation was often 
imputed to the Shah, and the Misbahzada was also actively 
concerned in this party. Its organ was the ZzRdigFtn 
(Free Men). 
In Tabriz, the Ilizb-i Iran-i Bidär whose activities 
were explained in the previous chapter, the Tüda branch, 
the Azädikhähan, the Labour Union were active during the 
elections. The Azädikhäh n was a liberal party led by the 
old agitator, 
0Ali Asrhar Sartipzäda, who for a brief period 
was, or claimed to be the leader of the Tüda branch in Tabriz 
until displaced by Amir Khizi. Born in Tabriz about 1884, 
Satipzäda was a friend and supporter of Tagizäda during the 
Constitutional Revolution. His reputation in those days was 
that of a fire-eating revolutionary, a member of the Democrat 
Party. In the days of Riza Shah, he was one of the Tabriz 
malcontent and opposed the Shah; he became known for his 
sympathy with the Russians', and though he was never imprisoned 
he was always under some kind of surveillance from the police. 
When Rizä Shah abdicated it was thought that the Soviets would 
reward Sartipzada for his pro-Soviet leanings, but then it 
appeared that he was more of a nationalist than a pro-Soviet, 
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and the Russians were offended. He had the support of the 
paper Sahand, whose editor, Habib Agazada, was still a fugitivo 
in Tihrän, having been markedly pro-German. The paper appoarod 
then to advocate democracy. 
57 
The labour union of Tabriz was led by Mutallib Latifi. 
There was a strong Caucasian tinge about this group. They 
seemed to be supporting Russian nominees. 
58 
A detailed study of the political parties during the 
election period is beyond the scope of this study. The abovo 
account seemed essential in order to present the situation 
of the elections at their inception, with those startor 
parties and groups. During the campaign many more cropped up. 
By the end of the elctions in 1944, the number of parties 
had reached to forty-two. 
59 
It seemed that this confusing 
and complicated post-ßiza Shah electoral picture 
- would create a 
Majlis filled with, as the British Logation 
commented, " the loud-voiced, the self-seeking, and the 
plausible". 
6o 
Apart from the political parties, the Court, Government, 
local magnates, and the Allies were all active in influencing 
the elections. But they were only partially successful in that, 
57- British Legation to F0, (Tabriz Diary), May 27,1944. 
E 3219/94/34, FO 371/40178. 
58. Bullard to F0, August 13,1943. E 4766/38/34, F0 371/350759 
59" For the list of political parties, groups, and Trade 
Unions see Appendix Four. Three articles by Machalski, 
Elwell-Sutton, and D'Erme, op_cit. discuss Iran's 
political parties between 19k1and 3.947- 
60. British Legation to F0, August 7,1943. op. cit. 
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and none could gain overall control over the results. For 
instance, Suhaili and his Interior Minister Tadayyun, could 
only manipulate the votes coming out from the ballot boxes. 
61 
Foreign interference, particularly from the Russians, 
appeared to have been of little effect, as Bullard remarked 
in November 1943 "The bogy of Russian intervention in the 
elections in the north has proved to be very small one". 
62 
Even the Russians acquiesced in the election of Abulgäsim 
Amin-, a member of a wealthy family, from Rasht, who when in 
Government service was known to be guilty of peculation, 
and whose paper UmId published severe criticism of Dr. 
Millspaugh., In Saräb too, the Russians did not prevent the 
election of the wealthy landowner, Prince Muhammad Val! 
FarmanfarmDiyän, who was elected almost unanimously despite 
the intense campaign of his rival, a Russian nominee. Finally, 
The Foreign Office commented: "it is interesting that, in spite 
of all forebodings and the Cassandra-like prophecies of the 
Americans, the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, and a host of others, 
the Russians.. have exerted little influence in the voting in 
their zone". 
6_1 
61. For a detailed account of the interference of Suhaili 
and Tadayyun in the elections see Muzakirat-i Majlis, 
Daura-yi Chah7ardahum, l0 Farvardin 1323 (March 30,1944). 
Farrukh accused Suhaili and'Tadayýrun of "partibazi" 
(nepotism) in the elections; "I `lam-i jurm bar`Alaih-i 
Suhaili va Tadayyun", in Kai Ustuvän, Siyasat-i Muväzana 
-yi Manfl, vol. I, pp. 371-404. 
62. Bullard to Eden, Confidential, No. 462, Nov. 23,1943. 
E 7569/239/34, FO 371/35117- 
63- Minute on Bullard. Ibid. 
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Nonetheless, the Shah was not satisfied with the results. 
He had planned to have the elections annulled and fresh 
elections conducted under a new Prime Minister. He revealed 
his plan to Bullard: 
"He spoke of the large sums spent on 
voting and interference by officials 
and by the Russians. I said that this was 
true but perhaps inevitable at Persia's 
stage of political development and the 
only alternative was probably a Majlis 
filled almost entirely with local 
landowners. I asked the Shah whether 
he thought that a Majlis elected 
as he proposed would differ greatly 
from the one now being elected. His 
reply was that at least the new deputies 
would be representative of the people. 
I fear that what the Shah wants is not 
better but subservient deputies. We have 
an example of this at Bandar Abbas where 
he is trying to force on the electors 
a particularly unpleasant supporter of 
his from outside at the expenses of a 
local candidate. There is good reason 
to think that the Shah is almost 
hysterically afraid of Seyed Zia and would 
go to great lengths to exclude him from 
the Majlis but naturally he did not say 
this to me". 64 
The paragon, who would have been designated as Prime 
Minister to carry out the fresh elections, was Dr. Musaddiq, 
who could claim respect for having opposed Riza Shäh and was 
at the head of the poll in Tihrän as the most popular 
candidate. Bullard did not approve the plan, but left the 
64, Bullard to FO, No. 71, Jan. 20,1944. 
E 493/189/34, Fo 371/40186. 
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decision to the Shah. At any rate, the British Minister 
apparently saw some disadvantage if Musaddiq were to become 
Prime Minister in that he was "touchy and nationalistic". 
65 
Musaddiq is often painted in the west as being a demagogue, 
. 
narrow-minded, a wind bag, xenophobic aristocrat, whereas 
in actual fact, his principles of political liberalism, 
parliamentarism, and anti-militarism were more compatible 
with those of the educated middle class of the West than of 
the conservative landowning oligarchy. 
The £häh eventually abandoned his plan and agreed to 
the opening of the Majlis. His change of plan was partly due 
to Dr. Musaddiq's terms, who wanted to hold a referendum in 
order to secure the authority to amend the electoral law, and 
the Shah was against this. The Foreign Office seemed relieved 
that the Shah had dropped his plan. 
66 
They probably knew that 
they would have been blamed, if the Shah had gone on with his 
plan. In accordance with the established Iranian tradition, 
anything of this nature would be automatically attributed to 
British policy. 
The Fourteenth Majlis was inaugurated on February 26, 
1944. Its composition was predictably different from the 
previous one. The landowners were still the dominant force, 
65. Ibid. 
66. FO to Tihrän, Jan. 23,1944. E 506/189/34, FO 371/40386. 
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composing almost fifty per cent of the members, but not 
necessarily united. The remaining percentage had been 
divided as follows: those who had been engaged in politics 
23 per cent, in Law, journalism, and politics 13 percent, 
from commerce and industry 11 percent. The clergy represented 
only 3 per cent. 
67 
V 
To everybody's, and probably to his own surprise, 
Suhaili survived through 1943. This was because he promised 
everything to everybody. He successfully overcame the crises 
over the budgeting of the army, and the problem of the press. 
As to the former, the Shah, as noted earlier, wished to create 
a larger army with 108000 personnel. Given the coup de grace 
by Millspaugh, Suhaill proposed to reduce the budget of the 
army by cutting down the personnel from 65000 to 30000. After 
a lengthy argument, the figure was set at 86,000 by General Ridley, 
the head of the American military mission. 
1 . 0- The question of army and tax were always intermingled. 
Millspaugh's success in collecting taxes during the Rizä Shah 
regime was directly due to the orderly and subservient society 
which existed under the shadow of the army. But the Shäh's 
67, The figures shown above are based on my own research. 
The criterion has been the-main or known occupation of 
the deputies, though some practised several jobs. For 
a different interpretation see Zahra Shajiri, 
Namäyandigän-i Majlis-i Shurayyi Milli dar Dist-u-yik 
Daura-Xi Qanunguzäri, pp. 180-267. Also see James Bill, 
The Politics of Iran pp. 120-6. For an analytical list of the 
Majlis Deputies of the Fourteenth Majlis see Appendix 
Four. p. 603. 
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dislike of the stringency imposed by Milispaugh against the 
army was interpreted by Dreyfus in a different way: "the Shah 
is averse to Millspaugh's curtailment of army budget because 
this threatens his control of army on which his hopes of 
maintaining himself are based". 
68 
Having experienced the unpleasant effect of the suppression 
of the press, Suhaili was reluctant to ban the papers, which 
attacked Riza Shah and called some personalities "the 
treacherous agents of the dictatorship ( Ummal-i Khä in-i 
diktaturi). At last, under pressure from the Court, Suhaili 
suppressed several papers which had overstepped the mark in 
their criticism of royalty. To oppose undemocratic deeds by 
the Government, and to fight despotism, fourteen newspapers, 
mostly of the Left, banded themselves into what they called 
a Freedom Front (Jibha-yi Xzädl) in July 1943.69 The main force 
behind this front was the Tuda Party. It was also alleged that 
the formation of the front had been instigated by Qaväm. 
In October, Suhaili tried to secure British and Russian 
consent to withdrawing their troops from Iran even before the 
end of the war. The Government argued that the situation in 
the country had changed; Iran had expelled all the Germans, 
declared war on Germany, and become a member of the United Natio ns. 
70 
68. Dreyfus to SOS,.,. April 14,1943. US. F. R., vol. IV. 1943. p. 522. 
69. For the text of the manifesto of the Front see Damävand, 
2 Murdäd, 1322 (July 24,1943)- 
70- Memorandum of conversation by the Adviser on Political 
Relations (Murray), Nov. 4,1943. US. F. R., vol. IV, 1943, pp. 405-6. 
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This request was only overlooked by the concerned parties. 
But it seemed that the Shah did not aspire to the withdrawal 
of the foreign troops at too early a date; 
71 
a desire totally 
in contrast with the expressed wishes of the Government. 
The American Charge d'Affaires interpreted it thus; "it may 
indicate a fear on the Shah's part that there would be danger 
of revolution if Iran were left to its own devices at this 
moment". 
72 
Before the Government's request for troop withdrawal, 
Ahi, the Ambassador in Moscow, had called on the Soviet 
authorities to express the opinion that Iran was entitled, -., 
by the terms of the Tripartite Treaty, to be represented at 
the Moscow Conference, but had been told that no decision 
regarding Iran would be taken by the Conference. 
73 
True, the 
Conference did not take any decision but proposed that a 
Tripartite Declaration should be made at Tihrän at the 
conclusion of the Tihran Conference on December 1,1943.74 
The declaration, which was made in Tihrän, assured the Iranian 
Government of the Allies' "consideration" of economic 
assistance to Iran "at the close of hostilities". It pledged 
Iran's independence: "The Governments of the United States 
of America, the U:. S. S. R., and the United Kingdom are at one 
71. The Charge in Iran(Ford) to the SOS. Nove 10,19L3. Ibid, p. L08. 
72. Ibid. 
73" George V. Allen, Member of the American Delegation to the 
Tripartite Conference of Foreign Ministers, to SOS, Nov. 4, 
1943. Ibid, p. 401. 
74. For the full account of the Moscow Conference and 
negotiations concerning the Tihran Declaration see, 
Ibid, PP. 400-5. 
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with the Government of Iran in their desire for the 
maintenance of the independence, sovereignty, and territorial 
integrity of Iran , 075 
The Declaration was received by the Iranian Government 
and the press with much enthusiasm. Its significance was that 
the United States had, for the first time, publicly and 
formally, declared its interest in the welfare and independence 
of Iran, and that the Soviet Union and Britain had renewed 
their old pledges to respect Iran's integrity and sovereignty. 
But the Russians soon lifted, though prematurely, the veil 
when the controversial Iranian problem, once more, appeared - 
oil concession. 
t 
75" For the account of the Tihrä, n Conference and the text 
of the declaration see A. H. Hamzavi, "Iran and the Tehran 
Conference", pp. 192-203. Ramazani, Iran's Foreign Policy , 
op. cit., pp. 62-69. For documents concerning the conference 
and the declaration see US. F. R., The Conferences at Cairo 
and Tehran, 191+3, index: Declaration on Iran, p. 904 
